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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and game the-
ory, unified by their focus on the effects of pre-play communication on equilibrium
outcomes.
Communication is fundamental to elections. Chapter 2 extends canonical voter
turnout models, where citizens, divided into two competing parties, choose between
costly voting and abstaining, to include any form of communication, and charac-
terizes the resulting set of Aumann’s correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous
research, high-turnout equilibria exist in large electorates and uncertain environ-
ments. This difference arises because communication can coordinate behavior in
such a way that citizens find it incentive compatible to follow their correlated signals
to vote more. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of the
minority for a wide range of positive voting costs.
In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilib-
rium, which fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium, extending the
latter to multiple mediators. Subcommunication equilibrium similarly extends com-
munication equilibrium for incomplete information games. I explore the properties of
these solutions and establish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication
equilibria and Myerson’s quasi-principals’ equilibria. I characterize an upper bound
on expected turnout supported by subcorrelated equilibrium in the turnout game.
Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect of com-
vii
munication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting occurs,
subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through computers.
We study three communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public
Communication, where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and
Party Communication, where messages are exchanged only within one’s own party.
Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form of communication
and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communication increases turnout,
while public communication decreases turnout. The data are consistent with cor-
related equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public communication increases
turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support for the standard Nash
equilibrium turnout predictions.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis I address several research questions from the broad areas of political
economy and game theory. How can communication between competing groups of
economic agents help coordinate their actions? More specifically, how does commu-
nication among voters affect turnout? To gain a better understanding of the main
principles of group coordination under communication, I develop a generalization
of Aumann’s correlated equilibrium, and apply it to the canonical model of voter
turnout. I explore this topic in three chapters.
In Chapter 2 I seek a rational solution to the renowned turnout paradox. Canonical
voter turnout models, where citizens supporting two competing parties rationally
and independently choose between costly voting and abstaining, based on how likely
they are to be pivotal to the election outcome, provide unsatisfactory explanations –
predicting turnout rates close to zero. In an apparent contradiction to this prediction,
large election turnout rates are markedly higher. I re-examine these results in the
2presence of unrestricted pre-play communication, and characterize the resulting set
of correlated equilibria. In contrast to previous research, high-turnout equilibria
exist in large electorates and uncertain environments. This difference arises because
communication can be used to coordinate behavior in such a way that voters find it
incentive compatible to always follow their signals past the communication stage, and
vote more as a result. The equilibria have expected turnout of at least twice the size of
the minority for a wide range of positive voting costs, and show intuitive comparative
statics on turnout: it varies with the relative sizes of different groups, and decreases
with the cost of voting. This research provides a general micro-foundation for group-
based theories of voter mobilization, or voting driven by communication on a network.
In Chapter 3 I introduce a new equilibrium concept, called subcorrelated equilibrium,
which extends Aumann’s correlated equilibrium to the case of multiple mediators and
fills the gap between Nash and correlated equilibrium. Subcommunication equilib-
rium similarly extends communication equilibrium for incomplete information games.
I explore the general properties of these solution concepts. In particular, I estab-
lish an equivalence between a subset of subcommunication equilibria and Myerson’s
quasi-principals’ equilibria. I apply subcorrelated equilibrium to the analysis of voter
turnout games, where voters preferring one of the two competing parties can corre-
late their strategies within, but not across, their parties, and characterize an upper
bound on expected turnout that can be supported by a subcorrelated equilibrium.
Chapter 4, co-authored with Thomas Palfrey, reports a new study of the effect
of communication on voter turnout using a laboratory experiment. Before voting
3occurs, subjects may engage in various kinds of pre-play communication through
computers. Theoretically, pre-play communication in a voter turnout game admits
equilibria with higher total turnout, as compared with no communication, by induc-
ing correlation between voters’ turnout decisions. Experimentally, we study three
communication treatments: No Communication, a control; Public Communication,
where voters exchange public messages with all other voters, and Party Communi-
cation, where messages are exchanged only within one’s own party. We also vary the
common voting cost and the relative party sizes, generating additional comparative
static predictions. Our results point to a strong interaction effect between the form
of communication and the voting cost. With a low voting cost, party communica-
tion increases turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. The data are
consistent with the correlated equilibrium play. With a high voting cost, public com-
munication increases turnout. With communication, we find essentially no support
for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.
Subcorrelated and subcommunication equilibria developed in this thesis have many
applications beyond the turnout games. The particular interesting ones left for fu-
ture research include models of strategic network formation and endogenous party
government.
4Chapter 2
Correlated Equilibria in Voter
Turnout Games
What drives voter turnout is a fundamental question in political economy. Canonical
models, which rely on voters rationally and independently deciding whether to turn
out based on how likely they are to be pivotal to the election outcomes, provide
unsatisfactory explanations (Downs (1957), Riker and Ordeshook (1968), Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1985), Myerson (2000)). In particular, these models fail to rationalize
the high turnout rates observed in very large elections. Intuitively, as the electorate
grows large, the probability that any individual voter is pivotal goes to zero, so with
voting incurring a cost, very few people should turn out. This flaw has led many
scholars to seek alternative, behavioral explanations.1
This study re-examines these results in the presence of communication, broadly de-
fined – between candidates, media, and voters – and shows that this can support
1See, e.g., Feddersen and Sandroni (2006), Bendor et al. (2011), Ali and Lin (2013).
5high turnout in large elections while maintaining the assumption that voters’ incen-
tives are purely instrumental. The key difference is that communication allows for
strategies such that equilibrium behavior is still optimal for each individual voter,
but such that voters’ turnout decisions are now correlated, rather than independent
as in the standard game-theoretic analysis. That is, communication allows us to ex-
amine correlated equilibria (Aumann, 1974, 1987). These equilibria are behaviorally
more plausible than Nash since they model voters’ knowledge of the other voters’
equilibrium strategies as a result of communication and learning, and so can apply
to electorates with less than fully informed voters, like the U.S. (Bartels, 1996).
As suggested above, the forms of communication allowed in the model are very
general. The only necessary condition is that the communication results in some
amount of correlation in voters’ decisions. As such, the model provides a very rich
space in which communication can be from a few senders to many receivers – as
it would be with the media or parties communicating with voters – or between a
very large number of senders and receivers. In this sense, the model can provide a
micro-foundation for group-based voter mobilization: as mobilization efforts induce
correlation in decisions, they provide a mechanism for turnout that does not rely on
group-based utilities or coercion (Uhlaner (1989), Schram and van Winden (1991),
Cox (1999)). Moreover, as correlation could be induced by any signal – even signals
like weather, which would not be thought of as having political content – the model
incorporates mechanisms that would not play any role in standard rational choice
explanations.2
2See Gomez, Hansford, and Krause (2007) who demonstrate not only that the bad weather on
6The intuition underlying the highest-turnout correlated equilibrium is straightfor-
ward. To see this, suppose there are two parties, A and B, who compete in an
election decided by majority rule. Citizens (potential voters) are not indifferent be-
tween the parties, so there are nA citizens that support party A and nB < nA citizens
that support party B. Each citizen decides to vote based only on the tradeoff be-
tween her potential effect on the election outcome and the cost of voting. A voter
will only affect the outcome when pivotal, that is, when her vote would change the
election from her least favored party winning to a tie, or from a tie to her most
favored party winning. As in standard models, in any equilibrium, the probability
that a voter is pivotal, multiplied by the benefit she gets from changing the outcome
of the election, must be greater than or equal to the cost of voting. Thus turnout is
highest when the election results in a tie, either directly or in expectation.
Without communication, citizens will make turnout decisions independently. The
largest tie would require all of minority citizens (nB citizens), and the exact same
number of majority citizens (nB out of nA citizens) to participate. In such a case,
every recruited citizen would be pivotal with the same probability, and so, as long
as it is high enough, would have incentives to turn out as required by this strategy.
But the remaining nA − nB majority citizens would deviate by also turning out, so
this is not an equilibrium. In fact, except for few very special cases, there are no
equilibria where all citizens use pure strategies.
With communication, however, turnout decisions can be correlated. The party sup-
the election day decreases turnout, but also that it affects Democrats and Republicans differently.
7ported by the minority of the citizens signals all of its supporters to vote. The
party with the majority support uses a more complicated communication protocol.
In some fraction of elections, p, the majority party creates a pivotal situation by
sending a signal to vote to nB of its supporters and no signal to the rest of majority
citizens. In the remaining fraction of elections, the majority party sends to all of
its supporters a signal to vote with probability nB
nA
, and no signal with probability
1− nB
nA
. Therefore, each minority citizen will be pivotal with probability p. As long
as p is high enough, all minority citizens will find it in their interest to turn out
and vote. On the other hand, the majority citizens, based on the signal from their
party, will not know for sure whether or not they are in the pivotal situation. For
the value of p corresponding to the correlated equilibrium, majority citizens will also
find it in their interest to follow the signal of their party, and to avoid the cost of
voting by abstaining if they receive no signal. It is easy to see that in this correlated
equilibrium the expected turnout will be quite high: twice the size of the minority.
If the minority is large enough, voter turnout could thus be close to 100%.
The upper bound on turnout of twice the size of the minority, highlighted in the
example above, is sometimes closely approached by the actual elections. To take a
recent high profile elections, the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence gathered
1,617,989 votes in favor of independence.3 Internet, telephone, and face-to-face opin-
ion polls, averaged over the last two months before the referendum day indicated
that about 42.07% of Scots supported independence, which translates into about
3Source: www.bbc.com/news/events/scotland-decides/results
81,802,023 citizens.4 Assuming that polls more or less perfectly revealed the major-
ity and minority supports, this means that nearly 90% of minority citizens turned
out, which is close to the full minority turnout in the example. Moreover, the total
turnout was 3,619,915 citizens, which is almost exactly twice the size of the minority
(up to a third decimal point).
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. Subsection 2.0.1 provides a
literature overview. Section 3.1 describes the basic model, which assumes complete
information and homogenous voting costs. Subsections 2.1.1.1 and 2.1.1.2 present
and discuss the main results for this case. Subsection 2.1.1.3 presents efficiency
analysis for the basic model. Section 2.2 extends the basic model to the case of het-
erogeneous voting costs and shows that the main results continue to hold. Section 2.3
explores the effects of private information about voting costs. Section 2.4 discusses
how our results extend the related findings in the existing literature. Section 3.3
concludes.
2.0.1 Related literature
This study directly relates to two strands of the voluminous literature on formal
models of turnout. One is the pivotal voter model, in particular, Palfrey and Rosen-
thal (1983, 1985). The other is group-based models that build upon the pivotal
voter analysis, e.g. Morton (1991). Our model combines these approaches, and so
contributes to the literatures on the turnout paradox and voter mobilization.
4Source: whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/should-scotland-be-an-independent-country-1
9The turnout paradox, that is, the unsupportable rational choice prediction of turnout
rate close to zero in large elections, was first formulated by Downs (1957) in the
context of a decision theoretic voting model, which was extended later by Tullock
(1967) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968). It would be impossible to mention here all
the relevant papers that have been published on the topic since those early studies,
so we have to restrict ourselves to the most closely related works. We refer the reader
to Feddersen (2004) and Geys (2006) for very well-written recent literature surveys.
See also Palfrey (2013) for a recent survey of laboratory experiments in political
economy, including experiments testing different theories of turnout (Ibid., Section
4).
The pivotal voter model of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) argues that voters’ deci-
sions to turn out are strategic, so the probability of being pivotal must be determined
endogenously in equilibrium. Under complete information and common voting cost,
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) found several classes of high-turnout Nash equilibria.
Under incomplete information about voting costs, though, Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1985) showed that non-zero turnout rate in large elections is not sustainable in the
(quasi-symmetric) Bayesian Nash equilibrium: only voters with non-positive voting
costs will vote in the limit as the majority and minority groups get large. Myer-
son (1998, 2000) introduced a very general approach to the analysis of large games
with population uncertainty. However his “independent actions” assumption, which
results in the number of players being a Poisson random variable, does not allow
correlation between players’ strategies. Barelli and Duggan (2013) prove existence
of a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium in games with correlated types and
10
interdependent payoffs. Their Example 2.4, an application of their main purifica-
tion theorem, is a more general version of the costly voting game under incomplete
information than the one we consider in Section 2.3. Unlike them, we study the
strategic form incomplete information correlated equilibria of this game that differ
from Bayesian Nash equilibria with correlated types, and focus on characterizing the
bounds on expected turnout rather than equilibrium existence.
Although the pivotal voter model prediction about expected turnout fails under in-
complete information, the comparative static predictions are largely supported in
laboratory experiments: see, e.g. Levine and Palfrey (2007). More recent work
falling within this approach focused on welfare effects associated with turnout, com-
parison of mandatory and voluntary voting rules, and the effect of polls (e.g., Bo¨rgers
(2004), Goeree and Grosser (2007), Diermeier and Van Mieghem (2008), Krasa and
Polborn (2009), Taylor and Yildirim (2010)). Campbell (1999) finds that decisive
minorities (i.e., those with lower voting costs or with greater expected benefits) are
more likely to win in a quasi-symmetric equilibrium, even if their expected share
in the electorate is small. His main point of departure from Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1985) is introducing correlation between voter types (i.e., party preference) and vot-
ing cost. In this respect, he extends Ledyard (1984) who assumed that types and
costs are distributed independently.
Kalandrakis (2007, 2009) looks at general turnout games with complete information
and heterogeneous costs, and shows that almost all Nash equilibria of these games
are regular and robust to small amounts of incomplete information. These findings
11
can be compared to our results in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. Another closely related
paper is Myatt (2012), who investigates how adding aggregate uncertainty about
candidates’ popularity could be used to solve the turnout paradox. His main result
can be viewed as adding a modicum of correlation in an asymptotic approximation
of the high-turnout quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium characterized in Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1985) to rule out zero equilibrium turnout rate as the electorate grows
large. Similarly to those equilibria, it requires the common voting cost to be high
enough, and predicts a tie in the equilibrium. Myatt (2012, Proposition 2) shows
that the same logic can be applied to mixed-pure Nash equilibria, but characterizes
the expected turnout only for a special case of the candidates’ popularity density.
Our results allow for correlation directly in the solution concept.
There are other prominent approaches to modeling voter behavior that aim at solv-
ing the turnout paradox (e.g., the ethical voter model of Feddersen and Sandroni
(2006); see also the recent extensions by Evren (2012) and Ali and Lin (2013); or
adaptive learning models, e.g., Bendor et al. (2011); or models based on uncertainty
about candidates, e.g., Sanders (2001); or the quality of voters’ private signals, e.g.,
McMurray (2013)). While these and similar models highlight a number of important
aspects of voting in mass elections, they do not explicitly consider correlations in
voters’ actions. Our approach in this Chapter is different: we deliberately maintain
the stark rational choice setting to show that even in this case the high-turnout
equilibria can be supported once correlation among voters is accounted for.5
5The effects of communication on turnout may be also indirect. For example, Ortoleva and
Snowberg (2015) find, inter alia, that voter overconfidence, even conditional on ideology, increases
turnout. Communication among voters might be a possible way that overconfidence builds up in
12
Unlike the pivotal voter model, where the individual voter is a central unit of analysis,
group-based models operate at the level of groups of voters. An early example is
Becker (1983), who models competition among pressure groups for political influence
non-strategically as independent utility maximization by each group subject to a joint
budget constraint. Uhlaner (1989) emphasizes the role of groups in voting decisions,
but does not characterize the equilibrium of the model. Morton (1991) shows that
with fixed candidates’ positions, positive turnout can be obtained in equilibrium with
two groups, but in the general equilibrium framework, where candidates’ positions
can shift, the paradox prevails. Schram (1991) and Schram and van Winden (1991)
develop a model with two groups and opinion leaders in each group, who produce
social pressure on others to turn out. The individual voters are modeled as consumers
of social pressure. It is shown that it is optimal for the producers of social pressure
to do it, but to explain why consumers of social pressure would find it optimal to
follow the leaders a civic duty argument is used. Shachar and Nalebuff (1999) develop
a model of a pivotal leader, and structurally estimate it using voting data for U.S.
presidential elections. See Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), Cox (1999), and references
therein for an overview of empirical findings related to party mobilization models.
Overall, group-based models get around the turnout paradox by assuming the exis-
tence of a small number of group leaders who control voter mobilization decisions by
allocating resources or by means of social pressure. The exogenous mapping from
mobilization efforts to voter turnout is assumed. The micro-foundation for the con-
trol mechanism as well as the origins of group leaders are not usually modeled. In
the first place.
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our case, both of these mechanisms arise naturally as coordination mechanisms in
the form of pre-play communication among voters. Communication in turn induces
correlation among the voters’ strategies that can lead to surprisingly high turnout.
There is growing field and laboratory experimental evidence that communication
among voters, and between political activists and voters, taken in a wide variety of
forms (e.g., public opinion polls, get-out-the-vote campaigns, and so forth) critically
influences turnout rates. A book-length treatment of field experiments studying ef-
fects of get-out-the-vote campaigns on turnout is Gerber and Green (2008), and one
of influential earlier papers is Gerber and Green (2000). Gerber et al. (2011) show
that effects of TV advertising may be strong but short-lived. See also Lassen (2005)
on a related topic of voter information affecting turnout.6 Recently, DellaVigna
et al (2014) emphasize the social pressure aspect of turnout, also studied in Ger-
ber, Green, and Larimer (2008), while Barber and Imai (2014) show that even the
neighborhood composition itself may matter for turnout. A recent work by Sinclair
(2012) emphasizes the role of networks in political behavior, arguing that networks
not only provide information, but also directly influence citizens’ actions. See also
Rolfe (2012). This approach is complementary to our work: while we do not explic-
itly model social connections among voters, one can easily imagine how such network
links could serve as channels of pre-play communication.
Laboratory experiments include, e.g., Grosser and Schram (2006), who study the
effects of communication in the form of neighborhood information exchange between
6McMurray (2012) notes that models that avoid the turnout paradox by introducing consumption
benefits, at the same time nullify the empirical relation between voter information and turnout.
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an early voter (sender) and a late voter (receiver) from the same neighborhood.
Grosser and Schram (2010), and Agranov et al. (2013) study the effects of polls on
turnout and welfare. In particular, Agranov et al. (2013) show that while polls do
not have negative welfare effects, they overestimate voter turnout. The authors also
find evidence for voting with the winner, where a voter is more likely to turn out if
she thinks her preferred candidate is more likely to win.
2.1 The Model
The set of voters is denoted N , with |N | = n ≥ 3. There are two candidates, A and
B. The decision making rule is simple majority with ties broken randomly. Each
player i ∈ N has type7 ti ∈ {A,B} representing her political preference: if ti = A
then i prefers candidate A to candidate B, if ti = B then the preference is reversed.
Denote by NA, with |NA| = nA, the group of voters who prefer candidate A, and
NB, with |NB| = nB, the group preferring candidate B. Throughout the Chapter
we assume that nA > nB, and will refer to NA and NB as majority and minority,
respectively. Thus in the usual parlance, candidate A is the favorite, while candidate
B is the underdog.
Each voter has two pure actions: to vote for the preferred candidate (action 1) or
abstain (action 0).8 Thus i’s action space is Si = {0, 1}. The set of voting profiles is
7We do not explicitly include i’s private voting cost in her type for convenience reasons and
always refer to i’s voting costs separately.
8Voting for a less preferred candidate is always dominated, and can be dispensed with.
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S = S1×· · ·×Sn, i.e. S = {(si)i∈N |si ∈ {0, 1}}. Voting is costly, and utility of voting
net of voting cost is normalized to 1 if the preferred candidate wins, 1/2, if there is a
tie, and 0 otherwise. Instead of explicitly modeling candidates as players of this game,
we use a representation with a centralized mediator giving out recommendations to
voters, who either maximizes or minimizes total expected turnout. As will be clear
from Proposition 1, our main result, this does not matter for the empirically relevant
case of the large minority with nB >
1
2
nA. In Chapter 4 we analyze the general case
where this representation matters.
2.1.1 Complete information and homogenous voting costs
In this section we assume that NA and NB are commonly known. Furthermore,
assume that the participation cost is the same for all voters and fixed at c ∈ (0, 1/2).9
In a more general case with heterogeneous costs, considered in Section 2.2, we discuss
how one could allow some voters, e.g., those who view voting as a social duty, to
have negative voting costs. In the case of a negative common cost, however, letting
c < 0 results in a trivial equilibrium with everybody voting, so for the rest of this
section we only consider non-negative values of c.
Definition 1. A correlated equilibrium is a probability distribution10 µ ∈ ∆(S) such
9If c ≥ 12 (c ≤ 0), the problem is trivial, with abstaining (voting) being everyone’s dominant
strategy.
10Aumann (1987) calls this object a correlated equilibrium distribution; this distinction is imma-
terial.
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that for all i ∈ N , for all si ∈ {0, 1}, and all s′i ∈ {0, 1}
∑
s−i∈S−i
µ(si, s−i) (Ui(si, s−i)− Ui(s′i, s−i)) ≥ 0 (2.1)
where Ui(si, s−i) is the utility of voter i at a strategy profile (si, s−i).
To get some intuition for this definition, assume for a moment that all joint strat-
egy profiles have a strictly positive probability, and divide both sides of (2.1) by
Prob(si) =
∑
s−i∈S−i µ(si, s−i). Since Prob(s−i|si) = µ(si, s−i)/Prob(si), correlated
equilibrium can be interpreted as a probability distribution over joint strategy profiles
where at every profile player i’s choice is a weak best response under the posterior
distribution conditional on that choice. Conditioning is used here to obtain the oth-
ers’ posteriors about player i’s choice, which must be correct in equilibrium. Notice
also that Nash equilibrium is a special case of correlated equilibrium, where µ is the
product of n independent probability distributions, each one over the correspond-
ing player’s action space. Thus Nash equilibrium rules out any correlation between
players’ actions.
Call (2.1) voter i’s incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. Since each player has
only two (pure) strategies, we only need to consider those inequalities in (2.1) where
s′i 6= si; thus for each of n players we will only need two inequalities making it 2n
inequalities in total (plus the feasibility constraints on µ). Denote D(NA, NB, c) the
set of solutions to such a system. Formally,
D(NA, NB, c) = {µ ∈ ∆(S)| for all i ∈ N, (2.1) holds} (2.2)
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D(NA, NB, c) is a convex compact set, and since any Nash equilibrium is a corre-
lated equilibrium, D(NA, NB, c) is also non-empty. It will be convenient to explicitly
rewrite (2.2) as the set of distributions µ ∈ ∆(S) such that ∀i ∈ N the following two
inequalities hold
∑
s−i∈S−i
µ(0, s−i) (Ui(0, s−i)− Ui(1, s−i)) ≥ 0 (2.3)∑
s−i∈S−i
µ(1, s−i) (Ui(1, s−i)− Ui(0, s−i)) ≥ 0 (2.4)
Substituting the expression for the voter’s utility with normalized benefit minus
voting cost, conditions (2.3)-(2.4) reduce to
c
∑
s−i∈V iD
µ(0, s−i) +
(
c− 1
2
) ∑
s−i∈V iP
µ(0, s−i) ≥ 0 (2.5)
−c
∑
s−i∈V iD
µ(1, s−i) +
(
1
2
− c
) ∑
s−i∈V iP
µ(1, s−i) ≥ 0 (2.6)
where for any i ∈ Nj, j ∈ {A,B}
V iP =
(sk)k∈N\{i}| ∑
k∈Nj\{i}
sk =
∑
k∈N−j
sk or
∑
k∈Nj\{i}
sk =
∑
k∈N−j
sk − 1
 (2.7)
V iD =
(sk)k∈N\{i}| ∑
k∈Nj\{i}
sk >
∑
k∈N−j
sk or
∑
k∈Nj\{i}
sk <
∑
k∈N−j
sk − 1
 (2.8)
are the sets of profiles where player i is pivotal, and not pivotal, respectively. In the
latter case, we call player i a dummy, hence the subscript.
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Conditions (2.5)-(2.6) have a simple interpretation. They say that in any corre-
lated equilibrium, unlike in the Nash equilibrium, for each player there are two
best response conditions: one, (2.6), is conditional on voting, and the other, (2.5),
conditional on abstaining. These conditions are equivalent to the following two re-
strictions:
c ≥ 1
2
Prob(i is pivotal | i abstains)
c ≤ 1
2
Prob(i is pivotal | i votes)
Thus, a correlated equilibrium in this game is given by a probability distribution over
joint voting profiles where at every profile each player finds it incentive compatible
to follow her prescribed choice conditional on this profile realization.
Out of many possible correlated equilibria, we focus on the boundaries of the set:
we study the equilibria that maximize (max-turnout) and minimize (min-turnout)
expected turnout. Formally, a max-turnout equilibrium solves the following linear
programming problem:
maximize f(µ) =
∑
s∈S
(
µ(s)
∑
i∈N
si
)
(2.9)
s.t. µ ∈ D(NA, NB, c)
for 0 < c < 1/2. Correspondingly, a min-turnout equilibrium solves
minimize f(µ) s.t. µ ∈ D(NA, NB, c) (2.10)
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A potential difficulty in deriving the analytical solution to these problems lies in the
2n incentive compatibility constraints (2.5)-(2.6) that must be simultaneously satis-
fied. Fortunately, it is possible to overcome this problem. The simplification comes
from the observation that for all correlated equilibria that maximize or minimize
turnout, there exists a “group-symmetric” probability distribution that delivers the
same expected turnout.
Let µ(zi, a, b) denote the probability of any joint profile where player i plays strategy
zi, and, among the other n− 1 players, a players turn out in group NA and b players
turn out in group NB. Define a set of group-symmetric probability distributions as
follows.
M = {µ ∈ D(NA, NB, c)|
∀i ∈ NA,∀a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1},∀b ∈ {0, . . . , nB} : µ(0i, a, b) = µ(1i, a− 1, b)
∀k ∈ NB,∀b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1}, ∀a ∈ {0, . . . , nA} : µ(0k, a, b) = µ(1k, a, b− 1)}
In words, the distributions inM place the same probability on all such profiles that
have the same number of players turning out from either side, and differ only by the
identity of those who turn out and those who abstain. Thus the identity of the voter
does not matter as long as the total number of this voter’s group votes is the same,
given the fixed number of votes on the other side.
Lemma 1. For any distribution µ∗ ∈ D(NA, NB, c) that solves problem (2.9) or
(2.10), there exists an equivalent group-symmetric probability distribution σ∗ that
also delivers a solution to the same problem. Formally, f(σ∗) = f(µ∗) and σ∗ ∈M.
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Proof. See 2.A.1. 
Lemma 1 allows a substantial simplification of the problem without any loss of gener-
ality, reducing 2n inequalities down to just four: two for a member of group NA and
two more for a member of group NB; and reducing the number of variables (unknown
profile probabilities) from the original 2n profiles down to (nA + 1)(nB + 1), which is
the maximal number of profiles with different probabilities under group-symmetric
distributions.
Before describing the general characterization of solutions to (2.9) and (2.10), we
walk through the simplest possible example with 3 voters, which serves to illustrate
both Lemma 1 and the main results of the Chapter.
Example 1. Suppose N = {1, 2, 3}. Let NA = {1, 2} and NB = {3}. There are
eight possible voting profiles: from (0, 0, 0) with no one voting to (1, 1, 1) with full
turnout. Denote (si, sj, sk) a strategy profile where i, j ∈ NA and k ∈ NB. Then for
each i ∈ NA,
Ui(si, s−i) =

1− sic if (si, sj, sk) ∈ {(0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 1)}
1
2
− sic if (si, sj, sk) ∈ {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1)}
0 if (si, sj, sk) = (0, 0, 1)
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Similarly, for k ∈ NB,
Uk(sk, s−k) =

1− c if (si, sj, sk) = (0, 0, 1)
1
2
− skc if (si, sj, sk) ∈ {(0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 1), (1, 0, 1)}
−skc if (si, sj, sk) ∈ {(0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (1, 1, 1)}
Denote µsisjsk = µ(si, sj, sk) to simplify notation. Now conditions (2.5)-(2.6) re-
duce to the following system of linear inequalities, where we also add the standard
probability requirements:
cµ010 +
(
c− 1
2
)
(µ000 + µ001 + µ011) ≥ 0 (2.11)
−cµ110 +
(
1
2
− c
)
(µ100 + µ101 + µ111) ≥ 0 (2.12)
cµ100 +
(
c− 1
2
)
(µ000 + µ001 + µ101) ≥ 0 (2.13)
−cµ110 +
(
1
2
− c
)
(µ010 + µ011 + µ111) ≥ 0 (2.14)
cµ110 +
(
c− 1
2
)
(µ000 + µ010 + µ100) ≥ 0 (2.15)
−cµ111 +
(
1
2
− c
)
(µ001 + µ011 + µ101) ≥ 0 (2.16)
∀s ∈ {0, 1}3 µs ≥ 0 (2.17)∑
s∈{0,1}3
µs = 1 (2.18)
The solutions have the following properties.11 In any correlated equilibrium the
11Recall that we restricted c to lie in (0,0.5). We can now provide the rationale behind this
assumption. If c > 0.5, the unique correlated equilibrium has µ000 = 1, i.e., no one votes. This
follows because once c > 12 , inequalities (2.12), (2.14), and (2.16) can only hold if µ100 = µ101 =
µ110 = µ111 = 0, µ010 = µ011 = 0, and µ001 = 0, which implies µ000 = 1. If c = 0.5, any probability
distribution with µ110 = 0 and µ111 = 0 is a correlated equilibrium: inequalities (2.12), (2.14), and
22
constraints can be rewritten as
1
2 − c
c
(µ000 + µ010 + µ100) ≤ µ110 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(µ111 + min {µ100 + µ101, µ010 + µ011})(2.19)
µ010 ≥
1
2 − c
c
(µ000 + µ001 + µ011) (2.20)
µ100 ≥
1
2 − c
c
(µ000 + µ001 + µ101) (2.21)
µ111 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(µ001 + µ011 + µ101) (2.22)∑
s∈{0,1}3
µs = 1 (2.23)
µ000, µ001, µ010, µ011, µ100, µ101, µ111 ∈ [0, 1), µ110 ∈ (0, 1) (2.24)
This system has many solutions, and µ000 < 1 implies that all have positive expected
turnout. Notice that in (2.20)-(2.22) the probabilities of profiles with more votes are
bounded from above by the probabilities of profiles with less votes, while in (2.19)
it is the other way round. These relations are important for the extreme correlated
equilibria, because they determine the constraints that bind at an optimum.
We next identify the max-turnout equilibria that solve the following linear program:
maximize
∑
s∈{0,1}3
(si + sj + sk)µsisjsk s.t. µ ∈ D(2, 1, c) (2.25)
A solution to (2.25) always exists since D(2, 1, c) 6= ∅. We will denote such a solution
µ∗. Since the objective function does not depend on µ000 ≥ 0, (2.23) implies that
(2.16) can only hold if µ110 = µ111 = 0, while all remaining inequalities are trivially satisfied. If
c = 0, then any probability distribution with µ000 = µ001 = µ011 = µ101 = µ010 = µ100 = 0 is a
correlated equilibrium; thus it is any mixture between µ111 and µ110.
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µ∗000 = 0. Using this fact and (2.23), we can rewrite the objective in (2.25) as
∑
s∈{0,1}3
(si + sj + sk)µsisjsk = 1 + (µ011 + µ101 + µ110) + 2µ111 (2.26)
We next show that at µ∗ the value of the objective function is 2 for any 0 < c < 0.5.
Lemma 1 implies that without loss of generality we can let µ010 = µ100 and µ011 =
µ101. Hence (2.20) and (2.21) reduce to the same constraint, and (2.19)-(2.23) imply
12
µ010 ≤ µ111 + µ011
µ010 ≥
1
2 − c
c
(µ001 + µ011)
µ111 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(µ001 + 2µ011)∑
s∈{0,1}3
µs = 1
where the first inequality follows from (2.19) with µ∗000 = 0. This implies
µ111 ≤ 2µ010 −
1
2
− c
c
µ001
Then in (2.26) the right hand side is at most 1 + (µ011 + µ101 + µ110 + µ010 + µ100 +
µ111)−
1
2
−c
c
µ001 = 2− µ0012c . Now we can see that to achieve the upper bound of two,
it is necessary to put µ∗001 = 0. Thus we let µ
∗
000 = µ
∗
001 = 0, and put µ
∗
111 = 2µ
∗
010.
12For the sake of brevity, we omit the non-negativity constraints on µ.
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Then constraints (2.19)-(2.23) reduce to
1
2 − c
c
2µ∗010 ≤ µ∗110 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(3µ∗010 + µ
∗
011) (2.27)
µ∗010 ≥
1
2 − c
c
µ∗011 (2.28)
2µ∗010 ≤
1
2 − c
c
2µ∗011 (2.29)∑
s∈{0,1}3
µ∗s = 1 (2.30)
From the last two inequalities it follows that µ∗011 = µ
∗
101 =
c
1
2
−cµ
∗
010. Re-arranging,
1
2 − c
c
2µ∗010 ≤ µ∗110 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(
3 +
c
1
2 − c
)
µ∗010 (2.31)
µ∗011 =
c
1
2 − c
µ∗010 (2.32)
2µ∗011 + µ
∗
110 + 4µ
∗
010 = 1 (2.33)
Replacing µ∗110 = 1− 1−c1/2−c2µ∗010 from (2.33) and re-arranging, we obtain the following
system, which, if holds, delivers the value of two to the objective function:
µ∗000 = µ
∗
001 = 0
µ∗111 = 2µ
∗
010
µ∗011 =
c
1
2 − c
µ∗010
µ∗110 = 1− 2
1− c
1
2 − c
µ∗010
1
2 − c
c
2µ∗010 ≤ 1− 2
1− c
1
2 − c
µ∗010 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(
3 +
c
1
2 − c
)
µ∗010
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This system has at least one solution for all c ∈ (0, 0.5). In particular, we can put
µ∗000 = µ
∗
001 = 0
µ∗010 = µ
∗
100 = c(1− 2c)
µ∗111 = 2c(1− 2c)
µ∗011 = µ
∗
101 = 2c
2
µ∗110 = 4c
2 − 4c+ 1
One can verify that for this distribution, all original constraints hold, and the value
of the objective function is two. Hence for any cost 0 < c < 0.5, we can find a
correlated equilibrium with expected turnout being exactly two out of three voters,
i.e. twice the size of the minority. We will see shortly that this is a general property
of the max-turnout correlated equilibria.
2.1.1.1 Max-turnout equilibria
Let us now turn to the general case. Recall that we want to solve the following
problem for 0 < c < 1/2:
maximize f(µ) =
∑
s∈{0,1}n
(
µ(s)
∑
i∈N
si
)
(2.34)
s.t. µ ∈ D(NA, NB, c)
Let f ∗ ≡ f(µ∗) be the value of the objective at the optimum in (2.34). Our first
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main result is the analytic solution to the max-turnout problem for all costs in the
specified range.
Proposition 1. Suppose 0 < c < 0.5, nA, nB ≥ 1, and nA > nB. Then the follow-
ing13 holds:
(i) if nB ≥ d12nAe, then f ∗ = 2nB;
(ii) if nB < d12nAe, then
f ∗ = 2nB +
(nA − 2nB) (1− 2c)
1 + 2c
(
nA(nA−1)
nA+nB(nA−1) − 1
) = 2nB + φ(c),
where φ(c) ∈ (0, nA− 2nB) and is decreasing in c. Alternatively, f ∗ can be expressed
as
f ∗ = nA × 2cnB(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
2c(nA − nB)(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c) = nA × ξ(c)
where ξ(c) is decreasing in c, and
a) ξ(c) ∈ (0, 1) for all 0 < c < 1
2
;
b) ξ(c)→ 2nB
nA
as c→ 1
2
, so f ∗ → 2nB;
c) ξ(c)→ 1 as c→ 0, so f ∗ → nA.
Remark 1. The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix 2.A.2. Lemma 1 is funda-
mental in proving this result, allowing to establish the optimum and characterize the
max-turnout equilibrium support under a group-symmetric distribution (see Corol-
13In terms of notation, dxe stands for the smallest integer not less than x.
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lary 1 below). The intuition for the result is as follows. To maximize turnout, the
largest probability mass must be placed on the voting profile where everyone votes.
However, since nA > nB, the voting players from NB are not pivotal at this profile,
so for those players constraint (2.6) binds at the optimum. This implies that con-
straint (2.5) for abstaining players in NA binds at the optimum, because from (2.6)
for players in NB binding, the probability of the largest profile can be expressed via
the probabilities of profiles where the voting players from NB are pivotal, and those
are precisely the profiles where abstaining players from NA are pivotal. The key dif-
ference between cases (i) and (ii) only concerns the behavior of constraint (2.5) for
players in NB and constraint (2.6) for players in NA. Using these binding constraints
and the total probability constraint allows us to get a constructive characterization
of the optimum.
Proposition 1 shows that all max-turnout correlated equilibria exhibit a substantial
turnout of at least 2nB for all common costs in the range where neither voting nor
abstention is a dominant strategy, and for groups of different sizes. Max-turnout
equilibria have a very natural interpretation: when the group sizes are so different
that the minority have a priori low chances of winning even when the majority group
votes at random (i.e., nB < d12nAe), the cost of voting matters and the maximal
expected turnout is decreasing in cost. When the group size difference is not that
large, the maximal expected turnout equals twice the size of the minority and does
not depend on cost, as if voting was costless.
In addition to the maximal expected turnout, we also characterize the support of
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the optimal group-symmetric distributions. Using Lemma 1, we can, without loss
of generality, describe the profiles in the support as (a, b) where a (b) is the total
number of voters from NA (NB, respectively) who turn out at this profile.
Corollary 1. A correlated equilibrium with maximal expected turnout can be imple-
mented via a group-symmetric distribution with the following support S˜ ⊂ S:
(i) if nB ≥ dnA+12 e, then
S˜ =
{
(a, nB) ∈ Z2|a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 2} ∪ {nB, . . . , nA}
}
;
(ii) if nB < d12nAe, then
S˜ =
{
(a+ 1, a) ∈ Z2|a ∈ {0, . . . , nB}
} ∪ {(nB, nB)} ∪ {(nA, 0)}
Proof. See 2.A.2. 
In words, when nB > d12nAe, the equilibrium support consists of everyone in the
minority voting except at the profile (nB − 1, nB), and the majority mixing between
all profiles. When nB < d12nAe, the support consists only of the profiles where the
minority has exactly one vote less than the majority, the largest tied profile, and a
single extreme profile with the full turnout by the majority and full abstention by
the minority, (nA, 0).
Group-symmetric distributions allow to characterize the correlated equilibria with
maximal expected turnout without loss of generality, but this characterization is
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not unique: it is possible that an asymmetric probability distribution also delivers
a solution to the max-turnout problem. However, the group-symmetric distribu-
tion has an attractive implementation property: all voters in a group are treated
equally. Namely, one way to think about a group-symmetric correlated equilibrium
is to imagine a mediator selecting a profile with a given total number of votes on
each side according to the group-symmetric equilibrium distribution, µ∗, and then
randomly recruiting the required number of voters on each side according to the
selected profile, giving a recommendation to vote to those selected, and a recom-
mendation to abstain to the rest. Thus the group-symmetric max-turnout equilibria
involve interim randomization on the part of the mediator.
Remark 2. Based on the profiles that have positive probability in equilibrium, it is
instructive to compare the correlated equilibria identified in case (i) with the mixed-
pure Nash equilibria of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983): indeed, according to Corollary
1, just like in those equilibria, voters in NB should vote for sure, and voters in
NA should mix. The similarity ends here, however. First, the max-turnout mixed-
pure Nash equilibria have expected turnout increasing in the cost. Second, in the
mixed-pure equilibria of Palfrey and Rosenthal, all voters of the mixing group vote
with the same probability q ∈ (0, 1). Hence the probability of a profile (a, nB) is(
nA
a
)
qa(1 − q)nA−a. In the correlated equilibria from case (i), the probability of the
same profile is
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB , where µ delivers a maximum to the objective in (2.34). For
the two probability distributions to coincide, it requires µa,nB = q
a(1− q)nA−a for all
a ∈ [0, nA]. But since
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB = 2c (see Corollary 2 below) and µnB−1,nB = 0,
there is no q ∈ (0, 1) that would satisfy this condition.
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Remark 3. If one restricts the equilibrium support in case (i) to the following
three profiles: full turnout, largest tie, and any single profile of the form (a, nB) for
a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 2}, the group-symmetric max-turnout equilibrium is unique. This
follows from equations (2.70) and (2.72) in 2.A.2. Our example in the introduction
is a special case of this restricted equilibrium support with a = 0.
In view of Corollary 1, we can compute the probability that the election results in
a tie, denoted pinB ,nB , since (nB, nB) is the only tied profile in the support of the
equilibrium distribution. It is also interesting to see how the probability of the tie
changes with the size of the electorate. There are several ways to model the limiting
case when the electorate grows large. We present here the results for the simplest
case, which is keeping the ratio nB
nA
= α fixed at some α ∈ (0, 1] as nB, nA →∞.
Corollary 2. (i) if nB ≥ dnA+12 e, then
pinB ,nB = 2c
(ii) if nB < d12nAe, then
pinB ,nB =
2c
1 +
(
1
2c
− 1) ( 1
nA−1 +
nB
nA
)
(iii) for any fixed c, as nA, nB → ∞ with nBnA = α ∈ (0, 1), for α ∈ (0, 0.5) we have
pinB ,nB → 2c1+α( 12c−1) , and for α ∈ (0.5, 1), pinB ,nB → 2c.
Proof. See equations (2.71) and (2.93) in 2.A.2. 
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Corollary 2 shows that the probability of the tied outcome only depends on the
cost and the relative size of the competing groups, and is increasing in the cost.
There is one caveat: the tie probability is derived under the assumption of a group-
symmetric probability distribution. For an asymmetric probability distribution that
also delivers a solution to the max-turnout problem, Corollary 2 holds as long as the
equilibrium support stays the same.
Another important property concerns the probability that the majority wins. Given
Corollaries 1 and 2, it is not surprising that there are again two cases for the max-
turnout equilibria:
Corollary 3. The probability the majority wins in a correlated equilibrium with max-
imal expected turnout, pim, is restricted as follows.
(i) if nB ≥ dnA+12 e, then
1− c ≥ pim > 1
2
For the special case in Remark 3,
pim =
nB
nA
+ c
(
1− 2nB
nA
)
(ii) if nB < d12nAe, then
pim = 1− c
1 +
(
1
2c
− 1) ( 1
nA−1 +
nB
nA
)
Proof. See 2.A.3. 
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Corollary 3 shows that the probability that majority wins is decreasing in the cost
for a small minority (case (ii)). As c→ 0.5, pim → 0.5 from above. Furthermore, for
all costs in (0, 0.5) the majority wins with probability at least 0.5. In case (i), when
nB ≥ dnA+12 e, the upper bound on this probability is decreasing in the cost, but the
situation is a bit more complicated, since pim is non-monotone in the cost for a fixed
pair of groups sizes nA and nB. The reason is the non-monotone behavior of the
binomial coefficients as well as the sensitivity of the linear program to the changes in
the constraint coefficients. The total probability mass fluctuates along the profiles of
the form (a, nB) for a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 2} ∪ {nB, . . . , nA} depending on the cost, and
so does the probability of the majority winning.
Our next proposition shows that as the size of the electorate grows large, the max-
turnout correlated equilibria remain divided into the same two categories: the cost-
independent case with the maximal expected turnout being twice the size of the
minority, and the cost-dependent case, where the maximal expected turnout includes
an additional term.
Proposition 2. Fix c ∈ (0, 0.5) and let nA, nB →∞ with nBnA = α ∈ (0, 1].
(i) If α ≥ 0.5, then
lim
nA,nB→∞
f ∗
n
=
2α
1 + α
(ii) If α < 0.5, then
lim
nA,nB→∞
f ∗
n
=
2α
1 + α
+
(1− 2α)(1− 2c)
(1 + α)(1− 2c (1− 1
α
)
)
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Proof. See 2.A.4. 
2.1.1.2 Min-turnout equilibria
Concluding the section on the basic model, let us briefly address the lower bound
on the expected turnout. This case is different in that now we are looking for a
solution that minimizes the linear objective function subject to the same constraints
(2.5)-(2.6).
Denote the minimal expected turnout in this problem by
f∗ ≡ f(µ∗) = min
µ∈D(NA,NB ,c)
∑
s∈{0,1}n
(
µ(s)
∑
i∈N
si
)
(2.35)
Proposition 3. Suppose 0 < c < 0.5, and nA, nB ≥ 1. Then f∗ = 2 − ψ(c), where
ψ(c) ∈ (0, 2).
Proof. See 2.A.5. 
As Proposition 3 shows, the lower turnout bound is not very interesting. For all
cases, the minimal expected turnout is between 0 and 2, depending on the cost,
and the exact formula for ψ(c) is complicated, since, unlike the maximum case, the
equilibrium distribution support also depends on the cost, as shown in the Appendix.
On the other hand, the result is intuitive: the minimum turnout case is total cost-
minimizing, so to remove the individual incentives to turn out it is sufficient to
have the equilibrium distribution place all the probability mass onto the uncontested
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profiles where either side wins for sure. Such profiles need no more than two agents
voting.14
2.1.1.3 Correlated equilibria and efficiency
In this section we rely on the results we have obtained in the basic model to draw
some general implications about the effects of correlated strategies on welfare.
Firstly, we note that since the set of expected correlated equilibrium payoffs is convex,
there is always an equilibrium with the total expected turnout between the minimum
and the maximum.
Proposition 4. For any 0 < c < 0.5 and t ∈ [f∗(c), f ∗(c)], there exists a correlated
equilibrium with the total expected turnout equal to t.
Proof. See 2.A.6. 
Next, we ask which correlated equilibria are socially optimal. That is, we are looking
for equilibria that maximize expected social welfare, understood as a sum of all
individuals’ expected utilities. Given a correlated equilibrium µ, after some simple
algebra, the expected welfare can be formally written as follows.
W (µ) = (nA − nB) Pr(majority wins) + nB − cT (µ) (2.36)
14There is an exception to this rule when the voting cost is approaching zero, but even if profiles
with total turnout larger than 2 have positive probabilities in equilibrium, their effect on the
objective is completely compensated by the profiles with turnout between 0 and 2. See 2.A.5 for
details.
35
where T (µ) is the total expected turnout under µ. The expression in (2.36) nicely
demonstrates the relation between total expected turnout and welfare: increasing
total turnout reduces welfare if the probability that majority wins is kept constant,
but it may increase welfare if the increased turnout leads to a higher probability that
majority wins.
Given our results on max turnout equilibria in Section 2.1.1.1, we can now establish
some welfare properties of such equilibria.
Proposition 5. Suppose 0 < c < 0.5 and nA > nB. Denote W
∗ the expected welfare
at a max-turnout equilibrium.
(i) if nB ≥ dnA+12 e, then W ∗ = (nA − nB) Pr(majority wins) + nB(1 − 2c); and
nA+nB
2
− 2cnB < W ∗ ≤ nA − c(nA + nB);
(ii) if nB < d12nAe, then
W ∗ = nA(1− c)
(
1 +
2cnB(nA − 1)
2c(nA − nB)(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
)
;
(iii) In both cases, W ∗ is decreasing in the voting cost.
Correlated equilibria that maximize total welfare have lower expected turnout than
the max-turnout equilibria. A welfare-maximizing correlated equilibrium would re-
quire the probability that majority wins as large as possible (ideally, equal to 1) and
turnout as low as possible (ideally, 0). In this case the maximum welfare equals nA.
However, there is a tradeoff between the probability majority wins and the expected
turnout: majority cannot win for sure in any correlated equilibrium.
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Lemma 2. For any 0 < c < 1
2
, there does not exist a correlated equilibrium with
majority winning for sure.
Proof. See 2.A.7. 
Remark 4. It is interesting to note that if voting costs are different in different
groups, it is possible to have a correlated equilibrium with majority winning for
sure. In particular, if there are two group costs, cA and cB, then for cA < cB both
IC constraints for voters in NA and non-voters in NB can be satisfied. The welfare-
maximizing equilibria in such case have the probability majority wins equal to one,
and all probability mass on the profiles with one and two voters from NA and zero
voters from NB.
When looking for a welfare-maximizing correlated equilibrium, Lemma 2 implies that
the probability majority wins enters (2.36) non-trivially and must be traded off with
the total expected turnout. Similarly to Lemma 1, there is no loss of generality in-
volved from considering only group-symmetric probability distributions. We can now
establish the equilibrium support for welfare-maximizing equilibria, and characterize
the optimum. Formally, the problem is now
maximize W (µ) s.t. µ ∈ D(NA, NB, c) (2.37)
Proposition 6. Assume nA > 2.
i) There is a unique cutoff cost c∗ such that for any 0 < c < c∗ the maximal expected
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welfare implementable in a correlated equilibrium is
W (µ∗, c) = nA − c+
[
c− nA+nB+2nB( 12−c)
2
− (
1
2
−c)2(1+nB)
c
]
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
+ nB
2c
+ 1
and the corresponding equilibrium support profiles are (a+1, a), a ∈ [0, nB], (nB, nB),
and (2, 0).
ii) for c > c∗ such that Condition A (see below) holds, the maximal expected welfare
implementable in a correlated equilibrium is
W˜ (µ∗, c) = nA − c+
[
c(1 + nB) + nB [nB − nA − 1]− (
1
2
−c)2(1+nB)
c
]
nB−(c+ 12 )
1
2
−c +
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
and the corresponding equilibrium support profiles are (a + 1, a), a ∈ [0, nB], (0, 1),
and (2, 0).
iii) for c > c∗ such that Condition A does not hold, the maximal expected welfare
implementable in a correlated equilibrium is
W¯ (µ∗, c) = nA − c+
(12 − c) [nB(nB − nA)− c(nB − 1)]
nB −
(
c+ 12
)
and the corresponding equilibrium support profiles are (0, 1), (1, 0), and (2, 0).
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Proof. See 2.A.8 
Remark 5. The unique cutoff cost c∗ is determined by equation (2.113) in the proof.
Condition A in the statement of Proposition 6 is the following cubic inequality in
the voting cost:
c3
(
nA +
nB − 5
2
)
+
c2
2
((nA − nB)(nB − 1) + 3− nB)
− c
4
(
nB + 1
2
+ (nA − nB)(2nB + 1)
)
+
(nA − nB)(nB + 1)
8
> 0
This inequality is equivalent to having W˜ (µ∗, c) > W¯ (µ∗, c).
Proposition 6 characterizes welfare-optimal equilibria and shows that those are gen-
erally different from either min- or max-turnout equilibria, although the expected
turnout in the welfare-maximizing case is close to the minimal expected turnout.
2.2 Complete Information and Heterogeneous Vot-
ing Costs
We have assumed so far that the cost of voting is common for all players. This
assumption may seem too strong, so in this section we are going to relax it and see
if the main results continue to hold.
Assume that each voter i ∈ N has a voting cost ci ∈ (0, 0.5) and the costs are
commonly known. In this cost range, no voter has a dominant strategy to always
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vote or always abstain. The correlated equilibrium conditions (2.5)-(2.6) now take
the following form: ∀i ∈ N ,
ci
∑
s−i∈V iD
µ(0, s−i) +
(
ci − 1
2
) ∑
s−i∈V iP
µ(0, s−i) ≥ 0 (2.38)
−ci
∑
s−i∈V iD
µ(1, s−i) +
(
1
2
− ci
) ∑
s−i∈V iP
µ(1, s−i) ≥ 0 (2.39)
where, as before, V iP (V
i
D) is the set of voting profiles where player i is a piv-
otal(dummy, respectively). Denote D(NA, NB, (ci)i∈N) the set of probability dis-
tributions over ∆(S) that satisfy (2.38)-(2.39).
With heterogeneous costs, the group-symmetric distribution construction (see Lemma
1), may entail some loss of generality. Since voting costs are different, the expected
turnout can be increased, compared to the group-symmetric case, if the probabil-
ity distribution over profiles is adjusted so that each profile probability takes into
account not only the total number of those players voting at this profile, but also
their voting costs. E.g., profiles where players with higher costs are voting might be
optimally assigned smaller probability than profiles with the same total turnout, but
where players with lower costs are voting.15
Without loss of generality, let us order all players in group NA (NB, respectively) by
their voting costs from low to high. Denote cA, cB the lowest costs in the respective
groups. Similarly, denote c¯A, c¯B the highest costs. A joint cost profile c[cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B ]
15Nevertheless, there is an important special case with two common group costs, cA and cB ,
where one can prove an analog of Lemma 1. We do not analyze it here.
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is any cost assignment (ci)i∈N to the players in N such that ∀i ∈ Nj, j ∈ {A,B},
cj ≤ ci ≤ c¯j. Denote the maximal expected turnout in the turnout problem with
heterogeneous costs by
h∗ ≡ f(µ∗) = max
µ∈D(NA,NB ,(ci)i∈N )
∑
s∈{0,1}n
(
µ(s)
∑
i∈N
si
)
(2.40)
In the present version of the manuscript, we restrict our analysis to the case of
symmetric distributions and demonstrate that our results under homogenous costs
can be replicated as a special case. The main goal of this exercise is to show that the
maximal expected turnout remains at high levels under heterogeneous costs, even if
the set of admissible probability distributions is restricted to be symmetric.
2.2.1 Symmetric distributions
In this subsection, we require the probability distributions to be group-symmetric.
Analogously to Lemma 1, define
MH := {µ ∈ D(NA, NB, (ci)i∈N)|
∀i ∈ NA,∀b ∈ {0, . . . , nB},∀a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1} : µ(0i, a, b) = µ(1i, a− 1, b)
∀k ∈ NB,∀b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1},∀a ∈ {0, . . . , nA} : µ(0k, a, b) = µ(1k, a, b− 1)}
In words,MH is the set of group-symmetric probability distributions over joint pro-
files which are also correlated equilibria for complete information and heterogeneous
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costs. Denote the maximal expected turnout in the turnout problem with heteroge-
neous costs and group-symmetric distributions by
h˜∗ := max
µ∈MH
∑
s∈{0,1}n
(
µ(s)
∑
i∈N
si
)
(2.41)
Clearly, h∗ ≥ h˜∗. We will now show that an analog of Proposition 1 holds under the
condition cA = c¯B.
Proposition 7. Suppose 0 < ci < 0.5 for all i ∈ N . Require µ ∈ MH . Then the
following expressions for h˜∗ provide the optimal value to the objective in the max
turnout problem with heterogeneous costs and group-symmetric distributions if and
only if cA = c¯B = c and
(i) nB > d12nAe, with h˜∗ = 2nB;
(ii) nB < d12nAe, with
h˜∗ = nA × 2c¯AnB(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
2c¯A[nA − nB](nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
= nA × ξ(c, c¯A)
where ξ(c, c¯A) is decreasing in both c and c¯A, and
a) ξ(c, c¯A) ∈ (0, 1) for all 0 < c ≤ c¯A < 12 ;
b) ξ(c, ·)→ 2nB
nA
as c→ 1
2
, so h˜∗ → 2nB;
c) ξ(·, c¯A)→ 1 as c¯A → 0, so h˜∗ → nA.
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Furthermore, 2nB < h˜
∗ < nA.
Proof. See 2.A.9. 
Proposition 7 is our second main result. It shows that the maximal expected turnout
under correlated equilibria and group-symmetric distributions behaves similarly to
the case of a single voting cost, and essentially depends on two things: the relative
sizes of the groups and the bounds of the support of the cost distribution. The
intuition for the result is similar to Proposition 1. Maximizing turnout implies that
constraint (2.39) for players in NB binds at the optimum. This in turn implies
that constraint (2.38) for players in NA binds at the optimum. Now the binding
constraint (2.39) for players in NB crucially depends on c¯B, because once it holds for
the voters with the highest costs in group NB, it automatically holds for voters in
NB with lower costs. On the other hand, the binding constraint (2.38) for players
in NA crucially depends on cA, because once it holds for the voters with the lowest
costs in group NA, it automatically holds for voters in NA with higher costs. The
effects of the two constraints cancel each other out if and only if cA = c¯B. Once
this condition holds, the key difference between cases (i) and (ii) under symmetric
distributions only concerns the behavior of constraint (2.38) for players in NB and
constraint (2.39) for players in NA, just like in Proposition 1.
In the proof of Proposition 7 we show that when cA = c¯B, the equilibrium distribution
support is the same as in Proposition 1, so Corollary 1 holds without change. For
the sake of completeness let us also provide here the expressions for the probability
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of the largest tie, pinB ,nB . The only change from Corollary 2 concerns the case of
small minority.
Corollary 4. Suppose nA > nB ≥ 1, 0 < ci < 0.5 for all i ∈ N , and cA = c¯B = c.
Assuming symmetric distributions,
(i) if nB > d12nAe then
pinB ,nB = 2c
(ii) if nB < d12nAe, then
pinB ,nB =
2
1
c
[
1 + 1
2c¯A(nA−1) +
nB
nA
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)]
− 1
c¯A(nA−1)
Proof. See equations (2.130) and (2.151) in the proof of Proposition 7 in 2.A.9. 
Notice that if c = c¯A, the expression for case (ii) coincides with its analog in Corollary
2.
What happens when cA 6= c¯B? In Appendix 2.A.9 we show that if c¯B < cA, then the
maximal expected turnout exceeds the value of h˜∗ for both cases of Proposition 7 and
for any admissible combination of the other cost thresholds. At first sight this might
look counterintuitive: c¯B < cA implies that the majority group find it costlier to vote
than the minority group, so they should vote less. However, the higher voting cost
of the majority group also implies that it will be easier to satisfy their IC constraints
for abstention, as well as the minority group IC constraints for voting. Thus in the
group-symmetric max-turnout correlated equilibrium, the competitive profiles with
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higher total turnout will be assigned higher probabilities, producing higher expected
turnout. As cB → 12 , c¯B → cA, so the maximal expected turnout converges to h˜∗
from above. Similarly, when c¯B > cA, the maximal expected turnout is lower than
the value of h˜∗ for both cases of Proposition 7. Nevertheless, as min{cA, cB} → 12 ,
cA → c¯B, so the maximal expected turnout converges to h˜∗ from below. Therefore,
the result of Proposition 7 is, in a sense, a limiting case when the lowest cost threshold
increases towards 1
2
and symmetric distributions are assumed.
One can also imagine the case where some voters have costs greater than 1
2
or less
than 0. These cases are not very interesting from the analysis point of view: if voter i
has a dominant strategy to abstain due to ci >
1
2
(violating constraint (2.39) for any
probability distribution that places a positive probability on profiles with i voting),
her presence in the list of players does not affect at all the outcome of the election, so
we can redefine N ≡ N \ {i}. A more elaborate way to handle this problem requires
the use of an asymmetric probability distribution, which would distinguish i from the
other players in her group and assign probability zero to all profiles with i voting. We
do not fully analyze this case, but we conjecture that allowing for high-cost voters
will not substantially change our results.
If voter i has a dominant strategy to vote due to ci < 0, then simply removing
this voter results in a loss of generality. The case of negative costs requires some
special handling, but it is tractable in our framework. First of all, without additional
assumptions about the distribution of such costs across groups, one can nevertheless
argue that, under the veil of ignorance, voters with negative costs are just as likely
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to belong to either of the groups, so we would expect their votes to cancel each other
out. Notwithstanding this argument, we would like to consider the case of negative
costs for some voters for the following reasons. First, it suggests a turnout model
that incorporates some additional factors, like citizen duty, which may be important
for some voters. Second, we need to consider the negative costs to be able to directly
compare our results with Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), who in their Assumption 2
explicitly include them. It is important to understand whether we get a high-turnout
equilibria due to our solution concept being the correlated equilibrium, or due to a
different assumption about the cost support.
Let L ⊂ N be the set of voters with (strictly) negative costs. We restrict the set
of admissible joint distributions to those that place probability zero on voters in L
receiving a recommendation to abstain and probability one on voters in L receiving
a recommendation to vote. With this modification, we can replace the actual group
sizes, nA and nB with their modified versions, n˜A and n˜B, which take into account
the voters from L so that n˜A = nA −LA and n˜B = nB −LB. This is as if the actual
group sizes are shifted by a constant. It is clear that our results hold for the modified
game.
2.3 Incomplete Information
Incomplete information in the voter turnout game was introduced by Ledyard (1981),
and further explored in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985). Under incomplete information,
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Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985, Theorem 2) established that in the quasi-symmetric
Bayesian Nash equilibrium only voters with non-positive voting costs will vote in
the limit as nA, nB get large. There are several ways to introduce the incomplete
information into the basic model, but not all of them are suitable for the analysis of
high-turnout correlated equilibria. In this section we consider the simplest version.
In general, player i’s type is a pair (ti, ci) of her political type (candidate preference)
and the corresponding cost of voting. The political type directly affects the utilities
of all voters through the resulting split into majority and minority, but the voting
cost type only affects the utility of a specific player. In this section we assume, for
simplicity, that voters’ political types are common knowledge.16 We use t to denote
the fixed commonly known joint political type where each voter i has political type ti.
The costs of voting are stochastic: each voter i ∈ N , draws her private cost of voting,
ci, from a commonly known discrete
17 distribution Fti with support {cti , . . . , c¯ti},
where 0 < cti ≤ 12 and 0 < c¯ti < 1. The assumption about the support range helps
rule out uninteresting equilibria, e.g. those with everyone voting for sure, or those
with everyone abstaining for sure. We assume ci is distributed independently of all
other voters’ costs c−i (and types t−i). Distributions FA and FB determine the set
of admissible joint cost profiles, characterized by the tuple of respective cost bounds
16This is a strong assumption. There are ways of relaxing it (Myerson, 1998, 2000), but they are
inconsistent with the variant of the incomplete information correlated equilibrium we consider in
this Chapter. We conjecture that this assumption can be relaxed in a communication equilibrium
(Myerson, 1986; Forges, 1986), and leave it for future research.
17Typically it is assumed in the literature that the cost distributions are absolutely continuous.
We do not make this assumption to avoid dealing with measurability issues in the definition of a
strategic form correlated equilibrium below. See Cotter (1991) for a detailed discussion of these
issues.
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(cA, c¯A, cB, c¯B) as
C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B) ≡ {(ci)i∈N |cti ≤ ci ≤ c¯ti} (2.42)
We write C−i(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B) to refer to the set of admissible cost profiles for players other
than i. Denote pi(c) the probability of a joint cost profile c = ((ci)i∈N) ∈ C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B).
The independently distributed costs then imply that
pi(c) ≡
 ∏
{i∈N :ti=A}
FA(ci)
 ∏
{i∈N :ti=B}
FB(ci)

Since the political types are fixed by assumption, we omit the respective component
in the definition of players’ strategies and for each i ∈ N define a pure strategy
si : {cti , . . . , c¯ti} → {0, 1A, 1B} as a function that maps voter i’s cost into an action
(abstain, vote for candidate A, or vote for candidate B, respectively). We assume
that voters never vote for the candidate of the opposite political type, so we abuse
notation and merge 1A and 1B into 1 meaning the act of voting for the “correct”
candidate. The set of all pure strategies for player i ∈ N is a finite set Si =
{0, 1}{cti ,...,c¯ti}, i.e. the set of all functions from cost types into actions. Let S ≡
×i∈NSi be the set of all joint strategies.
The utility of player i from a joint strategy s(c) ≡ (sj(cj)j∈N) when player i’s voting
cost is ci (and the joint political type is t) takes the following form:
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ui(s(c)|ci) =

1− si(ci)ci if
∑
{j∈N |tj=ti}
sj(cj) >
∑
{j∈N |tj 6=ti}
sj(cj)
1
2
− si(ci)ci if
∑
{j∈N |tj=ti}
sj(cj) =
∑
{j∈N |tj 6=ti}
sj(cj)
−si(ci)ci if
∑
{j∈N |tj=ti}
sj(cj) <
∑
{j∈N |tj 6=ti}
sj(cj)
Let us now discuss the solution concept. There are quite a few alternative definitions
of the correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information (see in particular
Forges (1993, 2006, 2009), Section 8.4 of Bergemann and Morris (2013) and Milch-
taich (2013)), which are often far from being equivalent. The sets of expected payoffs
corresponding to specific definitions are (sometimes) partially ordered by inclusion.
We use the strategic form incomplete information correlated equilibrium, as defined
in Forges (1993, 2006). This is the strongest definition in the sense that it results in
the smallest set of expected payoffs compared, for example, to the communication
equilibrium (Myerson (1986), Forges (1986)). Hence if we can obtain a substantial
turnout in the strategic form correlated equilibrium, then we can also obtain it in
any of the more general definitions of the correlated equilibrium under incomplete
information.
A strategic form incomplete information correlated equilibrium(SFIICE) is a prob-
ability distribution q ∈ ∆(S) that selects a pure strategy profile s = (si)i∈N with
probability q(s), such that when recommended si and knowing her type, no player
has an incentive to deviate, given that other players follow their recommendations.
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Formally, q ∈ ∆(S) is a SFIICE if for all i ∈ N , all ci ∈ {cti , . . . , c¯ti}, all ai ∈ {0, 1},
and any si ∈ Si such that si(ci) = ai, we have
∑
{
c−i∈C−i(cA,c¯A,cB,c¯B)
}pi(c)
∑
a−i
 ∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i)
[ui(ai, a−i)− ui(a′i, a−i)] ≥ 0
for all a′i ∈ {0, 1}.
It will be convenient to explicitly rewrite these conditions as the set of distributions
q ∈ ∆(S) such that for all i ∈ N , all ci ∈ {cti , . . . , c¯ti}, and all si ∈ Si such that
si(ci) = 0 we have
∑
c−i
pi(c)
ci ∑
a−i∈V iD
 ∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i|si(ci) = 0)

+
(
ci − 1
2
) ∑
a−i∈V iP
 ∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i|si(ci) = 0)
 ≥ 0 (2.43)
and for all si ∈ Si such that si(ci) = 1 we have
∑
c−i
pi(c)
−ci ∑
a−i∈V iD
 ∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i|si(ci) = 1)

+
(
1
2
− ci
) ∑
a−i∈V iP
 ∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i|si(ci) = 1)
 ≥ 0 (2.44)
where, as before, V iP and V
i
D are the set of joint action profiles such that player i is
pivotal and dummy, respectively, and the summation over the others’ costs is under-
stood to be over cost profiles in C−i(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B). The induced probability distribution
over action profiles at every cost profile c ∈ C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B) is given by
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ν(a|c) ≡
∑
{s∈S|∀i∈N :si(ci)=ai}
q(s) (2.45)
The max-turnout problem under incomplete information now takes the following
form:
g∗ ≡ max
q∈D(NA,NB ,FA,FB)
∑
{c∈C(cA,c¯A,cB,c¯B)}
pi(c)
 ∑
a∈{0,1}n
ν(a|c)
(∑
i∈N
ai
) (2.46)
Full characterization of the solution to this problem is not our goal in this section.
Rather, we just want to show a possibility result, that correlated equilibria with sub-
stantial turnout can survive in the incomplete information case. The next proposition
delivers the desired result.
Proposition 8. Suppose nA, nB ≥ 1 and nA > nB. Let FA, FB be any discrete
distributions over players’ voting costs, {cA, . . . , c¯A}, and {cB, . . . , c¯B}, respectively,
such that c¯B ≤ cA ∈ (0, 0.5), 0 < c¯A < 0.5, and 0 < cB < 0.5. Then g∗ ≥ h˜∗, where
h˜∗ is defined in (2.41).
Proof. See 2.A.10. 
This result holds for large electorates as well.18
18In particular, we mean the case where the ratio between group sizes remains fixed as their sizes
increase to ∞, with fixed cost supports.
51
2.4 Discussion
Since Nash equilibria are also correlated equilibria, it is important to understand
what exactly the analysis of correlated equilibria adds to the existing results in the
literature.
Under complete information and common voting cost, this Chapter extends Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1983), who characterized two classes of the Nash equilibria that ex-
hibit substantial turnout and survive when the electorate becomes large.19 Palfrey
and Rosenthal call those mixed-pure strategy equilibria and symmetric totally-mixed
strategy equilibria, respectively. The former equilibria require all voters in one group
mixing between voting and abstention with some common probability, whereas vot-
ers in the other group are further divided into two subgroups such that all voters in
one subgroup vote for sure, and all voters in the other subgroup abstain for sure.
The latter equilibria require voters in each group mixing with the same group-specific
probability. Both of these equilibrium classes have a counterintuitive property: the
expected turnout is increasing in cost. Furthermore, symmetric totally-mixed equi-
libria only exist when the cost is large enough and both groups have the same size.
This unfortunate dependence on both groups having exactly the same size translates
directly into the incomplete information case, and, in a sense, is the primary rea-
son why no high-turnout equilibria survive even slightest uncertainty in Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1985) when the electorate size gets large. The corresponding result in
19This latter criterion is important: Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) identify many other equilibria
that have nice properties, but do not survive in large electorates.
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this Chapter (see Proposition 1) has neither of these shortcomings.
Under heterogeneous voting costs, we can compare our Proposition 7 with Taylor
and Yildirim (2010, Proposition 2). They find that under incomplete information,
in large electorates the limit expected turnout and the probability of winning are
completely determined by the lowest voting costs in each group. In contrast, the
max-turnout correlated equilibrium puts a joint restriction both on the lowest voting
cost in one group and the highest voting cost in the other. This is the effect of two
opposing incentive compatibility constraints. In a quasi-symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in cutpoint strategies, which is typically considered in the literature,
the two constraints for each group merge into one at the critical cost. Another
related result is Kalandrakis (2007), who proves that under complete information
and heterogeneous costs almost all Nash equilibria are regular, and there exists at
least one monotone Nash equilibrium, where players with higher costs participate
with weakly lower probabilities. In our group-symmetric max-turnout correlated
equilibria a similar logic allows to restrict attention to the lowest and highest costs
in each group.
Under incomplete information, we extend Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985). Their high-
turnout equilibria do not survive uncertainty when the electorate size gets large. In
contrast, our high-turnout correlated equilibria persist under certain conditions on
cost supports (see Proposition 8). This result can be also compared with Kalandrakis
(2009), who basically shows that high-turnout Nash equilibria of the complete infor-
mation game with a common positive cost can persist under incomplete information.
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Assuming that densities of the private voting cost, private benefit, or both, converge
to a point mass that corresponds to a complete information turnout game with a
positive common voting cost, Kalandrakis (2009, Theorem 4) permits introducing
incomplete information with respect to individual voting cost, the size of each candi-
date’s support, or both. The crucial difference from Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985)’s
negative result on high-turnout equilibria under incomplete information is that Ka-
landrakis holds the size of the electorate fixed, and varies the uncertainty level, while
Palfrey and Rosenthal hold the uncertainty level fixed and vary the total size of the
electorate. A natural restriction on Kalandrakis’ results comes from the fact that the
Nash equilibria of the complete information game can be approximated by Bayesian
equilibria only for sufficiently small perturbations. Thus while Kalandrakis (2009)
established regularity of the class of asymmetric Nash equilibria which was typically
dismissed in the literature due to lack of tractability, he does not resolve the turnout
paradox. Our results, in a sense, provide a link between those two papers. We show
in Proposition 8 that group-symmetric max-turnout correlated equilibria can be pre-
served under incomplete information about voting costs, while correlation allows to
maintain high-turnout for large electorates, as long as cost supports are fixed.
One potential criticism of our model concerns the idea of maximizing the expected
total turnout without separate considerations for turnout in each group of support-
ers. It is not clear a priori whether our model can be consistent with the models
of the group-based ethical voter approach, if we assume that both groups indepen-
dently maximize the turnout within their own members. However, our results in
Proposition 1 show that when the minority is large, the same level of maximal ex-
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pected total turnout can be achieved when groups maximize their members’ turnout
independently. We relegate more general analysis to Chapter 3, which explicitly
addresses coordination among groups in a new equilibrium concept.
Another limitation of the model comes from assuming the common knowledge of
party sizes and party supports. Relaxing this assumption is an important extension
we leave for future research. We conjecture that the highest-turnout correlated equi-
libria remain robust to this change in the model assumptions, however it seems that
it requires a more restrictive solution concept than the one we used: the communi-
cation equilibrium (Forges, 1986; Myerson, 1986).
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This is the first study to introduce and characterize the set of correlated equilibria
in the voter turnout games. The solution concept of the correlated equilibrium,
developed by Aumann (1974, 1987), allows us to explicitly take into account the
possibilities of pre-play communication between voters. Communication expands the
set of equilibrium outcomes in turnout games thereby providing a micro-foundation
for group-based mobilization, as well as a solution to the turnout paradox that does
not require ad hoc assumptions about voters’ utility.
We analyzed the correlated equilibrium turnout in three main settings, varying the
information structure (complete and incomplete) and the assumptions on agents’
voting costs (homogenous and heterogeneous).
55
Under complete information and homogenous voting cost, we fully characterized the
turnout bounds in terms of the correlated equilibria that maximize and minimize
the expected turnout. These bounds provide a theoretical constraint on the levels of
turnout that can be achieved if there are no restrictions on pre-play communication,
and also characterize the range of expected turnout implementable in a correlated
equilibrium. The set of correlated equilibria includes all equilibria arising under
any of the more restricted communication protocols, e.g., voter communication in
networks.
We found that there are two classes of the max-turnout correlated equilibria, deter-
mined by the relative sizes of the two competing groups. If the minority is at least
half the size of the majority, the resulting expected turnout is twice the size of the
minority and does not depend on the cost. If the minority is less than half the size
of the majority, the resulting expected turnout is a decreasing function of the voting
cost that starts at the size of the majority for low costs and goes down to twice
the size of the minority for high costs. We also characterized the equilibrium distri-
bution support and several key election statistics (probabilities of a tie and of the
majority winning). In contrast to the high-turnout Nash equilibria, the high-turnout
correlated equilibria possess intuitive properties. For example, the majority group is
more likely to win for all costs, and the tie probability is increasing in the cost. We
also characterize the correlated equilibria that maximize social welfare. Those are
generally different from the minimal turnout equilibria, but exhibit a similar range
of expected turnout.
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We then showed that the high-turnout equilibria under complete information and
homogenous voting cost have analogs under heterogeneous costs, which may also
remain feasible correlated equilibria under incomplete information about voting costs
(assuming certain additional conditions about the cost support).
Our results emphasize the important role of communication in turnout games. A
natural question remains: why is the correlated equilibrium a reasonable solution
concept? How, exactly, the correlated equilibria we describe in this Chapter can be
implemented? The answer to the first question is given by Aumann (1987) and Hart
and Mas-Colell (2000). Correlated equilibrium can be interpreted as an “expression
of Bayesian rationality”: if it is common knowledge that every player maximizes ex-
pected utility given her (subjective) beliefs about the state of the world, the resulting
strategy choices form a correlated equilibrium. Furthermore, correlated equilibrium
can be obtained as a result of a simple dynamic procedure driven by players’ regret
over past period observations.
The answer to the second question typically invokes describing a direct mechanism
where an impartial mediator, such as a leader, gives recommendations to players.
However it is important to realize that a correlated equilibrium can be also imple-
mented without the mediator, as a Nash (or even sequential) equilibrium of the
expanded game with simple communication.20 Laboratory experiments are a use-
ful tool for understanding the effects of unmediated communication on turnout in
a controlled setting. In Chapter 4 we show that these effects are nuanced: with
20See Forges (1990), Gerardi (2004), and Gerardi and Myerson (2007).
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a low voting cost, party-restricted communication increases turnout, while public
communication decreases turnout; while with a high voting cost, public commu-
nication increases turnout. From a theoretical perspective, establishing a realistic
communication scheme that is “minimally necessary” for implementing high-turnout
correlated equilibria remains a promising extension that we leave for future research.
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2.A Appendix: Proofs
2.A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Fix any i ∈ NA and consider two voting profiles: x1 := (0i, a, b) and x2 :=
(1i, a− 1, b) such that the total number of votes in group NA is a, the total number
of votes in group NB is b, and in the first profile voter i abstains, while in the second
profile i turns out to vote and somebody else from NA abstains. We will construct
the equivalent symmetric distribution iteratively. At step 1, we let σ∗1(s) = µ
∗(s) for
all profiles s 6= x1, x2. The objective in either (2.9) or (2.10) does not depend on
voters’ identities, only on the total number of votes in each profile. Since the total
number of votes at either x1 or x2 is the same and equals a+b, it does not matter for
the objective how σ∗1 distributes the probability mass among x1 and x2 compared to
µ∗ as long as µ∗(x1) +µ∗(x2) = σ∗1(x1) +σ
∗
1(x2). Hence we can let σ
∗
1(x1) = σ
∗
1(x2) =
1
2
(µ∗(x1) + µ∗(x2)). Clearly, this argument holds for any a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1}, any
b ∈ {0, . . . , nB}, and any i ∈ NA, and a similar argument holds for any k ∈ NB and
profiles (0k, a, b) and (1k, a, b− 1), respectively. We can now iteratively construct σ∗,
where at each step t ≥ 2 we define xt1 and xt2 by one of the remaining combinations of
(a, b, i), and let σ∗t (s) = σ
∗
t−1(s) for all profiles s 6= xt1, xt2. Once we have considered all
combinations, we obtain σ∗, for which by construction f(σ∗) = f(µ∗) and σ∗ ∈ M.
It remains to show that all IC constraints are satisfied at σ∗. To see this, let’s roll
back to σ∗1 and show that the IC constraints are satisfied at each iteration. Notice
that the sets V iD and V
i
P in (2.8) and (2.7) do not depend on other voters’ identities,
but only on the total number of votes on each side of the profile, hence x1 ∈ V iP if
and only if x2 ∈ V `P for any ` ∈ NA, ` 6= i such that ` votes at x1 and abstains at
x2 (since a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1}, there must exist at least one such player). Similarly,
x2 ∈ V iP if and only if x1 ∈ V `P for any such `. These relations hold for all (x1, x2)
with a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1}, and any b ∈ {0, . . . , nB}. By assumption, IC constraints
(2.5)-(2.6) hold for all i ∈ N under µ∗. Since the voting cost is the same for everyone
in NA, and µ
∗ is optimal, the corresponding IC constraints must be of the same kind
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(slack or binding) for both i and ` under µ∗, and, moreover, they must put the same
restriction on the total probability that i is pivotal at x1 as they put on the total
probability that ` is pivotal at x2, i.e.∑
s−i∈V iP
|s−i|=a+b
µ∗(0i, 1`, s−i∪`) =
∑
s−`∈V `P
|s−`|=a+b
µ∗(0`, 1i, s−i∪`)
and ∑
s−i∈V iP
|s−i|=a−1+b
µ∗(1i, 0`, s−i∪`) =
∑
s−`∈V `P
|s−`|=a−1+b
µ∗(1`, 0i, s−i∪`)
But then redistributing this probability mass symmetrically under σ∗ does not violate
the IC for i ∈ NA, a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1}, and any b ∈ {0, . . . , nB}. Similarly, we
can prove that this redistribution does not violate the IC for k ∈ NB and b ∈
{1, . . . , nB − 1}, a ∈ {0, . . . , nA}. 
2.A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Using the fact that all profile probabilities sum up to one and µ0,0 = 0 at the
optimum, rewrite the objective in (2.34) as
1 +
∑
{s|∑ si=2}
µ(s) + 2
∑
{s|∑ si=3}
µ(s) + . . .
+(n− 2)
∑
{s|∑ si=n−1}
µ(s) + (n− 1)µ(1, . . . , 1) (2.47)
Since
∑
s µ(s) = 1, the above expression is maximized if the largest possible prob-
ability is placed on the outcomes with more turnout.21 In particular, the maximal
possible value of n is achieved when µ(1, . . . , 1) = 1.
21Indeed, each consecutive term in the expanded sum has a greater marginal effect on the value
of the objective than the previous term.
60
Since nA > nB, the full turnout profile, (1, . . . , 1) is in VA. By Lemma 1, it is
sufficient to consider symmetric distributions. To simplify the notation, we denote
the probability of any profile with a, b total votes for A,B, respectively, by µa,b ≡
µ(#A = a,#B = b), without further reference to an individual player. We are
going to use these (nA + 1)(nB + 1) probabilities as our decision variables. When
we distinguish between individual voters among those in the profile (a, b), however,
there are going to be
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
different profiles (each having the same probability
µa,b in the symmetric distribution). Hence the total probability constraint is now
written as
nA∑
a=0
nB∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b = 1 (2.48)
One may wonder how the symmetric distribution can be implemented. In the medi-
ator setup, we can think of it in the following way: a mediator picks a voting profile
(a, b) with probability
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b, and then randomly recruits the respective num-
ber of voters on each side. These voters receive a recommendation to vote. The
remaining voters receive a recommendation to abstain.
Using the symmetry, we can rewrite constraints (2.5)-(2.6) for players in NA (NB,
respectively) as the following system of four inequalities with respect to (nA+1)(nB+
1) variables of the form µa,b:
nA−1∑
a=1
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b ≥
1
2
− c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
(2.49)
nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−1∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b ≤
1
2
− c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
(2.50)
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and
nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB−1}∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b ≥
1
2
− c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
)
(2.51)
nA∑
a=2
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b ≤
1
2
− c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa,a
)
(2.52)
We will refer to the first and the third inequality above as the odd incentive com-
patibility (IC) constraints, and to the second and the fourth inequality as the even
IC constraints, distinguished by the group.
Since we assumed nA > nB, at the largest turnout profile µ(1, . . . , 1) ≡ µnA,nB voters
from NB (as well as voters from NA, if nA > nB + 1) are dummies. This implies that
the even IC constraint for NB is always binding at the optimum. As for the even IC
constraint for NA, we can show that for nA > nB ≥ d12nAe it is always slack. To see
this, notice that the even IC for NA requires
µnA,nB ≤
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
−
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 −
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
b
)
µnB+1,b −
nB∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0
+
1
2c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB −
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 (2.53)
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The binding even IC for NB requires
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
]
−
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa+1,a −
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnB+1,b
−
nB∑
b=2
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µ0,b (2.54)
Comparing the right hand sides of these two expressions, we see that in every single
term of (2.53), except for the two terms on the last line, the total profile turnout
matches exactly the total profile turnout in the corresponding term of (2.54). There
are three possibilities. If the RHS of (2.54) is strictly less than the RHS of (2.53),
the even IC for NA is slack, so we are done. The RHS of (2.54) cannot be strictly
greater, since then the even IC for NA does not hold at all, and so we are not at the
optimum of the constrained maximization program. The critical case is when the
two RHS are the same; but this holds at the optimum if and only if the sum of the
last two terms of (2.53) is zero (otherwise, since the profiles in the last two terms
of (2.53) are not matched in (2.54), and so are not restricted by (2.54), the RHS of
(2.53) in the optimum can be increased without increasing the RHS of (2.54), which
is optimal when nB ≥ d12nAe).
As long as nB ≥ d12nAe, we have 2nB ≥ nA and 2nB + 1 > nA, so
1
2c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB −
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 > 0
That is, the sum of the two terms on the last line of (2.53) is strictly positive at the
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optimum. This follows, since the total turnout of the first term, 2nB +1, exceeds the
total turnout of the largest term in the above sum, which is nA, achieved at µnA,0.
Therefore, the RHS of (2.54) is strictly less at the optimum than the RHS of (2.53)
and so the even IC for NA is slack, given that the even IC for NB is binding. Now,
if nB < d12nAe, then 2nB + 1 ≤ nA, so it is easy to see that the even IC constraints
for both groups are binding at the optimum.
As for the odd IC constraints, we can show that the situation is the opposite: the
odd IC for NA is always binding at the optimum, while the odd IC for NB only binds
when nB > d12nAe (for even nA) or nB ≥ d12nAe (for odd nA). To see this, notice
that in the binding constraint (2.54) all profiles such that a non-voter from NA is a
dummy have the negative sign, so we want to reduce them as much as possible in the
optimum. The only subset of profiles where a non-voter from NA is a dummy which
is not directly restricted by (2.54) has the form
∑nA−1
a=1
(
nA−1
a−1
)
µa,0. But these profiles
are restricted by (2.53). If the latter is binding, the restriction is trivial. Suppose
not, then if we reduced all directly restricted by (2.54) probabilities to their lower
limit of zero and the odd IC for NA still was not binding, then constraint (2.53)
(slack by assumption) would imply that µnA,nB < 0. Therefore, the odd IC for NA
must bind at the optimum.
Let us now turn to the odd IC constraint for NB. The odd IC for NA is binding as
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we just demonstrated, so we can rewrite (2.49) and (2.51), respectively, as
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB −
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB−1 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB
+
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB+1∑
a=2
a−2∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−3∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
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and
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nB − 1
b
)
µnA,b
+
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 +
nB+1∑
a=2
a−2∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nB−3∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b ≥
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
)
(2.56)
Comparing these two expressions, we see that, except for the terms on the first two
lines of (2.55) and those on the first line of (2.56), in every remaining profile of
(2.55) the total turnout matches exactly the total turnout in the corresponding term
of (2.56).
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Suppose nB < d12nAe, then 2nB < nA. We want to show that at the optimum
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nB − 1
b
)
µnA,b +
1
2c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB >
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB +
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB−1 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB (2.57)
The case of nA − 1 < nB + 1 is not possible, since then nA = nB + 1, but 2nB < nA
implies nB < 1. So nA − 1 ≥ nB + 1, then nA ≥ nB + 2. Notice that on the RHS
of (2.57) (at profiles with probability µa,nB in the first sum) the total turnout in
each profile equals nB + nA − k, where k ≥ 1, matching the corresponding turnout
in each profile on the LHS of (2.57) (at profiles with probability µnA,b) as long as
nA − k ≥ nB + 1 (since a ≥ nB + 1 in the first sum). Once nA − k = nB + 1, there
are no more profiles left in the first sum of the RHS of (2.57), but there remain
profiles with probability µnA,b in the corresponding sum on the LHS of (2.57) as
long as 0 ≤ nB − k ≤ nB − 1, since we have 0 ≤ b ≤ nB − 1. Writing the largest
possible k∗ = nA − nB − 1, we see that since nA ≥ nB + 2 by assumption, we indeed
have k∗ ≥ 1. Therefore, the LHS of (2.57) contains the profiles with larger turnout
that are unmatched by the profiles on the RHS of (2.57): at the very least, the
corresponding probabilities are µnA,0 and µnA,1. So at the optimum (2.57) holds;
hence, the odd IC for NB is slack.
Now if nA is even, we can extend this result to the case where nB = d12nAe, since
then 2nB = nA, so even though µnA,1 becomes matched by the first probability in
the sum on the RHS, µnB+1,nB , we still have µnA,0 unmatched on the LHS. However,
if nA is odd, then nB = d12nAe implies 2nB = nA + 1, so µnA,0 becomes matched by
µnB ,nB−1, and hence the odd IC for NB is binding at the optimum.
Finally, if nB > d12nAe, then 2nB ≥ nA + 1, so all profiles on the LHS of (2.57) are
matched by the corresponding profiles on the RHS, so the odd IC for NB is binding.
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Table 2.1 summarizes our findings on binding and slack constraints in the maximiza-
tion problem. To finish the proof, we need to consider three cases, corresponding to
Table 2.1: IC Constraints at the Optimum (Max-Turnout Equilibria)
nB < d 12nAe nB = d 12nAe nB > d 12nAe
Odd IC for NA (2.49) always binds
Even IC for NA (2.50) binds slack slack
Odd IC for NB (2.51) slack slack for even nA; binds
binds for odd nA
Even IC for NB (2.52) always binds
Note: nA > nB, 0 < c <
1
2
the columns of Table 2.1.
First, suppose nB > d12nAe. Then the odd IC constraint for NA binding implies
nB+1∑
a=1
a−1∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b −
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
+
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
= 0, (2.58)
the odd IC constraint for NB binding implies
nB+1∑
a=2
a−2∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nA∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b
+
nB−2∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b −
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a
+
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
)
= 0, (2.59)
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and the even IC constraint for NB binding implies
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=2
a−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
]
(2.60)
At the optimum, µnA,nB must be as large as possible. This implies that the terms in
the first parentheses must be as large as possible, and in particular, the last term in
the second sum,
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB , since it has the largest turnout among the terms with
the positive sign. Now, from the odd IC for NA,(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
· µnB−1,nB =
c
1
2 − c
[
nB+1∑
a=1
a−1∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
−
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
(2.61)
Substituting, re-arranging and simplifying the terms (notice that µ0,0 = 0 by opti-
mality),
68
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
(
−
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
nA + 1
nA − nB + 1µa,a+1
+
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
(
a(nA + 1)− nAnB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
))
+
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(nA + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
nB(nA + b− a)− b(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
a=2
a−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
nB(nA + b− a)− b(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB
b
)(
(nA − nB)(nB − b)− (nB + b)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µnB+1,b
+
nA
nA − nB + 1
nA−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,0 −
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b (2.62)
The binding odd IC for NB allows us to express µnA,nB−1 as
µnA,nB−1 =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
)
−
(
nB+1∑
a=2
a−2∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
b=0
(
nB − 1
b
)
µnA,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b
)
Plugging µnA,nB−1 into the expression for µnA,nB above, we obtain
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µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
1
nA − nB + 1
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − a− 1
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB
+
1
2 − c
c
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
a
)(
(a− nB)(2nA − nB + 1) + a
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,a
+
(nA + 1)(2− 12c)− nB
nA − nB + 1
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
+
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)− 12−cc (nB − a)(nA − nB + 1) + nA(nB − a)− (nB + a)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
µa+1,a
+
(
c(nA − 1)−
(
1
2 − c
)
(nA − nB + 1)
c(nA − nB + 1)
)
nAµ1,0 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − a− 1
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB
+
nB−3∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − nB + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − nB + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − nB + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=2
(
nA
a
)
2nA − nB + 1− a
nA − nB + 1 µa,0 +
nB−2∑
b=0
(
nB
b
)(
nB − 2b
nB
)
µnA,b
+
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − 2nB + 1)− (nB + b)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µnB+1,b (2.63)
It is important to determine the signs of all the terms in the above expression. It
is easy to see that the first term (the largest tied profile) is positive, the next one
negative. The terms with µa,a, a ∈ {1, . . . , nB−1}, are negative, as well as the terms
with µa,a+1, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 2}.22 The terms with µa+1,a, a ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1}, are
22To see this, note that for 0 < c < 0.25 we have 2 − 1/2c negative, which is sufficient. When
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negative too.23 The term with µ1,0 can be positive depending on the cost (but has the
lowest possible total turnout). The remaining terms on the same line are positive.
All terms on the next three lines (terms with µa,b for a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 3}, b ∈ {a +
2, . . . , nB−1}; a ∈ {nB+2, . . . , nA−1}, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB−1}; and a ∈ {3, . . . , nB}, b ∈
{1, . . . , a − 2}) are positive.24 The terms with µa,0, a ∈ {2, . . . , nA − 1} are all
positive. The last term on the same line (with µnA,b) is positive for b ∈ [0, bnB2 c]
and negative for b ∈ [bnB
2
c + 1, nB − 2]. The terms on the last line (terms with
µnB+1,b, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB−1}) are all positive, since even for b = nB−1, the numerator
is positive.
We can now start optimizing by setting µa,b = 0 for all negative terms with total
turnout smaller than nB + nB. That is, in (2.63) we set
µa,a = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 1} (2.64)
µa,a+1 = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 2} (2.65)
µa+1,a = 0, a ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1} (2.66)
0.25 < c < 0.5, the difference 2− 1/2c is positive, but since nB < nA + 1,
(nA + 1)
(
2− 1
2c
)
− nB < nB
(
2− 1
2c
)
− nB = nB
(
1− 1
2c
)
< 0.
23This follows, since the numerator of the expression in the parentheses multiplied by µa+1,a can
be rewritten as (
1− 1
2c
)
(nB − a)(nA − nB + 1)− (nA + 1)(nB − a− 1) < 0.
24The case when b ≥ a+2 is obvious. The next one (a ∈ {nB+2, . . . , nA−1}, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB−1})
follows from observing that already at a = nA − 1, b = 1, the numerator is
(nB − 1)(2nA − nB + 1) + (1− nA)nB = nB(nA − nB + 3)− nA − (nA + 1)
> nB(nA − nB + 3)− 2nB − nA > nB(nA − nB + 3)− 4nB + 1
= nB(nA − nB − 1) + 1 > 0.
The terms for a ∈ {3, . . . , nB}, b ∈ {1, . . . , a − 2} are all positive, since even if we take the largest
a = nB , the numerator is positive: (nB − b)(2(nA − nB) + 1) − nB > 0 ⇔ b < nB − nB2(nA−nB)+1 ,
which always holds.
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Given the slack even IC for NA at the optimum when nB > d12nAe (see Table 2.1),
we must have
µnA,nB <
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB +
(
1
2c
− 1
)(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB
+
1
2 − c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 +
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
b
)
µnB+1,b
+
nB∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 +
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0
]
(2.67)
Using (2.64)-(2.66), we obtain
µnA,nB <
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB +
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB
+
1
2 − c
c
µ1,0 −
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
(
nA − 1
nB − 2
)
µnB−1,nB +
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
b
)
µnB+1,b
+
nB∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 +
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0
]
(2.68)
Replacing the LHS of this expression with (2.63) and re-arranging, we obtain
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nA(nA − 1)
nA − nB + 1µ1,0 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
nB − 1
nA − nB + 1µa,nB
+
nB−3∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − nB + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1) +
a
nA
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − nB + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1) +
a
nA
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − nB + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1) +
a
nA
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=2
(
nA
a
)(
2nA − nB + 1− a
nA − nB + 1 +
a
nA
)
µa,0 +
nB−2∑
b=0
(
nB
b
)
2(nB − b)
nB
µnA,b
+
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(2nA − 2nB + 1)− (nB + b)
nB(nA − nB + 1) +
nB + 1
nA
)
µnB+1,b <
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
nB − 1
nA − nB + 1µnB ,nB +
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB
+
1
2 − c
c
(nA + 1)µ1,0 +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)(
a+ 1− nB
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB
−
[(
nB
nB − 1
)
µnA,nB−1 +
(
nA − 1
nB − 2
)
µnB−1,nB
]
(2.69)
Notice that all terms to the left of the inequality sign are positive and enter (2.63)
with positive signs. The terms to the right of the inequality sign are all positive
except the last parenthesis. Since those terms in the parentheses are not restricted
by (2.63) (due to our constraint substitution), we optimally set them equal to zero.
In addition we set µ1,0 = 0 since this allows to increase the remaining terms on the
RHS that have larger turnout.
Taking into account the signs of the terms in (2.63), and given (2.69), we see that
the RHS of (2.63) is optimized whenever we increase the RHS of (2.69). Therefore,
in the optimum the sum of the terms on the LHS of (2.69) is as small as possible. It
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cannot be zero, though, due to the binding odd IC constraint for NA (2.58). Indeed,
this constraint determines the maximal allowed increase to µnB ,nB via the sum of∑nA−1
a=nB+1
µa,nB and
∑nB−2
a=0 µa,nB (taken with appropriate coefficients).
Hence in the optimum, the support of the equilibrium distribution only includes the
profiles of the form (a, nB) for a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 2} ∪ {nB, . . . , nA}. Therefore, the
optimal probability of the largest profile is
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
1
nA − nB + 1
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − a− 1
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB
+
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − a− 1
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB (2.70)
The only remaining constraint is that the total sum of probabilities is one, which,
given (2.70), can be written as
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB +
1
2 − c
c
1
nA − nB + 1
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − a− 1
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − a− 1
nA − nB + 1
)
µa,nB = 1
Rewriting,
nA
nA − nB + 1
(
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB
)
+
1
2c + nA − nB
nA − nB + 1
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB = 1
74
Using the binding odd IC constraint for NA, (2.58), we obtain
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB −
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB = 0
Substituting into the previous expression, we obtain
µnB ,nB =
2c(
nA
nB
) (2.71)
Hence
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB =
(1− 2c)(nA − nB)
nA
(2.72)
Plugging these expressions into the objective function and simplifying, we rewrite
(2.47) as
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f∗ = 1 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(nB + a− 1)
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(nB + a− 1)
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB
+(nB + nB − 1)
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB + (nA + nB − 1)µnA,nB
= 1 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(nB + a− 1)
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(nB + a− 1)
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB
+(nB + nB − 1)2c+ nA + nB − 1
nA − nB + 1
[
1− 2c+
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)
(nB − a− 1)µa,nB
+
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)
(nB − a− 1)µa,nB
]
= 1 + (2nB − 1)2c+ (1− 2c)(nA + nB − 1)
nA − nB + 1 +
2(nB − 1)nA
nA − nB + 1
[
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB
]
= 4cnB + (1− 2c)
[
1 +
nA + nB − 1
nA − nB + 1 +
2(nB − 1)nA(nA − nB)
(nA − nB + 1)nA
]
= 4cnB + 2(1− 2c)nB nA − nB + 1
nA − nB + 1 = 2nB
So, the maximal expected turnout is twice the size of the minority.
This completes the proof of case (i), with the exception of the knife-edge case of
nB = d12nAe. We address this case after finishing the proof of case (ii).
Now suppose nB < d12nAe. Then 2nB < nA. Due to the odd IC for NA and even IC
for NB binding, we can express the probability of the largest profile as
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µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
(
−
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
nA + 1
nA − nB + 1µa,a+1
+
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
(
a(nA + 1)− nAnB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
))
+
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(nA + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
nB(nA + b− a)− b(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
a=2
a−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
nB(nA + b− a)− b(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB
b
)(
(nA − nB)(nB − b)− (nB + b)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µnB+1,b
+
nA
nA − nB + 1
nA−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,0 −
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b (2.73)
On the other hand, the even IC for NA binding implies
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
−
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 −
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
b
)
µnB+1,b
−
nA∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 (2.74)
Comparing these two expressions and taking into account that the odd IC for NB is
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slack, we see that at the optimum,
µa,a+1 = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 1} (2.75)
µa,a = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 1} (2.76)
µnB+1,b = 0, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1} (2.77)
µa,b = 0, a ∈ {nB + 2, . . . , nA − 1}, b ∈ {0, . . . , nB} (2.78)
µa,b = 0, a ∈ {3, . . . , nB + 1}, b ∈ {1, . . . , a− 2} (2.79)
µa,b = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 2}, b ∈ {a+ 2, . . . , nB} (2.80)
Given (2.75)-(2.80), we can rewrite (2.74) as
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
1
2 − c
c
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
−
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b −
nB+1∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 − µnA,0 (2.81)
We also rewrite (2.73) as
µnA,nB =
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1) µa+1,a −
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b
+
(
1
2 − c
)
nA
cnB(nA − nB + 1)
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB +
nA
nA − nB + 1
nB+1∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,0 (2.82)
Now (2.81) and (2.82) imply that in the optimum
µnA,b = 0, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1} (2.83)
In addition, the slack odd IC for NB, given (2.75)-(2.80), takes the form
µnA,0 +
nB+1∑
a=2
(
nA
a
)
µa,0 >
1
2 − c
c
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a (2.84)
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Together with 2nB ≤ nA−1, this implies that at the optimum µa,0 = 0, a ∈ [2, nB+1],
and hence the support of the distribution includes only the profiles of the form
(a + 1, a), a ∈ [0, nB], (nB, nB) and (nA, 0). In particular, µnA,nB = 0, since from
(2.84) and (2.81), µnA,0 offsets µnB+1,nB and µnB ,nB (from the maximization point of
view, the profiles with higher turnout must receive larger probability weights).
Hence we can rewrite (2.81) as
µnA,nB = 0 =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
− µnA,0 (2.85)
The probability constraint now can be written as
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
= 1
Simplifying,
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nA + (a+ 1)(
1
2c − 1)
nA
)
µa+1,a
+
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)(
nA
nB
+
1
2c
− 1
)
µnB ,nB = 1 (2.86)
From (2.82),
0 =
(
nA
nB
) 1
2c − 1
nA − nB + 1µnB ,nB
+
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa+1,a (2.87)
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Thus
µnB ,nB = −
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(
1
2c − 1)
(
nA
nB
) )µa+1,a (2.88)
Now we can rewrite (2.86) as
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
nA + (a+ 1)(
1
2c − 1)
nA
−
(
nA
nB
+
1
2c
− 1
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nA(
1
2c − 1)
)]
= 1 (2.89)
Simplifying,
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
1 +
(a+ 1)( 12c − 1)− nB(nA − 1) + a(nA + 1)
nA
−nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB
(
1
2c − 1
) ] = 1 (2.90)
In addition, the binding odd IC for NA implies
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
(
nB − a− nB
nA
)
= 0 (2.91)
The binding even IC for NB is implies
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa+1,a =
1
2
− c
c
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB (2.92)
Using these expressions together with (2.86) and (2.88), we can (after some tedious
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algebra) express
µnB ,nB =
2c(
nA
nB
) (
1 +
(
1
2c − 1
) (
1
nA−1 +
nB
nA
)) (2.93)
Now, from (2.85),
µnA,0 =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
=
1
2 − c
c
[(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
(
1
2c
− 1
)(
1
nA − 1 +
nB
nA
)
+
(
nA
nB
)
nB
nA
µnB ,nB
]
=
1
2 − c
c
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
1
2c
(
1
nA − 1 +
nB
nA
)
− 1
nA − 1
]
=
2c
nA+
1
2c
−2
nA−1 +
nB( 12c−1)
nA
(
1
2c
− 1
)[
1
nA − 1
(
1
2c
− 1
)
+
1
2c
nB
nA
]
(2.94)
Plugging these expressions into the objective function and simplifying, we rewrite
(2.47) as
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f∗ = 1 +
nB∑
a=0
2a
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a + (2nB − 1)
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB + (nA − 1)µnA,0
= 1 +
nB∑
a=0
2a
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
−(2nB − 1)
(
nA
nB
) nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(
1
2c − 1)
(
nA
nB
) )µa+1,a
+(nA − 1)
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
−
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
) nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
) (
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(
1
2c − 1)
(
nA
nB
) )µa+1,a)
= 1 +
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
2a− (2nB − 1)nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(
1
2c − 1)
+(nA − 2nB + 2nB − 1)
(a+ 1)( 12c − 1)
nA
− (nA − 2nB + 2nB − 1)nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nA
]
= 1 +
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
2a− (2nB − 1)nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(
1
2c − 1)
+(2nB − 1)
(a+ 1)( 12c − 1)
nA
− (2nB − 1)nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nA
+(nA − 2nB)
(a+ 1)( 12c − 1)
nA
− (nA − 2nB)nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nA
]
= 1 + 2nB − 1 +
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
2a− 2nB + 1
+(nA − 2nB)
(a+ 1)( 12c − 1)− nB(nA − 1) + a(nA + 1)
nA
]
= 2nB +
nA − 2nB
2cnA
(
1 + nB − nB
nA
) nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
= 2nB +
nA − 2nB
2cnA
(
1 + nB − nB
nA
)(
1− µnA,0 −
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
)
= 2nB +
nA − 2nB
2cnA
(
1 + nB − nB
nA
)
×
 nA+
1
2c
−2
nA−1 +
nB( 12c−1)
nA
− 2c ( 12c − 1) [ 1nA−1 ( 12c − 1)+ 12c nBnA ]− 2c
nA+
1
2c
−2
nA−1 +
nB( 12c−1)
nA

= 2nB +
(nA − 2nB)(1− 2c)
1 + 2c
(
nA(nA−1)
nA+nB(nA−1) − 1
)
= 2nB + φ(c)
= nA × 2cnB(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
2c(nA − nB)(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
= nA × ξ(c)
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This completes the proof of case (ii).
Finally, there remains the knife-edge case of nB = d12nAe. When nA is odd, the
odd IC for NB is binding, so the proof of case (i) given above works just the same,
giving the maximal expected turnout of 2nB. When nA is even, the odd IC for NB
is slack, so the proof of case (ii) directly applies. The value of the objective function
at the optimum has φ(c) = 0. However, in contrast to case (ii), the support of the
symmetric distribution is different and in fact, may include all profiles except the tied
ones with turnout less than nB, and the profiles of the form (a, a+1), a ∈ [0, nB−1].
There is no simple analytic expression available for the equilibrium support, so we
verified our conclusions for this case using computer simulations. 
2.A.3 Proof of Corollary 3
Proof. Case (ii). In this case, the only profile in the support where the majority can
lose is (nB, nB), so
pim = 1− 1
2
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB = 1−
c
1 +
(
1
2c
− 1) ( 1
nA−1 +
nB
nA
)
Case (i). Since in the equilibrium distribution support all the profiles where the
majority wins are of the form (a, nB) for a ∈ [nB +1, nA] plus the largest tied profile,
it is easy to see that
pim =
1
2
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB + µnA,nB (2.95)
The first term above equals c from (2.71), but we do not have enough constraints to
identify the remaining terms in the sum individually. The rest of the proof charac-
terizes the bounds on these terms producing the result in the statement.
As Table 2.1 shows, at the optimum there are three binding constraints plus the total
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sum of probabilities constraint. It turns out that the first binding constraint, (2.58),
becomes equation (2.72), which we repeat here for convenience:
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB = (1− 2c)
(
1− nB
nA
)
(2.96)
The second binding constraint, (2.59), becomes an identity as it does not contain any
profiles from the equilibrium support. The third binding constraint, (2.60), reduces
to the total probability constraint. Namely,
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB +
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB +
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB = 1 (2.97)
From (2.71), 1
2
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB = c. Hence from the total probability constraint, 1−pim−
c ≥ 0 and the first inequality in the statement follows.
The two binding constraints we are left with, (2.96) and (2.97), are not enough to
determine pim even knowing µnB ,nB .
25 Nevertheless, from (2.96) and (2.97) we can
express
µnA,nB =
nB
nA
(1− 2c)−
nB−2∑
a=0
a
nA
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB −
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
a
nA
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB
Note that at the optimum µnA,nB > 0. We want to show that pim > 0.5 for all
c ∈ (0, 0.5). Suppose by way of contradiction that pim ≤ 0.5 for some cost c in this
range. Then from (2.95)
µnA,nB +
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB ≤
1
2
(1− 2c)
25For the special case identified in Remark 3, there are just two profiles in the equilibrium support
other than (nB , nB): (0, nB) and (nA, nB), hence we can derive their probabilities using (2.96) and
(2.97). We obtain µ0,nB = (1− 2c)
(
1− nBnA
)
, and therefore pim =
nB
nA
+ c
(
1− 2nBnA
)
.
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Correspondingly, from (2.97)
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB ≥
1
2
(1− 2c)
This implies that the total probability mass is greater on the lower turnout profiles
than on the higher turnout ones. Denote T the expected turnout at the optimal
probability distribution. From Proposition 1, T = 2nB. Then
2nB =
nB−2∑
a=0
(a+ nB)
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB + 2c · 2nB +
nA∑
a=nB+1
(a+ nB)
(
nA
a
)
µa,nB
= (1− 2c)
(
1
2
+ ε
)
µ¯L + 2c · 2nB + (1− 2c)
(
1
2
− ε
)
µ¯H ,
where µ¯L is the mean expected turnout at the lower turnout profiles, µ¯L ∈ (0, 2nB −
2); µ¯H is the mean expected turnout at the higher turnout profiles, µ¯H ∈ (2nB +
1, nA + nB), and ε ∈ [0, 0.5) is such that pim = 12 − ε. But then
2nB = (1− 2c)
[(
1
2
+ ε
)
(µ¯L + µ¯H)− 2εµ¯H
]
+ 2c · 2nB < 2nB,
since due to 2nB > nA and turnout maximization,
(
1
2
+ ε
)
(µ¯L + µ¯H)− 2εµ¯H < 2nB.
Contradiction, so pim >
1
2
. 
2.A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The results follow by taking the limits of the expressions for the maximal
expected turnout obtained in Proposition 1, divided by n ≡ nA + nB. To make
sure the proof of Proposition 1 works in the first place, notice that the incentive
compatibility constraints (2.49)-(2.52) are well-behaved for all n and bounded. 
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2.A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The minimum case is different, because the smallest (and so potentially opti-
mal) profile (0, 0) ∈ VT for all nA, nB ≥ 1. Nevertheless, the symmetric distribution
construction derived in the proof of Proposition 1 can be applied here just as well.
Notice first that µ0,0 ≥ 0 at the optimum. Using the latter and the fact that all
profile probabilities sum up to one, rewrite the objective in (2.35) as
1− µ0,0 +
∑
{s|∑ si=2}
µ(s) + 2
∑
{s|∑ si=3}
µ(s) + . . .
+(n− 2)
∑
{s|∑ si=n−1}
µ(s) + (n− 1)µnA,nB (2.98)
To minimize this expression, we want to increase µ0,0 as much as possible and set all
remaining probabilities to their lowest possible level. Notice that profiles (0, 1) and
(1, 0) are not directly present in (2.98), and profiles with total turnout of exactly two
have the same (absolute) marginal effect on the objective as µ0,0.
The odd ICs forNA andNB, (2.49) and (2.51), respectively, restrict µ0,0 from above
26,
and the exact bound depends on the ratio
1
2
−c
c
. This ratio approaches zero when the
cost increases towards 0.5, so for large enough cost, minimization requires placing
the largest probability mass onto (0, 0) at the expense of other voting profiles (in
particular, with total turnout of three or more), and so the minimal expected turnout
approaches zero. The opposite happens when the cost is close to 0, because then
1
2
−c
c
→∞, and hence (2.49) and (2.51) both require their right hand sides being close
to zero. Since nA ≥ nB, this is achieved by setting µa,a = 0 for a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 1}.
The probability of the largest tied profile, µnB ,nB , can be positive at the optimum
for c close to zero, because
1
2
−c
c
(
nA−1
nB−1
)
µnB ,nB restricts µ2,0 from above in the even IC
for NA, (2.50), and
1
2
−c
c
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB restricts µ0,2 from above in the even IC for NB,
(2.52), whereas for nA = nB, µnB ,nB is not at all restricted by the odd IC constraints
26If nA = nB , the right hand sides of the ICs for NA in (2.49) and (2.51) must be a bit adjusted
to have the indices in the first summation go up to nB − 1 instead of nB .
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(see ft.26), and for nA > nB, µnB ,nB is only restricted by the odd IC for NA. But in
all cases, the value of the objective does not exceed 2: it is always optimal to shift the
largest possible probability mass onto the profiles with total turnout between 0 to 2,
so even when c is close to 0, the (possible) presence of non-zero terms with turnout
exceeding 2 is compensated by their small equilibrium probabilities. The analytic
expression for the missing cost-dependent part of the expected turnout, ψ(c), can be
now straightforwardly, though rather tediously (due to the equilibrium distribution
support depending on the cost) derived using the same approach we applied in the
proof of Proposition 1. For c close to 0, all IC constraints are binding, while for c
close to 0.5, all but the even IC for NB bind. 
2.A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Any t ∈ [f∗(c), f ∗(c)] can be written as a linear combination of f∗(c) and
f ∗(c): t = λf∗(c) + (1 − λ)f ∗(c) for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Since f∗(c), f ∗(c) are expected
turnouts in a min-turnout and max-turnout correlated equilibria (CE), and the set
of CE payoffs is convex, t is also an expected turnout in some correlated equilibrium
given by probability distribution λµ∗ + (1− λ)µ∗. 
2.A.7 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose there is a correlated equilibrium with ma-
jority winning for sure. Then a profile (0, 0) is not in equilibrium support. The only
way the IC constraint for voters in NB can be satisfied with a positive voting cost
is to restrict the total probability mass to only those profiles where no one from NB
ever votes.27 This leaves admissible only profiles with voters from NA voting. Denote
ν(1i, a − 1, b) the equilibrium probability of a joint profile where i ∈ NA votes and
27Strictly speaking, in this case the conditional probability that a voting player from NB is pivotal
is not well-defined, so the corresponding IC constraint is vacuously satisfied.
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there are a − 1 other players from NA voting and b players from NB voting.28 The
IC constraint for voter i from NA (see (2.6)) takes the following form:
nA∑
a=2
ν(1i, a− 1, 0) ≤
1
2
− c
c
ν(1i, 0, 0)
At the same time, the IC constraint for any non-voter from NB (see (2.5)) can be
written as
nA∑
a=2
∑
i∈NA
ν(1i, a− 1, 0) ≥
1
2
− c
c
∑
i∈NA
ν(1i, 0, 0)
Clearly, both constraints cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Hence there is no cor-
related equilibrium with majority winning for sure. 
2.A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Welfare maximizing correlated equilibria have Pr(majority wins) as large as
possible and expected turnout as small as possible, so profiles of the form (a +
1, a), a ∈ [0, nB] must be in the support. The IC for non-voters in NB is now binding
at the optimum and implies (
nA
2
)
µ2,0 +
(
nB − 1
1
)
µ0,1 =
1
2 − c
c
[
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
]
, (2.99)
hence the equilibrium profiles must also include either (2, 0), or (0, 1), or both. Note
though that at (0, 1) majority loses, so including this profile decreases the probability
that majority wins as well as expected welfare. It is also important that in (2.99)
the probability of tied profiles restricts the probability mass distributed among the
welfare-optimal profiles (a + 1, a), a ∈ [0, nB − 1], so there can be at most one tied
28This is a shorthand notation, which should be understood as a sum of probabilities of all joint
profiles where i is voting and all remaining players behave as described.
88
profile in the equilibrium: (nB, nB).
The odd IC constraint for NA implies
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
2
)
µ2,0 ≥
1
2 − c
c
[(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB +
(
nB
1
)
µ0,1
]
This constraint is always slack at the optimum since it does not restrict the total
probability of the welfare-maximizing profiles on the left hand side.
The even IC constraint for NA implies(
nA − 1
1
)
µ2,0 ≤
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
(2.100)
and is binding at the optimum due to (2.99). Finally, the even IC constraint for NB
implies
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa+1,a ≤
1
2 − c
c
(
µ0,1 +
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
)
(2.101)
This constraint can be satisfied if either (0, 1) or (nB, nB) are in the support
29, in
which case the constraint is binding as long as some of the profiles (a+1, a), a ∈ [1, nB]
are in the support. If neither (0, 1) nor (nB, nB) is in the support, the constraint
requires all profiles (a+ 1, a), a ∈ [1, nB] not to be in the support as well.
Rewriting (2.99), we obtain
(
nA
2
)
µ2,0 +
(
nB − 1
1
)
µ0,1 =
1
2 − c
c
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a (2.102)
29It is not optimal to include both profiles in the support, because then there is simultaneously
a decrease in the probability majority wins and an increase in the expected turnout.
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From (2.100),
(nA − 1)µ2,0 =
1
2 − c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
(2.103)
so we can rewrite (2.102) as
1
2 − c
c
[
nB−1∑
a=0
[(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
−
(
nA
2
)
nA − 1
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)]
µa+1,a
]
=
1
2 − c
c
(
nA
2
)
nA − 1
((
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
+ (nB − 1)µ0,1
or
1
2 − c
2c
nAµ1,0 +
1
2 − c
2c
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
1− a
(
1 +
2
nB
))
µa+1,a =
1
2 − c
c
(
nA
nB
)
nB
2
µnB ,nB + (nB − 1)µ0,1 (2.104)
Notice that all terms in the sum on the first line are negative if profiles (a+1, a), a ∈
[1, nB] are in the support.
The total probability constraint takes the following form:
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA
2
)
µ2,0 +
(
nB
1
)
µ0,1 +
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB = 1
Plugging in the expression for µ2,0 from (2.103), we obtain
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
1 +
(12 − c)(a+ 1)
2c
]
+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
nB(
1
2 − c)
2c
+ 1
]
+ nBµ0,1 = 1 (2.105)
Using the total probability constraint, the total welfare minus the fixed nB term can
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be written as follows
W − nB = (nA − nB)
[
1− 1
2
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB − nBµ0,1
]
−c
[
nB∑
a=0
(2a+ 1)
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a + 2
(
nA
2
)
µ2,0 + 2nB
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB + nBµ0,1
]
Suppose all profiles (a + 1, a), a ∈ [1, nB] are in the support, then IC constraint
(2.101) is binding:
nB∑
a=0
a
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a =
1
2 − c
c
(
nBµ0,1 + nB
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
)
(2.106)
Thus we can rewrite the above expression for welfare as
W − nB = (nA − nB)
[
1− 1
2
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB − nBµ0,1
]
−c
[
2(12 − c)
c
(
nBµ0,1 + nB
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
)
+ 1 +
(
nA
2
)
µ2,0 + (2nB − 1)
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
]
Simplifying, this equals
= nA − nB − c+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
c− nA + nB
2
]
+ nBµ0,1 [2c+ nB − nA − 1]− c
(
nA
2
)
µ2,0
Plugging in the expression for µ2,0, we obtain
nA − nB − c+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
c− nA + nB
2
− nB(
1
2 − c)
2
]
+ nBµ0,1 [2c+ nB − nA − 1]
−
1
2 − c
2
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
(a+ 1)µa+1,a
)
After tedious algebraic manipulations with the binding IC constraints, we can express
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the sum of all (a+ 1, a) profile probabilities as follows.
1
2 − c
2c
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a = µ0,1
nB − 1 +( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
)

+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
) +
nB(
1
2 − c)
2c

Using this expression together with (2.106) to substitute the respective terms in the
formula for welfare, we obtain
W = nA − c+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
c− nA + nB
2
− nB(
1
2 − c)
2
]
+ nBµ0,1 [2c+ nB − nA − 1]
−c
µ0,1
nB − 1 +( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
)
+ (nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
) +
nB(
1
2 − c)
2c

−
1
2 − c
2
1
2 − c
c
(
nBµ0,1 + nB
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
)
Simplifying, we can finally write
W ∗ = nA − c+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
c− nA + nB + 2nB(
1
2 − c)
2
−
(
1
2 − c
)2
(1 + nB)
c
]
+
µ0,1
[
c(1 + nB) + nB [nB − nA − 1]−
(
1
2 − c
)2
(1 + nB)
c
]
(2.107)
From the binding IC constraints we obtain
1
2 − c
2c
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a = µ0,1
nB − 1 +( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
)

+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
) +
(
1
2 − c
)
nB
2c

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We can now write down the total probability constraint as follows
c+ 12
1
2 − c
µ0,1
nB − 1 +( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
)
+ (nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
( 12 − c
c
)2
(1 +
nB
2
) +
(
1
2 − c
)
nB
2c

+
(
1
2 − c
)2
2c2
(
nBµ0,1 + nB
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
)
+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
nB(
1
2 − c)
2c
+ 1
]
+ nBµ0,1 = 1
Simplifying,
µ0,1
[
nB − (c+ 12)
1
2 − c
+
(c+ 12(nB + 1))(
1
2 − c)
c2
]
+
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
(c+ 12(nB + 1))(
1
2 − c)
c2
+
nB
2c
+ 1
]
= 1
We can now estimate the effects of including either (0, 1) or (nB, nB) in the equilib-
rium support on welfare. First, let µ0,1 = 0, then(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB =
1
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
+ nB2c + 1
(2.108)
Plugging in to (2.107), we obtain
W ∗nB ,nB = nA − c+
[
c− nA+nB+2nB(
1
2
−c)
2 −
( 12−c)
2
(1+nB)
c
]
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
+ nB2c + 1
(2.109)
Second, let µnB ,nB = 0, then
µ0,1 =
1[
nB−(c+ 12 )
1
2
−c +
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
] (2.110)
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Plugging in to (2.107), we obtain
W ∗0,1 = nA − c+
[
c(1 + nB) + nB [nB − nA − 1]− (
1
2
−c)2(1+nB)
c
]
nB−(c+ 12 )
1
2
−c +
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
(2.111)
Comparing W0,1 and WnB ,nB , we see that (nB, nB) is in the support iff[
c− nA+nB+2nB(
1
2
−c)
2 −
( 12−c)
2
(1+nB)
c
]
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
+ nB2c + 1
>
[
c(1 + nB) + nB [nB − nA − 1]− (
1
2
−c)2(1+nB)
c
]
nB−(c+ 12 )
1
2
−c +
(c+ 1
2
(nB+1))(
1
2
−c)
c2
which is equivalent to
2c
[
2c− cnA − nB + 1
2
]
>
(12 − c)c(nB + 1)
[
cnB [nB − nA] + c− nB+14
]
c2(32nB − 1)− c2nB+14 + nB+18
It is straightforward to check that the denominator on the RHS is always positive
for nB ≥ 1 and c ∈ (0, 0.5), so we can rewrite
(
2c2(2− nA)− c(nB + 1)
)(
c2(
3
2
nB − 1)− c2nB + 1
4
+
nB + 1
8
)
>
(
c
2
− c2)(nB + 1)
[
cnB [nB − nA] + c− nB + 1
4
]
This expression reduces to the following quadratic inequality:
c2(2− nA)(3nB − 2)− c
[
(nB + 1)(nB
(
3
2
+ nA − nB
)
− nA) + nA − 2
2
]
+
(nB + 1)(nB − nA)(12 − nB)
2
> 0 (2.112)
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The discriminant of (2.112) is
D ≡ (nB + 1)2
(
nB
(
3
2
+ nA − nB
)
− nA
)2
+
(nA − 2)2
4
+ (nA − 2)(nB + 1)
[nB
2
+ (nA − nB)(1 + 6nB(nB − 1))
]
,
which is always positive for nA > 2 ≥ nB ≥ 1, so the cutoff cost is uniquely30
determined by
c∗ = min
{
0.5,
(nB + 1)(nB(
3
2 + nA − nB)− nA) + nA−22 −
√
D
2(2− nA)(3nB − 2)
}
(2.113)
Hence for 0 < c < c∗ profile (nB, nB) is in the equilibrium support, and the optimal
welfare is given by (2.109). For c∗ < c < 0.5, profile (nB, nB) is not in the equilibrium
support, but profile (0, 1) is, and the optimal welfare is given by (2.111). These
expressions were derived under the assumption that profiles (a+ 1, a), a ∈ [1, nB] are
in equilibrium support. To conclude the proof, we need to consider the case where
the cost is so high that these profiles are not in the support, and constraint (2.101)
is slack. In this case, of course, (nB, nB) is not in the equilibrium support.
Suppose that profiles (a + 1, a), a ∈ {1, . . . , nB} are not in the equilibrium support.
Then from (2.104),
1
2 − c
c
µ1,0 =
2(nB − 1)
nA
µ0,1
Using the total probability constraint, we can now write(
nA
1
)
µ1,0 +
(
nA
2
)
µ2,0 +
(
nB
1
)
µ0,1 = 1
or
µ0,1
2(nB − 1)
1
2
−c
c
+ 2nB − 1
 = 1
30The other critical cost value is always negative, so outside the range of (0, 0.5).
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So we obtain
µ0,1 =
1
2 − c
nB −
(
1
2 + c
)
µ1,0 =
2c(nB − 1)
nA
[
nB −
(
1
2 + c
)]
µ2,0 =
(
1
2 − c
)
(nB − 1)(
nA
2
) [
nB −
(
1
2 + c
)]
and the optimal welfare is
W ∗ =
nB(nB − c)(12 − c) + 2c(nB − 1)(nA − c) + (nA − 2c)
(
1
2 − c
)
(nB − 1)
nB −
(
1
2 + c
) (2.114)
We can now compare W ∗ with W ∗0,1 to obtain the condition on the cost for which
(a+ 1, a), a ∈ [1, nB] are not in the support: this is so iff
nA − c+
(12 − c)c2
[
c(1 + nB) + nB [nB − nA − 1]− (
1
2
−c)2(1+nB)
c
]
c2(nB − (c+ 12)) + (c+ 12(nB + 1))(12 − c)2
<
nB(nB − c)(12 − c) + 2c(nB − 1)(nA − c) + (nA − 2c)
(
1
2 − c
)
(nB − 1)
nB −
(
1
2 + c
)
which is equivalent to the following cubic inequality:
c3
(
nA +
nB − 5
2
)
+
c2
2
((nA − nB)(nB − 1) + 3− nB)
− c
4
(
nB + 1
2
+ (nA − nB)(2nB + 1)
)
+
(nA − nB)(nB + 1)
8
< 0

96
2.A.9 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. The proof closely follows the proof of Proposition 1. Assume that the optimal
correlated equilibrium distribution is symmetric, as defined there. Although the
voting costs are heterogeneous, it is easy to see that once constraints (2.38) hold for
the players with the lowest cost in each group, and constraints (2.39) hold for the
players with the highest cost, the incentive compatibility constraints for all players
will hold automatically.
Using symmetry, we obtain the following system of four inequalities with respect to
(nA + 1)(nB + 1) variables of the form µa,b:
nA−1∑
a=1
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b ≥
1
2
− cA
cA
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
(2.115)
nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−1∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b ≤
1
2
− c¯A
c¯A
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
(2.116)
97
and
nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB−1}∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b ≥
1
2
− cB
cB
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
)
(2.117)
nA∑
a=2
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b ≤
1
2
− c¯B
c¯B
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa,a
)
(2.118)
We will refer to the first and the third inequality above as the odd incentive com-
patibility (IC) constraints, and to the second and the fourth inequality as the even
IC constraints, distinguished by the group.
Since nA > nB, at the largest turnout profile µnA,nB all voters from NB (as well as
voters from NA, if nA > nB + 1) are dummies. Hence the even IC constraint for NB
is always binding at the optimum.
The even IC constraint for NA requires
µnA,nB ≤
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
−
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 −
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
b
)
µnB+1,b −
nB∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0
+
1
2c¯A
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB −
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 (2.119)
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The binding even IC for NB requires
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c¯B
c¯B
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
]
−
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa+1,a −
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnB+1,b
−
nB∑
b=2
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µ0,b (2.120)
These expressions immediately imply that the odd IC for NA is always binding at
the optimum. To see this, notice that in the binding constraint (2.120) all profiles
relevant for the odd IC for NA, i.e. those where a non-voter from NA is a dummy,
have the negative sign and so must be reduced as much as possible at the optimum.
The only subset of profiles where a non-voter from NA is a dummy that is not
directly restricted by (2.120) has the form
∑nA−1
a=1
(
nA−1
a−1
)
µa,0. But these profiles are
restricted by (2.119). If the latter is binding, the restriction is trivial. Suppose not,
then if we reduced all directly restricted by (2.120) probabilities to their lower limit
of zero and the odd IC for NA was still not binding, then constraint (2.119) (slack
by assumption) would imply that µnA,nB < 0. Therefore, the odd IC for NA must
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bind at the optimum, so we can write it as
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB −
1
2 − cA
cA
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB−1 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB
+
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB+1∑
a=2
a−2∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−3∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b =
1
2 − cA
cA
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
(2.121)
Thus for all cost thresholds the even IC for NB and the odd IC for NA are binding.
Proceeding exactly as in the proof of Proposition 1, we can express µnA,nB from
(2.120) (the binding even IC for NB) and then substitute the term
(
nA−1
nB−1
)
µnB−1,nB
using (2.121) (the binding odd IC for NA). The resulting expressions are the modified
versions of (2.60), (2.61), and (2.62), respectively:
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c¯B
c¯B
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=2
a−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
]
, (2.122)
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nA − 1
nB − 1
)
· µnB−1,nB =
cA
1
2 − cA
[
nB+1∑
a=1
a−1∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
−
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
, (2.123)
and
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c¯B
c¯B
(
−
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
nA + 1
nA − nB + 1µa,a+1
+
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
a(nA + 1)− nBnA
nB(nA − nB + 1) µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=2
a−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µa,b
]
+
1
2 − c¯B
c¯B
cA(
1
2 − cA
) nA
nA − nB + 1
[
nB+1∑
a=1
a−1∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
(2.124)
The key difference between (2.124) and (2.62) is that in (2.124), all terms in the last
square brackets have an additional multiplier
1
2
−c¯B
c¯B
cA
( 12−cA)
. The equivalence between
(2.124) and (2.62) holds if and only if this multiplier equals 1, that is, if and only
if cA = c¯B. If these cost thresholds are different, the equilibrium probability of the
largest profile, as well as other profiles in the equilibrium support, will be different
than in either of the cases considered in Proposition 1, and therefore, the corre-
sponding maximal expected turnout will be different from f ∗, the maximal expected
turnout in Proposition 1. How much different depends on the relation between cA
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and c¯B. Suppose that cA < c¯B. Then a simple contradiction argument implies
1
2
− c¯B
c¯B
cA(
1
2
− cA
) < 1 (2.125)
In this case, maximization implies placing a smaller probability mass on the largest
turnout profile than in Proposition 1.31 Therefore, the expected turnout is lower
than in Proposition 1 for all costs satisfying this condition. It is easy to show that
if cA > c¯B, the opposite inequality holds in (2.125) and the equilibrium distribution
places a larger mass on µnA,nB , so the expected turnout is higher than in Proposition
1.
We will now show that if cA = c¯B, the equilibrium distribution support does not
change, and the maximal expected turnout corresponds to f ∗ from Proposition 1.32
The remaining IC constraints, the even IC for NA and the odd IC for NB, generally
exhibit more complicated bind/slack properties. Unlike the homogenous cost case,
their behavior at the optimum depends on the relations between the cost thresholds.
We claim, however, that if cA = c¯B = c, the IC constraints exhibit the same behavior
as in Proposition 1: for nB > d12nAe the even IC for NA is slack for all admissible
values of c and the remaining cost thresholds, c¯A and cB, and the odd IC for NB is
binding. For nB < d12nAe the even IC for NA is binding, and the odd IC for NB is
slack.
Let nB > d12nAe. Comparing (2.120) and (2.119), we see that the RHS of (2.120)
cannot be strictly greater than the RHS of (2.119), since if this was the case, the even
IC for NA would not hold at all at the optimum of the constrained maximization
program. If the RHS of (2.120) is strictly less than the RHS of (2.119), then the
even IC for NA is slack, as we claim. The critical case is when the two RHS are the
31Note that this is true even if µnA,nB = 0 at the optimum, because in this case decreasing the
RHS of (2.124) means smaller probability of the next largest profile in the equilibrium support.
32This is exactly so for case (i), where the expected turnout does not depend on the cost. For
case(ii), which is cost dependent, we will show that the expected turnout exhibits the same cost-
dependent dynamics as in Proposition 1.
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same. Since by assumption nB > d12nAe, we have 2nB ≥ nA + 1, so 2nB + 1 > nA.
Then the total turnout of the first term on the last line of (2.119), 2nB + 1, exceeds
the total turnout of the largest term in the remaining summation on that line, which
is nA, achieved at µnA,0. Hence at the optimum
1
2c¯A
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB+1,nB −
nA∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 > 0
Since cA = c¯B = c, a simple contradiction argument implies that
1
2
− c¯A
c¯A
≤
1
2
− c¯B
c¯B
(2.126)
At the same time,
1
2
−c¯A
c¯A
< 1
2c¯A
, and the largest turnout in the parentheses on the first
line of (2.119), 2nB, is less than 2nB + 1, the turnout of the term with coefficient
1
2c¯A
on the last line of (2.119). Optimization implies that the effect of this latter term
must exceed the effect of the former. Therefore at the optimum the RHS of (2.120)
is strictly less than the RHS of (2.119), and so the even IC for NA is slack.
Turning to the odd IC constraints, we can rewrite (2.117) as
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nB − 1
b
)
µnA,b
+
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 +
nB+1∑
a=2
a−2∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b +
nB−3∑
a=0
nB−1∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
b
)
µa,b ≥
1
2 − cB
cB
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a
)
(2.127)
Comparing (2.127) with (2.121), we again see that, except for the terms on the first
two lines of (2.121) and those on the first line of (2.127), in every remaining profile
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of (2.121) the total turnout matches exactly the total turnout in the corresponding
term of (2.127). Since cA = c¯B, we have
1
2
− cA
cA
≤
1
2
− cB
cB
(2.128)
Then at the optimum
nB−1∑
b=0
(
nB − 1
b
)
µnA,b +
1
2c
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB ≤
nA−1∑
a=nB+1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB +
(
nA − 1
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB−1 +
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,nB (2.129)
This follows, since nB > d12nAe, so 2nB ≥ nA+1 and all profiles on the LHS of (2.129)
are matched by the corresponding profiles on the RHS. Together with (2.128), this
implies that the odd IC for NB is binding.
We can now proceed exactly as in the proof of Proposition 1. One can even show
that the expression for the probability of the largest tie remains the same:
µnB ,nB =
2c(
nA
nB
) , (2.130)
where c = cA = c¯B. Substituting the expressions for the probabilities of the largest
profiles into the objective function, we obtain h∗ = 2nB. This completes the proof
of case (i).
Now suppose nB < d12nAe, then 2nB < nA. Analogously to case (ii) of Proposition
1, we have the even IC for NA binding and the odd IC for NB slack at the optimum,
if cA = c¯B = c. Due to the odd IC for NA and the even IC for NB binding
33, we can
express the probability of the largest profile as
33These constraints bind for case (i) just as well.
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µnA,nB =
1
2 − c
c
(
−
nB−2∑
a=0
(
nA
a
)(
nB − 1
a+ 1
)
nA + 1
nA − nB + 1µa,a+1
+
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
(
a(nA + 1)− nAnB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
))
+
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
(nB − b)(nA + 1) + (b− a− 1)nB
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
nB(nA + b− a)− b(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
a=2
a−1∑
b=1
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(
nB(nA + b− a)− b(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa,b
+
nB∑
b=1
(
nA
nB + 1
)(
nB
b
)(
(nA − nB)(nB − b)− (nB + b)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µnB+1,b
+
nA
nA − nB + 1
nA−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,0 −
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b (2.131)
On the other hand, the even IC for NA binding implies
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
−
[
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b +
nB∑
a=3
a−2∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
+
nA−1∑
a=nB+2
nB∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
]
−
nB−1∑
a=1
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 −
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nA − 1
nB
)(
nB
b
)
µnB+1,b
−
nA∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 (2.132)
Comparing (2.132) with (2.131), taking into account that c¯A ≥ c and the odd IC for
105
NB is slack, we see that at the optimum, just like in case (ii) of Proposition 1,
µa,a+1 = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 1} (2.133)
µa,a = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 1} (2.134)
µnB+1,b = 0, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1} (2.135)
µa,b = 0, a ∈ {nB + 2, . . . , nA − 1}, b ∈ {0, . . . , nB} (2.136)
µa,b = 0, a ∈ {3, . . . , nB + 1}, b ∈ {1, . . . , a− 2} (2.137)
µa,b = 0, a ∈ {0, . . . , nB − 2}, b ∈ {a+ 2, . . . , nB} (2.138)
Given (2.133)-(2.138), we can rewrite (2.132) as
µnA,nB =
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
−
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB
b
)
µnA,b −
nB+1∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a− 1
)
µa,0 − µnA,0 (2.139)
We also rewrite (2.131) as
µnA,nB =
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1) µa+1,a
−
nB−1∑
b=1
(
nB − 1
b− 1
)
µnA,b +
(
1
2 − c
)
nA
cnB(nA − nB + 1)
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
+
nA
nA − nB + 1
nB+1∑
a=2
(
nA − 1
a
)
µa,0 (2.140)
Now (2.139) and (2.140) imply that at the optimum
µnA,b = 0, b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1} (2.141)
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In addition, the slack odd IC for NB, given (2.133)-(2.138), takes the form
µnA,0 +
nB+1∑
a=2
(
nA
a
)
µa,0 >
1
2 − cB
cB
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a
)
µa+1,a (2.142)
Together with 2nB ≤ nA − 1, this implies that at the optimum µa,0 = 0, a ∈
{2, . . . , nB + 1}, and hence the support of the distribution includes only the pro-
files of the form (a + 1, a), a ∈ {0, . . . , nB}, (nB, nB) and (nA, 0). In particular,
µnA,nB = 0, since from (2.142) and (2.139), µnA,0 offsets µnB+1,nB and µnB ,nB (from
the maximization point of view, the profiles with higher turnout must receive larger
probability weights).
Hence we can rewrite (2.139) as
µnA,nB = 0 =
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
− µnA,0(2.143)
The probability constraint can now be written as
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB +
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
= 1
Simplifying,
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nA + (a+ 1)(
1
2c¯A
− 1)
nA
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)(
nA
nB
+
1
2c¯A
− 1
)
µnB ,nB = 1(2.144)
From (2.140),
0 =
(
nA
nB
) 1
2c − 1
nA − nB + 1µnB ,nB +
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(nA − nB + 1)
)
µa+1,a(2. 45)
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Thus
µnB ,nB = −
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nB(
1
2c − 1)
(
nA
nB
) )µa+1,a (2.146)
Now we can rewrite (2.144) as
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
nA + (a+ 1)(
1
2c¯A
− 1)
nA
−
(
nA
nB
+
1
2c¯A
− 1
)(
nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)
nA(
1
2c − 1)
)]
= 1 (2.147)
Simplifying,
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
[
1 +
(a+ 1)( 12c¯A − 1)
nA
− [nB(nA − 1)− a(nA + 1)][2c¯A(nA − nB) + nB]
nAnB c¯A
(
1
c − 2
) ] = 1 (2.148)
In addition, the binding odd IC for NA implies
nB∑
a=0
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a
(
nB − a− nB
nA
)
= 0 (2.149)
The binding even IC for NB is implies
nB∑
a=1
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB − 1
a− 1
)
µa+1,a =
1
2
− c
c
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB (2.150)
Using these expressions together with (2.144) and (2.146), we can (after some alge-
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bra) express
µnB ,nB =
2(
nA
nB
) (
1
c
[
1 + 12c¯A(nA−1) +
nB
nA
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)]
− 1c¯A(nA−1)
) (2.151)
It is interesting to compare this expression with its analog (2.93) in the proof of
Proposition 1. Notice that the two coincide if c = c¯A. From (2.143),
µnA,0 =
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA − 1
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
(
nA − 1
nB − 1
)
µnB ,nB
)
=
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
[(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
(nB(nA − 1) + nA)
(
1
2c − 1
)
nA(nA − 1) +
(
nA
nB
)
nB
nA
µnB ,nB
]
=
1
2 − c¯A
c¯A
1
nA
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
(nB(nA − 1) + nA)
(
1
2c − 1
)
nA − 1 + nB
]
=
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)(
1
2c(
nB(nA−1)
nA
+ 1)− 1
)
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)(
1
2c
(
nB(nA−1)
nA
+ 1
)
− 1
)
+ nA
1
2c − 1
(2.152)
Plugging these expressions into the objective function and simplifying, we rewrite
the analog of (2.47) for the case of heterogeneous costs as
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h∗ = 1 + 2
nB∑
a=0
a
(
nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a + (2nB − 1)
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB + (nA − 1)µnA,0
= 1 + 2nB
(
1
2c
− 1
)(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB + (2nB − 1)
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
+ (nA − 1)
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)
nA
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
(nB(nA − 1) + nA)
(
1
2c − 1
)
+ nB(nA − 1)
nA − 1
= 1 +
(
nA
nB
)
µnB ,nB
[
nB
c
− 1 +
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)(
1
2c
(
nB(1− 1
nA
) + 1
)
− 1
)]
= 1 +
2
[
nB
c − 1 +
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)(
1
2c
(
nB(1− 1nA ) + 1
)
− 1
)]
1
c
[
1 + 12c¯A(nA−1) +
nB
nA
(
1
2c¯A
− 1
)]
− 1c¯A(nA−1)
= nA × 2c¯AnB(nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
2c¯A[nA − nB](nA − 1) + nB(nA − 1) + nA(1− 2c)
= nA × ξ(c, c¯A)
Finally, a simple proof by contradiction shows that 2nB < h
∗ < nA for all costs
0 < c ≤ c¯A < 12 . This completes the proof of case (ii).

2.A.10 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Set q to be a probability distribution in ∆(S) that chooses the cost-independent
strategies (i.e., constant functions from types to actions) with probability 1. This
allows us to write si(ci) = si for all ci ∈ (0, 0.5). Require in addition that for all
i ∈ N , all a−i ∈ V iD, and all a−i ∈ V iP∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i|si(ci) = 0) = µ(0, a−i)
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and ∑
{s−i(c−i)=a−i}
q(si, s−i|si(ci) = 1) = µ(1, a−i),
where µ(a) ∈ ∆(S) is the probability distribution over joint action profiles that
delivers the solution to the max-turnout problem under complete information with
heterogeneous costs defined by C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B) (see Proposition 7). Notice that for cost-
independent strategies, the summations on the LHS of the above expressions are
taken over a single strategy. Then for every player i, q selects the constant-zero
strategy si(ci) = 0 ∀ci ∈ (0, 0.5) with probability
∑
a−i µ(0, a−i), and the constant-
one strategy si(ci) = 1 ∀ci ∈ (0, 0.5) with the complementary probability. Suppose
first that c¯B = cA. Then Proposition 7 holds at any cost profile c ∈ C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B)
with the same equilibrium distribution over actions, µ(a) ∈ ∆(S), because this
distribution is completely determined by the cost bounds (cA, c¯A, cB, c¯B) and the sizes
of the groups, nA and nB. Therefore, none of the incentive compatibility constraints
(2.38)-(2.39) is violated at an arbitrary c ∈ C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B). Hence this is true for all
admissible c, and both constraints (2.43)-(2.44) hold as well. Therefore, we can
guarantee the expected turnout at least as large as h˜∗. If c¯B < cA, then, as discussed
in the proof of Proposition 7, the maximum expected turnout exceeds h˜∗, so again,
for any fixed cost profile c ∈ C(cA,c¯A,cB ,c¯B) we can satisfy conditions (2.38)-(2.39) with
the same equilibrium distribution µ(a) ∈ ∆(S). 
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Chapter 3
Subcorrelated and
Subcommunication Equilibria
How can communication between competing groups of economic agents help coordi-
nate their actions? Many important situations in economics and political science can
be modeled as a nexus of such agents and group coordination mechanisms. Exam-
ples include voter turnout, where citizens, supporting one of the two political parties,
receive mobilization messages and then decide between costly voting and staying at
home, local public good games, competitions between several teams, and so on.
To explore this question in an abstract framework, we introduce the concept of
subcorrelated equilibrium (SCE), which extends Aumann’s correlated equilibrium to
the case of multiple mediators, and subcommunication equilibrium (SCME), which
similarly extends Myerson’s communication equilibrium. There is a partition of
players into groups, and the subcorrelated equilibrium allows players’ choices to be
correlated within the group, but remain independent across different groups. Players
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receive (correlated) signals from their groups and make optimal choices given the
group structure, which is complicated by the fact that their utility depends on the
actions of players in all other groups.
More specifically, to account for possible coordination among players, game theorists
often add a pre-play communication stage, assuming that all players coordinate their
actions via a single correlation device. We relax this assumption and design the
subcorrelated equilibrium to provide positive answers to questions like: what happens
if the correlation device is only available to certain groups of players? What if
different groups of players coordinate their actions using different correlation devices?
The subcorrelated equilibrium carves out a subset of correlated equilibria consistent
with these additional restrictions on correlation devices; it thus fills the gap between
Nash and correlated equilibrium.
The subcorrelated equilibrium can be extended to the incomplete information setting
by introducing agents’ types and replacing correlation devices with communication
devices, which can now receive reports from the agents in their groups (in particular,
their types) in addition to giving recommendations. This leads to the notion of the
subcommunication equilibrium.
Subcorrelated and subcommunication equilibria are most closely related to equilibria
among several principals, developed in Myerson (1982, Section 4). Myerson inter-
prets communication devices in groups as principals controlling disjoint groups of
agents, who maximize their expected utility subject to their agents’ incentive com-
patibility constraints. Myerson’s principals’ equilibria, defined as a solution to this
113
mutual optimization problem may fail to exist in games with sufficient competition
among principals, because in this case a principal could benefit from deviating to a
non-equilibrium direct mechanism that is incentive compatible for her own agents,
but violates the incentive compatibility constraints of some other principal’s agents.
As a solution to this problem, Myerson introduced principals’ quasi-equilibria that
exist in all finite games and are asymptotically optimal for all principals. The sub-
communication equilibrium does not require different communication devices to be
competing principals, but for the subset of SCME where this interpretation holds, we
prove their equivalence to the set of principals’ quasi-equilibrium of Myerson (1982).
These equilibria can be obtained as a solution to the optimization problem where
all principals maximize their expected utility subject to their agents’ incentive com-
patibility constraints as well as the incentive compatibility constraints of all other
principals’ agents at the tuple of direct mechanisms under consideration.
Subcorrelated and subcommunication equilibria are related to several literatures.
The competing mechanisms literature (e.g., Epstein and Peters (1999), Martimort
and Stole (2002), and Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2013)) assumes multiple prin-
cipals controlling the same pool of agents, and that the principals know their own
mechanisms only, whereas the agents observe the mechanisms offered by all principals
and thus have some market information in addition to their type. Including market
information into an agent’s type leads to difficulties in the incomplete information
settings, because players in a direct mechanism must report their type to each prin-
cipal, which can lead to an infinite regress. See Peters and Troncoso-Valverde (2013).
Subcommunication equilibria have multiple principals controlling different groups of
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agents and using commonly known direct mechanisms. Another distinction (e.g.,
compared to Epstein and Peters (1999)) is that in our case, the outside option utility
may depend on the actions of the other principals’ agents.
The epistemic game theory literature that looks at correlated rationalizable equilib-
ria in players’ beliefs is relevant for the subcorrelated equilibrium. A related paper
here is Tsakas (2014), who introduces the so called “correlated-belief equilibrium”,
which relaxed the assumption of independent marginal conjectures, implied by a Nash
equilibrium. The main difference between the correlated-belief equilibrium and the
subcorrelated equilibrium is due to the fact that the former is a special case of a sub-
jective correlated equilibrium (Tsakas, 2014, Prop. 5), whereas the latter restricts
the objective correlated equilibrium. See also Liu (2015) for a more general epistemic
approach to the relation between the correlation devices, partition models, and belief
hierarchies. Another related idea can also be found in Stein, Ozdaglar and Parrilo
(2014). They introduce an equilibrium concept called “exchangeable equilibrium”,
where players’ strategies are conditionally independent and identically distributed
(iid) random variables. This is a weakening of the Nash equilibrium, where strate-
gies are unconditionally iid. Still, this concept assumes a single correlation device,
so it is a very different relaxation of the correlated equilibrium, compared to the
subcorrelated equilibrium.
Finally, there is also a somewhat distant relation to the literature on cooperative
solutions. For example, Ichiishi (1981) introduced a “social coalitional equilibrium”,
which has a similar flavor to the subcorrelated equilibrium. However in that paper
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as well as in other extensions that followed (see, e.g., Ray and Vohra (1997) and
references therein) players are assumed to behave cooperatively in groups (called
coalitions) and non-cooperatively across groups. In contrast, in the subcorrelated
equilibrium all behavior is non-cooperative. Furthermore, the main focus of Ichiishi
(1981) is on proving existence of the social coalitional equilibrium, which in our
setting follows immediately from the correlated equilibrium existence in finite games.
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 describes the main
modeling framework. We define the subcorrelated equilibrium and its properties in
Section 3.1.1. Section 3.1.2 describes the general case of subcommunication equi-
librium, which is an extension of the subcorrelated equilibrium to the incomplete
information setting. Section 3.2 applies the general ideas and definitions of subcor-
related and principals’ equilibria in a less abstract setting of a voter turnout game.
Section 3.3 concludes.
3.1 The Model
In this section we introduce the formal framework for subcorrelated and subcommuni-
cation equilibria. These concepts generalize correlated and communication equilibria
under complete and incomplete information, respectively. Accordingly, we split the
definitions and results into two subsections that differ by the information assump-
tions in the game. We start by providing the necessary notation.
There are two types of players: principals and agents. We assume that each principal
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has at least one agent, and that each agent interacts with no more than one principal.
Let I be the set of agents, and N , with n := |N |, the set of principals. For each
principal k ∈ N , let Nk ⊆ I be the set of k’s agents, with nk := |Nk|. Let N˜k := {k}∪
Nk be a set that consists of principal k and his nk agents. Let N :=
⋃n
k=1 N˜k = N ∪I
be the set of all players in the game. An alternative way to represent the players in
this game is to partition I into n disjoint groups of agents, where 1 ≤ n ≤ |I| is fixed,
and each group is controlled by a different principal. Let Ak := Ak0×Ak1×. . .×Aknk be
the joint action domain for principal k, who controls Ak0, and his agents, numbered
{1, . . . , nk}, who each control action domain Aki . Let A := ×nj=1Aj be the joint action
domain of all principals and their agents. We assume A is finite.
We are interested in the set of equilibrium outcomes in a game extended with general
forms of pre-play communication. While there are infinitely many ways communi-
cation between players can be introduced, we are going to invoke the revelation
principle and focus on direct mechanisms only.1
3.1.1 Complete information
We start by analyzing the complete information case. Before presenting the formal
definitions, we briefly discuss the main modeling choices for the principals’ behavior.
1The standard interpretation of a direct mechanism is in terms of a centralized mediator (a
communication device) who receives type reports from players, draws a joint action profile from
a probability distribution and then privately informs each player about their respective profile
component.
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3.1.1.1 Principals’ behavior
There are several alternative ways to model the principals’ behavior.
First, we can leave the principals out of strategic interactions entirely, and model all
pre-play communication among agents via a single correlation device.2 This device
can be thought of as an impartial mediator, drawing a joint action profile from a
commonly known probability distribution, and then privately informing each agent
about her respective profile component. The equilibrium conditions imposed on
the set of admissible distributions correspond to the incentive compatibility of each
agent’s actions when all other agents follow their recommended actions. This solution
concept is the (objective) correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974, 1987).
Second, we can take into account the division of the agents into groups, and model
each principal as an independent correlation device for their group. That is, each
principal serves as a mediator for his agents, drawing a voting profile from a prob-
ability distribution over group profiles, and then privately informing each agent in
his group about her respective profile component. The equilibrium conditions now
require in addition to incentive compatibility that the distribution over joint action
profiles is a product of n independent distributions over group profiles. This solution
concept is introduced in this chapter and called subcorrelated equilibrium; it selects
a subset of correlated equilibria.
Third, we can think of the principals as independent players who maximize their
2We focus on complete information case here, but the same logic applies to the incomplete
information case, with correlation devices replaced by communication devices.
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expected utilities by choosing an incentive compatible direct mechanism for their
agents given the other principal’s chosen mechanism. The equilibrium conditions
now require in addition to the product structure that the mechanisms are optimal
for each principal and incentive compatible for their agents. This solution concept,
called principals’ equilibrium, was introduced by Myerson (1982); it selects a subset
of subcorrelated equilibria. The difficulty about this concept is that each agent’s
incentive compatibility constraints depend on all other agents, while each principal
only cares about his own agents’ constraints. As a result, principals’ equilibria rarely
exist.
Finally, we can keep the same structure as in a principals’ equilibrium, but require
that the mechanisms are optimal for each principal subject to the incentive compati-
bility constraint for their agents as well as the other principals’ agents. We call this a
jointly feasible principals’ equilibrium; it selects a subset of subcorrelated equilibria.
Restricting both principals to choose among the jointly incentive-compatible prob-
ability distributions prevents profitable deviations by a principal that only become
possible due to lifting the additional restrictions imposed by the other principal’s
agents incentive compatibility. If the other principals’ agents’ IC constraints did
not restrict the first principal’s agents, this would mean that the other principals
could have increased her expected utility, but decided not to do it. We will show in
Section 3.1.2 that these equilibria always exist and have a tight relationship with My-
erson’s quasi-principals’ equilibria, which relax the principals’ equilibrium to ensure
existence and asymptotic optimality for all principals.
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In theory, the assumptions about principals’ behavior and utility are primitives of
the model, but there are many applications where these choices come naturally. In
Section 3.2 we investigate one such example of a voter turnout game. In the game
there are two candidates, competing in an election, and two (disjoint) groups of
citizens each supporting one of the candidates. Thus candidates correspond to prin-
cipals and supporting citizens to their agents. The voter turnout on the election day
decides the winner, but voting is costly for the citizens, so it is only rational for them
to vote when the chance their vote makes the difference is sufficiently high. Since
principals are political candidates, there are several particularly attractive models
of their utility. For example, candidates can be assumed to maximize expected wel-
fare of their supporters, or their expected turnout, or the probability of winning the
elections. In these cases, candidates’ objectives directly oppose one another, so it is
perhaps not surprising that such principals’ equilibria do not exist. We characterize
the subcorrelated equilibria of the turnout game that maximize the total expected
turnout, and some jointly feasible principals’ equilibria.
We will now present the formal definitions of the solution concepts discussed above,
starting from a subcorrelated equilibrium.
3.1.1.2 Definitions and properties
In the complete information case, players’ utilities are Uk0 : A → R for principal k
and Ui : A → R for principal k’s agent i. For any set X, denote ∆(X) the set of
all probability distributions on X. A direct mechanism pik ∈ ∆(Ak) is a distribution
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where pik(ak) is the probability that principal k chooses action ak0 and recommends
actions aki for all i ∈ Nk. This model also captures the situation where principals are
just mediators for their agents (i.e., correlation devices for each group): in this case
we can set Ak0 = {0} to ensure pik does not depend on principal k’s action and set
Uk0 (a) = 0 for any a ∈ A.
Definition 2. A subcorrelated equilibrium (with n groups) is a probability dis-
tribution pi ∈ ∆(A) such that
1) For all agents, incentive compatibility (IC) constraints hold under pi: ∀k ∈ N,∀ i ∈
Nk,∀ ai, a′i ∈ Aki
∑
a−i∈A−i
pi(ai, a−i) [Ui(ai, a−i)− Ui(a′i, a−i)] ≥ 0, (3.1)
and 2) pi is generated by n independent probability distributions, with
pi(a) =
n∏
k=1
pik(a|N˜k), (3.2)
for all a ∈ A, where pik ∈ ∆(Ak) and a|N˜k := ((ai)i∈N˜k) is group k joint action
component.
Constraints (3.1) define a correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1974, 1987). Eq. (3.2)
just adds an additional requirement that the resulting joint distribution is a product
of independently mixed group distributions, one for each group. Thus, in a subcorre-
lated equilibrium, players receive signals from their groups’ correlation devices, and
then best respond to a (possibly) correlated joint distribution. Notice that Definition
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2 does not impose IC constraints on the principals. This is not necessary: when prin-
cipals are active players, their IC hold by default since they are optimizing. When
principals are just mediators, their IC hold trivially since they are non-strategic.
We first consider the case where all principals are mediators, since this results in the
largest set of subcorrelated equilibria, and address the case with competing principals
in the more general, incomplete information case presented in Section 3.1.2.
Denote SCEn the set of all such subcorrelated equilibria with n mediators, CE the
set of Aumann’s correlated equilibria, and NE the set of Nash equilibria.
Proposition 9. SCEn has the following properties.
1. SCEn 6= ∅ for finite games and SCEn ⊆ CE. For n = 1, SCEn = CE. For
n = |I|, SCEn = NE.
2. SCEn is non-increasing in n: ceteris paribus, merging groups results in a
weakly larger set of subcorrelated equilibria.
3. SCEn is convex for n = 1, and sectionally convex for n > 1 with respect to
sections through the n− 1 dimensional joint mechanisms of all but one group.
In particular, for n = 2, SCEn is biconvex.3
Proof. Properties 1 and 2 follow directly from the definition, so we will only prove
Property 3. If n = 1, SCE1 = CE, hence it is convex. Suppose n > 1. Let
pi1, pi2 ∈ SCEn. We will show that if n− 1 out of n generating probabilities are the
3A set X ⊆ X1×X2 is biconvex if for each ` ∈ {1, 2} and each x` ∈ X`, all sections of X through
x` are convex, i.e., {x−` ∈ X−`|(x`, x−`) ∈ X} is convex for each x`. See Aumann and Hart (1986).
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same in pi1 and pi2, then piM ≡ λpi1 + (1−λ)pi2 ∈ SCEn for all λ ∈ [0, 1]. Since piM is
a linear combination of pi1 and pi2, all agents’ IC constraints hold at piM . Since n− 1
generating probabilities are the same in pi1 and pi2, without loss of generality let µ
1
k
and µ2k be the different generating probabilities for players in group Nk. Then for
any a ∈ A we can write
piM(a) = (λµ
1
k(a|N˜k) + (1− λ)µ2k(a|N˜k))
n−1∏
`=1
µ`(a|N˜`) = νk(a|N˜k)
n−1∏
`=1
µ`(a|N˜`),
where νk ∈ ∆(×i∈N˜kAi) is a valid probability distribution on the set of joint profiles
restricted to group N˜k. Therefore, by definition piM ∈ SCEn. 
3.1.2 Incomplete information
In this section we continue to explore the properties of the subcorrelated and prin-
cipals’ equilibria in the more general case, with incomplete information and commu-
nication devices.
Compared to the complete information case, we now introduce players’ types. Let
agents’ types for principal k be in T k := T k1 × . . . × T knk , and define T := ×nj=1T j.
Assume there is a common prior P ∈ ∆(T ) over types. Players’ utilities are now
Uk0 : A×T → R for principal k and Ui : A×T → R for principal k’s agent i. A direct
mechanism pik ∈ ∆(Ak×T k) is a distribution where pik(ak|tk) is the probability that
principal k chooses action ak0 and recommends actions a
k
i for all i ∈ Nk given the
reported type profile tk ∈ T k. Let pi ∈ ∆(A× T ) be a joint probability distribution
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over actions and types, then principal k’s expected utility given pi is
Uk(pi) =
∑
a∈A
∑
t∈T
pi(a, t)Uk0 (a, t)
We assume that pi is commonly known.4
Definition 3. A subcommunication equilibrium (with n groups) is a probability
distribution p¯i ∈ ∆(A× T ) such that
1) ∀k ∈ N , ∀i ∈ Nk IC constraints hold under p¯i: ∀τ ki , τˆ ki ∈ T ki , ∀δki : Aki → Aki ,
∑
t∈T
tki =τ
k
i
P (t)
∑
a∈A
[
p¯i(a|t)Ui(a, t)− p¯i(a|τˆ ki , t−i,k)Ui((δki (aki ), a−i,k), t)
] ≥ 0 (3.3)
and 2) there exists a tuple of n direct mechanisms (p¯i1, . . . , p¯in), with p¯ik ∈ ∆(Ak×T k)
for each k ∈ N , such that for each (a, t) ∈ A× T
p¯i(a, t) = P (t)
(
n∏
k=1
p¯ik(ak|tk)
)
(3.4)
We say that p¯i is a subcommunication equilibrium generated by (p¯i1, . . . , p¯in).
The first condition in Definition 3 is incentive compatibility for all principal k’s agents
assuming all other agents are honest and obedient. Constraints (3.3) define a Com-
munication equilibrium (Forges, 1986; Myerson, 1986, 1991). The second condition
is a partitioning requirement.
4In contrast, the competing mechanisms literature assumes that mechanisms chosen by different
principals may be only known to their agent(s).
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The subcommunication equilibrium with principals as mediators inherits the prop-
erties of the respective subcorrelated equilibrium, and the analog of Proposition 9
applies.
3.1.2.1 Equilibria with multiple principals
We now turn to a more restrictive model of principals’ behavior when they are not
simply mediators but also active players in the game. This further restricts the set
of subcorrelated/subcommunication equilibria.
First, using the product structure imposed by (3.4), we define the set of incentive-
compatible direct mechanisms for principal k ∈ N when the other principals are
using mechanisms (p¯i1, . . . , p¯ik−1, p¯ik+1, . . . , p¯in) as follows.
F k(p¯i1, . . . , p¯in) :=
{
γk ∈ ∆(Ak × T k)|∀i ∈ Nk,∀τki , τˆki ∈ T ki , ∀δki : Aki → Aki∑
t∈T
tki =τ
k
i
P (t)
∑
a∈A
∏
j 6=k
p¯ij(aj |tj)
 [γk(ak|tk)Ui(a, t)− γk(ak|τˆki , tk−i)Ui((δki (aki ), a−i,k), t)] ≥ 0} (3.5)
In words, F k(p¯i1, . . . , p¯in) is the set of all direct mechanisms γk for principal k such
that γk is incentive compatible for principal k’s agents given (p¯i1, . . . , p¯in) and assum-
ing all other agents are honest and obedient.
Define also
φk(p¯i) := arg max
γk∈Fk(p¯i1,...,p¯in)
Uk(p¯i
1, . . . , γk, . . . , p¯in) (3.6)
In words, φk is a direct mechanism delivering the maximum possible expected utility
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to principal k subject to IC constraints for principal k’s agents, but without imposing
IC constraints for other principals’ agents at p¯i.
Definition 4. A tuple of n direct mechanisms p¯i := (p¯i1, . . . , p¯in) is a principals’
equilibrium (Myerson, 1982) if for each k ∈ N , p¯ik = φk(p¯i).
A principals’ equilibrium is a straightforward generalization of the principal-agent
model to the case of multiple principals controlling disjoint sets of agents.
We can now give the definition of a nontrivial principals’ game.
Definition 5. A game G :=
(N , P, (Ai)i∈N , (Ti)i∈N , (Ui)i∈N ) is a nontrivial princi-
pals’ game if for each principal k there is at least one agent of some other principal
j 6= k, whose IC constraints are violated at k’s optimal IC mechanism. That is, for
each k ∈ N , ∃j such that p¯ij 6∈ F j(p¯i1, . . . , φk(p¯i), . . . , p¯in) for any p¯i.
In the class of nontrivial principals’ games we cannot separate optimal decisions of
different principals, which leads to non-existence of principals’ equilibria.
Proposition 10. In a nontrivial principals’ game principals’ equilibria do not exist.
Proof. Obvious from the definition of a nontrivial principals’ game. 
Given this negative result, Myerson proposed a relaxation of the principals’ equi-
librium called principals’ quasi-equilibrium that ensures existence in finite games
(including nontrivial principals’ games).
Definition 6. A tuple of n direct mechanisms p¯i = (p¯i1, . . . , p¯in) is a principals’
quasi-equilibrium (Myerson, 1982) if there exists a sequence of direct mechanisms
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{(pi1` , . . . , pin` )}∞`=1 such that for all k ∈ N
p¯ik = lim
`→∞
pik` (3.7)
Uk(p¯i) ≥ lim
`→∞
max
γk∈Fk(pi1` ,...,pin` )
Uk(pi
1
` , . . . , γ
k, . . . , pin` ) (3.8)
p¯ik ∈ F k(p¯i1, . . . , p¯in) (3.9)
where F k is defined by (3.5).
We develop another relaxation of the principals’ equilibrium, called the jointly feasible
principals’ equilibrium, which is consistent with the idea of a subcommunication
equilibrium.
Definition 7. A tuple of n direct mechanisms p¯i = (p¯i1, . . . , p¯in) is a jointly feasible
principals’ equilibrium if it generates a subcommunication equilibrium such that for
all k ∈ N
Uk(p¯i) = max
γk∈Fk(p¯i1,...,p¯in)
p¯ij∈F j(p¯i1,...,γk,...,p¯in), j 6=k
Uk(p¯i
1, . . . , γk, . . . , p¯in) (3.10)
Thus, in a jointly feasible principals’ equilibrium, players maximize their expected
utility subject to their agents’ IC constraints as well as those of other principals’
agents.
We will now show that Myerson’s principals’ quasi-equilibria and the jointly fea-
sible principals’ equilibria are equivalent. More specifically, the two concepts are
equivalent in the class of nontrivial principals’ games, as the following proposition
demonstrates.
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Proposition 11. For all nontrivial principals’ games, the set of jointly feasible prin-
cipals’ equilibria and the set of principals’ quasi-equilibria coincide.
Proof. (⇐) Let p¯i be a principals’ quasi-equilibrium, then condition (3.9) in Definition
6 holding for all principals implies that p¯i is a subcommunication equilibrium, while
conditions (3.7)-(3.8) imply that
Uk(p¯i) ≥ lim
`→∞
max
γk∈Fk(pi1` ,...,pin` )
Uk(pi
1
` , . . . , γ
k, . . . , pin` )
≥ lim
`→∞
max
γk∈Fk(pi1` ,...,pin` )
p¯ij∈F j(p¯i1,...,γk,...,p¯in), j 6=k
Uk(pi
1
` , . . . , γ
k, . . . , pin` )
= max
γk∈Fk(p¯i1,...,p¯in)
p¯ij∈F j(p¯i1,...,γk,...,p¯in), j 6=k
Uk(p¯i
1, . . . , γk, . . . , p¯in) (3.11)
Since (3.9) holds for all k at p¯i, we cannot have
Uk(p¯i) > max
γk∈Fk(p¯i1,...,p¯in)
p¯ij∈F j(p¯i1,...,γk,...,p¯in), j 6=k
Uk(p¯i
1, . . . , γk, . . . , p¯in)
hence (3.11) holds with equality and p¯i is a jointly feasible principals’ equilibrium
according to Definition 7.
(⇒) Let p¯i = (p¯i1, . . . , p¯in) be any jointly feasible principals’ equilibrium. By defini-
tion, p¯ik ∈ F k(p¯i1, . . . , p¯in) for all k, so (3.9) holds trivially. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
let φk(p¯i), defined by (3.6), be a direct mechanism delivering the maximum possi-
ble expected utility to principal k subject to IC constraints for principal k’s agents,
but without respect to other principals’ agents’ IC constraints at p¯i. By optimal-
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ity of φk, at least some of the IC constraints must be binding for at least some of
each principal k’s agents (otherwise she could do better) at φk(p¯i). If there was
a tuple (φ1, . . . , φn) such that φk(φ−k) = φk for all k, we would have a princi-
pals’ equilibrium. Since principals’ equilibria do not exist in the class of nontrivial
principals’ games (Proposition 10), for each k there is at least one agent of some
other principal j 6= k, whose IC constraints are violated at k’s optimal IC mecha-
nism, i.e. p¯ij 6∈ F j(p¯i1, . . . , φk(p¯i), . . . , p¯in). Consider a sequence of direct mechanisms
{(pi1` , . . . , pin` )}∞`=1 defined as follows: for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
pik` :=
(
1− 1
`
)
p¯ik +
1
`
φk(p¯i), (3.12)
Since lim`→∞(pi1` , . . . , pi
n
` ) = p¯i and (3.9) holds in the limit,
lim
`→∞
max
γk∈Fk(pi1` ,...,pin` )
Uk(pi
1
` , . . . , γ
k, . . . , pin` ) ≤ max
νk∈Fk(p¯i1,...,p¯in)
p¯ij∈F j(p¯i1,...νk,...,p¯in),j 6=k
Uk(pi
1
` , . . . , ν
k, . . . , pin` )
= Uk(p¯i)
Hence all conditions (3.7)-(3.9) hold for {(pi1` , . . . , pin` )}∞`=1 , so p¯i is a principals’ quasi-
equilibrium. 
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3.2 Application: Voter Turnout Games
In this section we apply the subcorrelated equilibrium framework in the context of
a voter turnout game.5
There are two candidates, A and B, competing in an election, and two (disjoint)
groups of citizens supporting one of the candidates: NA of size nA, and NB of size
nB. The candidates’ political positions are fixed and commonly known.
6 Each citizen
i ∈ I = NA∪NB, with |I| = nA +nB, has two pure actions: to vote for the preferred
candidate (action 1) or abstain (action 0). Thus i’s action space is Ai = {0, 1}. The
set of joint voting profiles is A = A1 × · · · × A|I|. Voting is costly with a common
cost c, where 0 < c < 1
2
.7 A citizen’s utility of voting (denoted Ui) net of the voting
cost is normalized to 1 if the preferred candidate wins, 1/2, if there is a tie, and 0
otherwise. Assume also that nA, nB ≥ 1, and nA > nB so that A is supported by a
majority of citizens.
We will analyze the subcorrelated equilibria in this turnout game. The citizens’ IC
constraints (conditions (3.1)) can be written as follows.8
c ≥ 1
2
Pr(i is pivotal | i abstains)
c ≤ 1
2
Pr(i is pivotal | i votes)
5The game-theoretic analysis of voter turnout without communication was done in Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1983, 1985). See Chapter 2 for the analysis of correlated equilibria in these games.
6Thus candidates have no action other than the choice of the direct mechanism for their sup-
porters. This assumption can be relaxed in the general equilibrium model like Ledyard (1981).
7The common cost assumption can be relaxed.
8See Section 2.1.1.
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These inequalities relate the probability of being pivotal (i.e., making a tie or break-
ing a tie with by casting one’s vote), conditional on the player’s own action, and
the voting cost. Thus, a correlated equilibrium in this game is given by a probabil-
ity distribution over joint voting profiles where at every profile each citizen finds it
incentive compatible to follow her prescribed choice conditional on this profile real-
ization. A subcorrelated equilibrium requires in addition that the probability of any
joint profile is a product of two independent probabilities of the respective group
profiles. Formally,
∑
a−i∈V iP
γj(0i, a−i|Nj)γ−j(a−i|N−j) ≤ c1
2 − c
∑
a−i∈V iNP
γj(0i, a−i|Nj)γ−j(a−i|N−j) (3.13)
∑
a−i∈V iNP
γj(1i, a−i|Nj)γ−j(a−i|N−j) ≤
1
2 − c
c
∑
a−i∈V iP
γj(1i, a−i|Nj)γ−j(a−i|N−j) (3.14)
for all i ∈ Nj, j ∈ {A,B}, where V iP (V iNP ) are the sets of |I| − 1 dimensional
“others’ ” voting profiles where player i is pivotal (non-pivotal, respectively), and
γj(zi, a−i|Nj) denotes the probability of nj-dimensional group voting profile where
player i plays action zi, while the remaining group j members play action a−i|Nj.
Denote DSC(·, γB, c) the set of probability distributions in ∆ (×i∈NAAi) that satisfy
IC constraints (3.13)-(3.14) for group NA given the action distribution γ
B in group
NB and voting cost c, and similarly, DSC(γA, ·, c) be the set of probability distribu-
tions in ∆ (×i∈NBAi) that satisfy IC constraints (3.13)-(3.14) for group NB, given
the action distribution γA in group NA. A subcorrelated equilibrium is generated by
(γA, γB) if and only if (γA, γB) ∈ DSC(·, γB, c)×DSC(γA, ·, c).
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A principals’ equilibrium in the turnout game, where each correlation device can be
viewed as an independent expected utility-maximizing principal, is a pair (γA∗, γB∗)
such that
γA∗ ∈ arg max
γ∈DSC(·,γB∗,c)
UA(γ, γ
B∗) (3.15)
γB∗ ∈ arg max
γ∈DSC(γA∗,·,c)
UB(γ
A∗, γ) (3.16)
It is easy to see that any principals’ equilibrium (γA∗, γB∗) ∈ DSC(·, γB∗, c)×DSC(γA∗, ·, c),
hence it is also a subcorrelated equilibrium. As in the general case, for any fixed di-
rect mechanism the other principal might be using, the expected utility of the current
principal is linear in their own direct mechanism: Uj(γ
j, γ−j) is linear in γj given
γ−j, j ∈ {A,B}.
There are several ways to define principals’ utility in the turnout game, of which
we will consider three. First, suppose two principals maximize the expected total
welfare of their groups, i.e., the sum of expected utilities of the voters in their groups.
We call such principals benevolent. Formally, expected utilities of principals A and
B, respectively, at a joint distribution generated by (γA, γB) are
UA(γ
A, γB) =
nB−1∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+1
γA(a)γB(b)[−ca] +
nB∑
a=0
γA(a)γB(a)
[(
1
2
− c
)
a+
1
2
(nA − a)
]
+
nA∑
a=1
min(a−1,nB)∑
b=0
γA(a)γB(b) [(1− c) a+ (nA − a)]
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and
UB(γ
A, γB) =
nB−1∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+1
γA(a)γB(b) [(1− c) b+ (nB − b)]
+
nB∑
a=0
γA(a)γB(a)
[(
1
2
− c
)
a+
1
2
(nB − a)
]
+
nA∑
a=1
min(a−1,nB)∑
b=0
γA(a)γB(b) [−cb] .
For any fixed γB and 0 < c < 1
2
, UA(γ, γ
B) is maximized at setting γA(nB + 1) = 1.
Second, a relevant formulation of principals’ utility concerns maximizing expected
group turnout. Call such principals turnout-motivated. In this case, we have
UA(γ
A, γB) =
nA∑
a=0
aγA(a)
UB(γ
A, γB) =
nB∑
b=0
bγB(b)
Finally, one can also look at principals maximizing their probability of winning elec-
tions. Call such principals office-motivated. In this case, principal A’s expected
utility is
UA(γ
A, γB) =
1
2
nB∑
a=0
γA(a)γB(a) +
nA∑
a=1
min(a−1,nB)∑
b=0
γA(a)γB(b)
and for principal B,
UB(γ
A, γB) =
nB−1∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+1
γA(a)γB(b) +
1
2
nB∑
a=0
γA(a)γB(a)
For any fixed γB, UA(γ, γ
B) is maximized at setting
∑nA
a=nB+1
γA(a) = 1.
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Our first result in this section shows that principals’ equilibria of the kind considered
above do not exist in the turnout game.
Proposition 12. Neither benevolent, nor turnout-motivated, nor office-motivated
principals’ equilibria exist in the turnout game.
Proof. The proof has three simple steps. First, any principals’ equilibrium in a
complete information game is a subcorrelated equilibrium. This trivially holds by
definition. Hence in the equilibrium agents’ IC constraints (3.13) -(3.14) must si-
multaneously hold for all voters in both groups. Second, as explained below, in
any benevolent, turnout-motivated, or office-motivated principals’ equilibrium, de-
noted (γA∗, γB∗), IC constraint (3.14) binds for group NB, restricting the optimal
mechanism of principal A, γA∗. Third, it now follows that principal A always has a
profitable deviation from (γA∗, γB∗) by disregarding the IC constraints for group NB
while his agents’ IC constraints (3.13)-(3.14) continue to hold: A’s expected utility
can be increased due to lifting the restriction on γA∗. Hence there cannot be any
such principals’ equilibrium, because the majority group principal would always find
it more profitable (and consistent with his agents’ IC constraints) to deviate.
The argument for the second step is as follows. Since nA > nB, for any fixed
mechanism of principal B and 0 < c < 1
2
, principal A can ensure NA is more likely to
win by increasing as much as possible (under the joint IC constraints for both groups,
as required by the subcorrelated equilibrium) the probability mass on profiles with
at least nB + 1 votes from group NA. Moreover, in any principals’ equilibrium of the
specified type, principal A actually wants to do it: if A was unconstrained, it would be
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optimal for him to put all probability mass on profiles with exactly nB+1 votes from
NA when benevolent, on the profile with nA votes from NA when turnout-motivated,
and on any mixture between nB + 1 and nA votes from NA when office-motivated,
respectively. Therefore, A optimally puts as large probability on such profiles as
allowed by the joint IC. But at any joint profile with at least nB + 1 votes from
NA, any voter from NB who also decides to turn out is non-pivotal. Therefore IC
constraint (3.14) for voters in NB has Pr(nB + 1 or more from NA vote ) on the left
hand side and must be binding in the optimum. 
We now briefly address the problem of maximizing the total expected turnout in a
subcorrelated equilibrium. Namely, let
(γA∗, γB∗) ∈ arg max
γA∈DSC(·,γB ,c)
γB∈DSC(γA,·,c)
∑
a∈{0,1}|I|
(
γA(a|NA)γB(a|NB)
∑
i∈I
ai
)
, (3.17)
Let f ∗SCE be the maximal expected turnout in problem (3.17) and f
∗ the maximal
expected turnout in the corresponding correlated equilibrium.9
It turns out that the max-turnout subcorrelated equilibria result in the same expected
turnout as the max-turnout correlated equilibria for the special case of nB ≥ d12nAe,
but have strictly lower turnout when nB < d12nAe.
Proposition 13. Suppose 0 < c < 1
2
. Then:
(i) if nB ≥ d12nAe, then f ∗SC = f ∗ = 2nB, i.e., the max correlated equilibria and
max subcorrelated equilibria result in the same expected turnout of twice the size of
9As we discussed before, the correlated equilibrium differs from the subcorrelated one by not
requiring the joint distribution to be a product mixture.
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minority.
(ii) if nB < d12nAe, then
f ∗SC < f
∗ = 2nB +
(nA − 2nB) (1− 2c)
1 + 2c
(
nA(nA−1)
nA+nB(nA−1) − 1
)
Proof. Follows from Proposition 1 in Chapter 2. 
Proposition 13 shows that for the case of large minority (nB ≥ d12nAe), there is no
difference between the max correlated and max subcorrelated equilibria in terms of
expected turnout.
Finally, let us turn to the difference between joint and individual group turnout
optimization in jointly feasible principals’ equilibria. The joint turnout optimization
is assumed in problem (3.17); now we instead consider distributions (γA∗, γB∗) that
solve
γA∗ ∈ arg max
γ∈DSC(·,γB∗,c)
γB∗∈DSC(γ,·,c)
∑
a∈{0,1}nA
γ(a) ∑
i∈NA
ai
 (3.18)
γB∗ ∈ arg max
γ∈DSC(γA∗,·,c)
γA∗∈DSC(·,γ,c)
∑
a∈{0,1}nB
γ(a) ∑
i∈NB
ai
 (3.19)
Thus, in (3.18)-(3.19), groups maximize their own expected turnout, not the total
turnout. However, there is a one-directional relation between the solutions to the
problem of maximizing total expected turnout in a subcorrelated equilibrium and
the solution to problem (3.17).
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Proposition 14. Any solution to the problem of maximizing the total expected
turnout in a subcorrelated equilibrium that solves (3.17) also solves (3.18)-(3.19).
The opposite does not hold in general: there are solutions to (3.18)-(3.19) which do
not solve (3.17). Nevertheless, there is always at least one solution to (3.18)-(3.19)
that also solves (3.17).
Proof. To see that solution to (3.17) also solves (3.18)-(3.19), note that for a fixed
γB∗, we can rewrite the right hand side of (3.17) as follows.
∑
a∈{0,1}|I|
γA(a|NA)γB∗(a|NB)
∑
i∈NA
ai +
∑
i∈NB
ai

=
∑
a∈{0,1}|I|
γB∗(a|NB)
∑
i∈NB
ai
 γA(a|NA) + γB∗(a|NB)
γA(a|NA) ∑
i∈NA
ai

=
∑
a∈{0,1}nB
γB∗(a)
∑
i∈NB
ai
+
 ∑
a∈{0,1}nB
γB∗(a)
 ∑
a∈{0,1}nA
γA(a) ∑
i∈NA
ai

= C(γB∗) +D(γB∗)
 ∑
a∈{0,1}nA
γA(a) ∑
i∈NA
ai
 ,
where C(γB∗), D(γB∗) ≥ 0 do not depend on γA. Similarly, for a fixed γA∗, we can
express the right hand side of (3.17) as
∑
a∈{0,1}|I|
γA∗(a|NA)γB(a|NB)
∑
i∈NA
ai +
∑
i∈NB
ai
 = C˜(γA∗) + D˜(γA∗)
 ∑
a∈{0,1}nB
γB(a) ∑
i∈NB
ai

Clearly, any solution to both of these equations also solves (3.18)-(3.19).
To show that the opposite does not hold, consider the following example. Let
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nA = 3, nB = 2. Fix the common cost c = 0.4, and consider the following pair
of distributions over the respective groups: γA000 =
1
15
, γA001 = γ
A
010 = γ
A
100 = 0,
γA011 = γ
A
101 = γ
A
110 =
4
15
, and γA111 =
2
15
for NA; and γ
B
00 = γ
B
01 = γ
B
10 = 0, γ
B
11 = 1 for
NB. The expected turnout in either group is 2, so the total expected turnout is 4. It
is easy to check that all IC constraints (3.13)-(3.14) hold for both groups. It is also
easy to see why these distributions solve (3.17): from Proposition 1 in Chapter 2, the
maximal expected turnout in the correlated equilibrium in this example is 4, so this
is the largest total expected turnout in any subcorrelated equilibrium. Consequently,
from the first part of this proof, (γA, γB) solve (3.18)-(3.19). Consider now a different
pair of distributions (νA, νB) specified as follows: νA000 = 0, ν
A
001 = ν
A
010 = ν
A
100 = 0,
νA011 = ν
A
101 = ν
A
110 =
4
15
, and νA111 =
3
15
for NA; and ν
B
00 =
1
5
, νB01 = ν
B
10 = 0, and
νB11 =
4
5
for NB. The only difference from (γ
A, γB) is that νA has moved 1
15
of prob-
ability from the profile with zero group turnout to a profile with full group turnout,
and νB has moved 1
5
of probability in the opposite direction. Again, it is easy to
check that all IC constraints (3.13)-(3.14) hold for these distributions as well. The
expected turnout in group NA is now 2.2, whereas the expected turnout in group NB
is 1.6. Hence the total expected turnout is 3.8 < 4, and so (νA, νB) is not a solution
to (3.17).
To see that (νA, νB) nevertheless solve (3.18)-(3.19), let’s write out the joint IC
constraints having fixed νA. Due to symmetry, it is sufficient to consider just one
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player in each group, so we start from group NB and player 1 in that group:
c
(
3 · 4
15
νB00 +
3
15
(νB00 + ν
B
01)
)
+
(
c− 1
2
)
3 · 4
15
νB01 ≥ 0
−c
(
3 · 4
15
νB10 +
3
15
(νB10 +
3
15
νB11)
)
+
(
1
2
− c
)
3 · 4
15
νB11 ≥ 0
For c = 0.4, the first constraint does not restrict νB00, while the second one requires
νB10 = 0, which by symmetry translates to ν
B
01 = 0. The IC constraints for group NA
now take the following form:
c
4
15
νB00 +
(
c− 1
2
)
4
15
νB11 ≥ 0
−c
(
2 · 4
15
νB00 +
3
15
νB00
)
+
(
1
2
− c
)(
2 · 4
15
νB11 +
3
15
νB11
)
≥ 0
The first constraint at c = 0.4 reduces to νB00 ≥ 14νB11. The second constraint reduces
to νB00 ≤ 14νB11. Hence νB00 = 14νB11, and the total probability constraint determines
νB00 =
1
5
, νB11 =
4
5
. So for the given νA, νB solves (3.19). Similarly, one can show that
for the given νB, νA solves (3.18). 
3.3 Concluding Remarks
This Chapter introduces the subcorrelated equilibrium as well as its generalization
for the case of incomplete information called subcommunication equilibrium. These
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equilibria refine the set of Aumann’s correlated equilibria, and Myerson’s and Forges’
communication equilibria, respectively, and can serve as an intermediate solution con-
cept between Nash and the correlated equilibrium, when there are several correlation
devices available to groups of players. Unlike principals’ equilibria of Myerson (1982),
subcorrelated/subcommunication equilibrium does not necessarily require that dif-
ferent correlation devices represent competing principals, which ensures existence
and makes it a potentially attractive solution concept for analysis of dynamic situa-
tions, e.g., where the game gradually evolves from some (equilibrium) status quo to
another equilibrium, like in policy reforms. We establish an equivalence between a
subset of subcorrelated equilibria and Myerson’s quasi-principals’ equilibria.
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Chapter 4
Voting with Communication: An
Experimental Study of Correlated
Equilibrium
How does communication among voters affect turnout? This is a key question for
modern political campaigns that actively employ media and social networks to reach
and mobilize their supporters. Field experimental studies, which usually isolate
a particular communication mechanism, have shown significant but mixed evidence
(Gerber and Green, 2000; Gerber et al., 2011), which is perhaps not surprising, given
the plethora of different ways people communicate. Effectiveness of political commu-
nication depends on complex interactions of different communication mechanisms,
political actors, and institutional structures (Druckman, 2014).
In this Chapter, we attempt to explore the general principles behind these interac-
tions in a laboratory experiment. There are two groups of voters of different sizes
(think political parties) that compete against each other in a winner-take-all election.
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Voters decide between turning out to vote for their preferred party and staying at
home. Voting is costly, with a commonly known voting cost c > 0, same for every-
one. Each voter’s payoff depends on which party wins the elections, which is in turn
defined by how many voters decide to turn out. A rational voter trades off expected
benefits with expected cost, so she should only turn out when there is a sufficiently
high chance of her vote changing the outcome.
Absent communication, each voter decides whether to participate independently of
others. The game-theoretic analysis of this case (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983) shows
that there is a multitude of Nash equilibria with a wide range of expected turnout.
With communication, the formal structure of the game changes dramatically, as
individual turnout decisions can now be correlated. Allowing for correlation greatly
expands the set of equilibria. In fact, the game with unrestricted communication
actually admits an infinite number of equilibria, with expected total turnout ranging
between zero and twice the size of the minority for all positive voting costs such that
voting is rationalizable, i.e., abstention is not a dominant strategy (?).
We study the effects of unmediated pre-play communication on turnout. Before mak-
ing their decisions, subjects engage in free-form communication in the form of chat,
by broadcasting messages to subsets of players. We consider two cases: public com-
munication, where players can exchange public messages visible to all participants;
and party communication, where players can exchange messages that are only public
within their own party (majority or minority). These communication patterns seem
to have reasonable analogs in typical elections. For example, car bumper stickers
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can be interpreted as public messages, while Facebook status updates (e.g., “I’m a
Voter” button feature, studied in Bond et al (2012)), visible only to one’s own group
of friends or social connections, are examples of party-based public messages. A
variation on correlated equilibrium, called subcorrelated equilibrium is used to char-
acterize the equilibria with party communication (?). While our experiment (and
the model) does not have any explicit centralized mobilization efforts per se, one
can view the kind of decentralized communication studied here as corresponding to
neighborhood information exchanges (Grosser and Schram, 2006) or conversations
and interactions with family and friends, or via social media.
In addition to the communication treatment, we vary the other crucial parameters
of the model: the voting cost (“low” cost with 10% and “high” cost with 30% of the
maximum election benefit), and relative party sizes (landslide and close elections).
The sensitivity of turnout to changes in these parameters under our restrictions on
communication has not been investigated.
The results of the experiment lead to three main contributions.
First, we establish a causal link between the cost of voting, the communication mech-
anism, and the total turnout rate, and identify strong interaction effects between the
structure of communication and the cost of voting. With a low voting cost, party
communication increases total turnout, while public communication decreases total
turnout. With a high voting cost, public communication increases total turnout.
Thus, we identify a cost/communication interaction effect, whereby cost consider-
ations appear an important factor in participation decisions under communication,
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which ties in with some existing empirical results (Brady and McNulty, 2011; Hodler,
Luechinger, and Stutzer, 2015).
Second, the experiment allows us to test, for the first time, the consistency of ex-
perimental data under communication with the correlated equilibrium. Correlated
equilibria have been largely ignored in the experimental study of pre-play commu-
nication, yet are particularly well suited for the analysis of such games.1 This is
especially true with our design that includes both public and party communication
mechanisms, which require somewhat different variations on the correlated equilib-
rium concept. We design several new tests to check for the consistency with correlated
equilibrium, and find that voting cost plays an important role here as well: with low
cost, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the data are generated by a correlated
equilibrium, while with high cost this is no longer the case. This approach also al-
lows us to test for consistency with (uncorrelated) Nash equilibrium, and these tests
find no support for Nash equilibrium in our communication sessions.
Third, we find that turnout levels are strongly affected by the ex ante competitiveness
of the election and the voting cost. Theoretically, turnout in each party is higher
when parties are closer to the same size (competition effect), and when costs are
lower (cost effect).2 We observe the competition effect (with respect to the majority
party only) in all our communication and cost variations, and the cost effect in all
but the public communication treatment.
1An exception is Moreno and Wooders (1998). See also Cason and Sharma (2007), and Duffy
and Feltovich (2010) for studies of abstract games with recommended play.
2This theory has support from other experiments (Levine and Palfrey, 2007; Herrera, Morelli,
and Palfrey, 2014).
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The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.0.1 we provide
a brief literature review. In Section 4.1 we describe the details of our experimental
design. In Section 4.2 we present our findings at the electorate level, party level,
and individual level. Section 4.3 concludes. Additional estimation details are in 4.A.
Experimental instructions are in 4.B.
4.0.1 Related literature
This Chapter contributes to studies of the effects of communication on turnout using
lab experiments. A laboratory setting provides a natural first step, allowing for tight
control of key model parameters and actors’ preferences that is nearly impossible in
the field.
Several studies investigate the effects of restrictive communication mechanisms –
like neighborhood information exchange and polls – on voter turnout. Grosser and
Schram (2006) consider the effects of communication in the form of neighborhood
information exchange. In their model, every two voters form a neighborhood with
one being an early voter (sender) and one a late voter (receiver). They find that
information exchange increases turnout, although these results seem to be sensitive
to the analyzed sender-receiver protocol. Grosser and Schram (2010), and Agranov
et al. (2013) study the effects of polls on turnout and welfare. In particular, Agranov
et al. (2013) show that while polls do not have negative welfare effects, they over-
estimate voter turnout. The authors also find evidence for voting with the winner,
where a voter is more likely to turn out if she thinks her preferred candidate is more
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likely to win. In our experiment, subjects communicate by means of a free-form chat
with public messages (either public within a party, or public within the whole elec-
torate). In theory, with a slightly different experimental design, this mechanism can
replicate the effects of both polls and neighborhood information exchanges. Schram
and Sonnemans (1996a) study a social pressure turnout model of Schram and van
Winden (1991) in the lab and find that communication increases turnout. In the
model, there are two groups and opinion leaders in each group, who produce social
pressure on others to turn out. One of the basic predictions of that model is that
communication increases turnout. In their experiment communication was oral be-
tween the members of the same group for 5 minutes, after which five more rounds of
the game without further communication were played, which is different from having
pre-play communication each round, as in our study.
A closer related paper is Kittel, Luhan, and Morton (2014). They study 3-party
elections with costly voting, varying voter preference types (swings, who have strict
rankings over three parties, vs. partisans, who strictly prefer one party but are
indifferent among the two less preferred ones), party labels (voters are assigned to
labeled parties), and pre-play communication protocol (public across groups vs. pub-
lic within groups, like in our experiment). They find that communication increases
turnout and increases the proportion of strategic voting. The effects of the com-
munication protocol on turnout depend on voter preferences (swing vs. partisan)
and are nuanced. In particular, swing voters and partisans show different turnout
rates: swings assigned to their second choice are more likely to turn out in the “all-
chat” than in the “party-chat”, while swings assigned to their first choice, as well as
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partisans, show no difference. While we use similar communication treatments, our
results are not directly comparable since 3-party elections introduce a completely
different motive for voting.
There are also two strands of the literature that are less related to our study. One
studies the effects of deliberation on jury voting, where abstention is not allowed
(Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey, 2000; Goeree and Yariv, 2011).3 Another
studies the performance of the Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) model in the lab, similar
to us, but without communication among voters (Schram and Sonnemans, 1996b;
Levine and Palfrey, 2007; Duffy and Tavits, 2008).
Summarizing the related literature analysis, our main methodological contribution
in this Chapter consists of exploring the effects of unrestricted public communication
protocols in the form of pre-play chat on voter turnout in the pivotal voter model,
which also allows us to check consistency of the data with the correlated equilibrium.
3Goeree and Yariv (2011) use a free communication protocol and find that communication
significantly improves information aggregation and efficiency. Interestingly, although they allow
subjects to send messages to any subset of other subjects, they observe that almost 100% of messages
were public.
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4.1 Experimental Design
4.1.1 Environment
In this section we provide some theoretical background for the pivotal voter model
(Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983) our experiment builds upon. There are n voters di-
vided into two parties, A and B, with the number of supporters nA and nB, respec-
tively, so that nA + nB = n. A is the majority party, thus nA > nB. Voters in
each party decide between voting for their respective party (action 1) or abstaining
(action 0). The election is decided by the simple majority with ties broken randomly.
Voting is costly, with c ∈ (0, 1/2) the common voting cost, same for everyone. The
utility of voting net of voting cost is normalized to 1 if the preferred party wins,
1/2, if there is a tie, and 0 otherwise. The game has complete information, the
only uncertainty from a player’s point of view comes from not knowing how exactly
everybody else is going to choose. Each voter would ideally prefer her party to win
the election without her actually voting, so the game combines a free-rider problem
with a collective action problem in each party.
Rational voters trade off expected benefits from voting with expected costs, so the
probability of their vote changing the election outcome becomes a major factor.
In equilibrium, this so called pivotal probability is determined endogenously. The
other important variables are probabilities of a tie and near tie (i.e., a tie± one
vote), and of the minority party winning (the upset rate). The equilibrium logic
leads from the primitives of the model (party sizes and voting cost) to predictions
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about these probabilities as well as the total turnout rates in each party and in the
whole electorate. The turnout game has many Nash equilibria, and out of those, we
focus on the ones with maximal expected total turnout. After all, the well-known
turnout paradox arises precisely because people tend to vote too much relative to
the equilibrium predictions.
In the experiment, we vary the sizes of the parties, nA and nB, the common voting
cost c, and the communication protocol. The latter factor is especially important,
because communication allows voters’ actions to be correlated, which may, in theory,
lead to higher turnout than predicted by the standard Nash equilibria. The main
difference between Nash (NE) and correlated equilibrium (CE), developed in Aumann
(1974, 1987) and formally defined below, is that in the latter, players’ strategies
can be correlated, while in a Nash all players decide whether to vote or abstain
independently. Thus a Nash equilibrium is also a correlated equilibrium, but (in a
formal sense) almost all correlated equilibria are not Nash equilibria.
Correlated equilibria in turnout games were analyzed in ?, who characterized the
bounds of the set of CE in these games. In particular, CE can have total expected
turnout of up to twice the size of the minority party when the minority size is at
least 50% that of the majority (the large minority case), and up to a higher value of
the majority size in the remaining, small minority, case. These equilibria presume
unrestricted communication between all players, so all strategies can be correlated
in a CE.
Subcorrelated equilibrium (SCE), proposed in ?, is a correlated equilibrium with ad-
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ditional restrictions on the structure of admissible correlations: namely (in a turnout
game), SCE allows players’ choices to be correlated within their party, but requires
independence of players’ choices across parties. It turns out that in the large mi-
nority case, one can limit communication in this way (i.e., to remain unrestricted
only within each party) and still get the twice the size of the minority theoretical
upper bound on the expected total turnout. However, this restriction to within-
party communication actually bites for the small minority case and predicts a lower
turnout.
The above considerations led us to implement the following treatments. We chose to
study electorates with (nA, nB) ∈ {(6, 4), (7, 3)} because these cases correspond to
“toss-up” and “landslide” elections, respectively, and result in different equilibrium
predictions. We will sometimes refer to partitions (6, 4) and (7, 3) as large and
small minority, respectively. We varied the voting cost between low (c = 0.1) and
high (c = 0.3). With respect to communication, we added to the game a pre-play
communication stage in the form of a computerized broadcast chat, where, before
making decisions, players engage in pre-play communication by exchanging public
messages to other players. We investigate two cases: Public Communication (PC),
where players can exchange public messages visible to all participants; and Group-
restricted public communication (GC), where players can exchange messages that are
only public within their own group. We also run a control case of no communication
(NC).
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Table 4.1 summarizes the Nash equilibrium4 turnout rates in this game, as well as
the maximum expected turnout rates for correlated and subcorrelated equilibrium,
for the four treatments in the party-size-voting-cost domain. Notation-wise, in Table
4.1, nA (nB) is the size of party A (B), c is the common voting cost, TA (TB) is
expected equilibrium turnout rate in party A (B), T is total expected turnout rate,
τ is probability of a tie, pi is probability of a pivotal event (defined as tie± one vote),
ωB is probability of the underdog winning (upset rate). The correlated equilibria
with maximal expected total turnout are not unique, so τ , pi, and ωB can differ
across different equilibria.
Table 4.1 shows several common patterns of theoretic predictions across treatments.
We emphasize those about the total turnout in the following proposition.
Proposition 15. In equilibria that maximize expected turnout, the total turnout
rate is 1) increasing with correlation among voters (from Nash to Subcorrelated to
Correlated equilibrium); 2) decreasing in the majority party size, except under high
voting cost in a quasi-symmetric Nash; 3) non-increasing in the voting cost.
4.1.2 Procedures
We ran a total of 6 sessions with a high common cost (c = 0.3) and another 6
sessions with a low common cost (c = 0.1), with the main focus on the effects
4Given the anonymous random matching and the symmetric structure of the game for each
party, we limit attention to Nash equilibrium where all members of the party mix with the same
probability. This is standard in the analysis of data from turnout experiments (Levine and Palfrey,
2007). Other kinds of highly asymmetric equilibria are discussed in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983).
See also Schram and Sonnemans (1996b).
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Table 4.1: Theoretic Predictions for Equilibria with Maximal Total Expected
Turnout
Nash Quasi-Symmetric
nA nB c TA TB T τ pi ωB
6 4 .1 .625 .375 .525 .089 .298 .083
– – .3 .161 .253 .198 .322 .781 .518
7 3 .1 .521 .479 .508 .098 .319 .009
– – .3 .147 .380 .217 .310 .773 .545
Subcorrelated Equilibria
nA nB c TA TB T τ pi ωB
6 4 .1 .667 1.000 .800 .200 .636 .365
– – .3 .667 1.000 .800 .600 .790 .421
7 3 .1 .725 .482 .652 .096 .278 .048
– – .3 .544 .799 .620 .479 .691 .240
Correlated Equilibria
nA nB c TA TB T τ pi ωB
6 4 .1 .667 1.000 .800 .200 .636 .365
– – .3 .667 1.000 .800 .600 .790 .421
7 3 .1 .581 .089 .670 .059 .335 .030
– – .3 .414 .215 .628 .429 .764 .215
Notes: There are many other equilibria with
smaller total turnout, which are not listed here.
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of communication. For each cost, there were 2 sessions on each one of the three
communication treatments: no communication (NC), group communication (GC),
and public communication (PC). We used a within-subjects design for the relative
size treatment in each session, and recruited 20 subjects per session to mitigate effects
of shared histories in the presence of communication. The same communication mode
(NC, GC, or PC) was used throughout the entire session. No subject participated
in more than one session. For communication treatments we limited the duration of
chat to 110 seconds.5
Each session consisted of 20 matches. In each match of the game, players in the
majority and the minority group were asked to decide whether to abstain or to vote,
knowing the common voting cost. To induce as neutral environment as possible, no
voting context was mentioned, similarly to the design of Levine and Palfrey (2007).
Majority and minority parties were called “type A” and “type B”, respectively. Sub-
jects chose between two abstract options, X and Y , which correspond to voting and
abstention. The voting cost was implemented as a bonus payoff (i.e., choosing option
Y would result in a higher individual payoff than choosing option X). An example
of the user interface is shown in Figure 4.1 in 4.A.
Our randomization algorithm is as follows. First, all subjects are randomly split into
majority and minority pools. E.g., for size (6, 4) and 20 subjects in a session, majority
pool has 12 people, and minority pool has 8. Next, for each of the two 10-subject
electorates, two subgroups are formed by randomly picking the corresponding number
5When analyzing chat logs, it was clear that this amount of time was more than enough for
meaningful communication.
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of subjects from each pool. This step is repeated for 10 matches (Part 1). Thus for
10 matches the party labels remain the same, but the subgroup composition changes
each match. For the next 10 matches (Part 2), those from the former minority pool
are assigned to the majority party for sure. Those from the former majority pool
are randomly picked to fill the remaining parties’ capacities in each group. We chose
this scheme to mitigate the inherent inequality of payoffs across subjects, since in
either size treatment the majority is more likely to win.6
We did not inform subjects about the number of matches in each part. Instructions
for Part 2 were delivered only once Part 1 was over. Two rounds from each part were
randomly selected and paid, so the payoff of each subject was the sum of payoffs in
four rounds plus the show-up fee of $7. Overall, the 12-session, 2× 2× 3 design used
240 subjects which generated a dataset with a total of 480 elections. Average payoff
per subject was $28.81, sessions with communication lasted approximately 1.5 hours,
sessions without communication took a bit less than one hour. Sample instructions
are in 4.B.
Table 4.2 summarizes our design and experimental parameters.
6There was one software issue in the session with (7,3)(6,4), low cost, and Public Communication.
The randomization scheme used in Part 1 ((7,3) treatment) was actually corresponding to (6,4).
That is, there were 7 people in group A, 3 people in group B, and their types were always correctly
labeled, but the randomization algorithm was such that some of them did not keep their types
constant the entire 10 matches: there were people from A switching to B and vice versa (as the
algorithm was only keeping together the first 6 people in one group). 8 subjects out of 40 were
affected in the sense that at least once during the 10 matches their types were switched, but since
it was a public communication treatment, we do not see this is as an issue for the analysis.
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Table 4.2: Design Summary
Communication Cost c = 0.1 Cost c = 0.3
First 10 rounds Next 10 rounds First 10 rounds Next 10 rounds
Group Chat (6,4) (7,3) (6,4) (7,3)
(7,3) (6,4) (7,3) (6,4)
Public Chat (6,4) (7,3) (6,4) (7,3)
(7,3) (6,4) (7,3) (6,4)
No Chat (6,4) (7,3) (6,4) (7,3)
(7,3) (6,4) (7,3) (6,4)
Notes: Table cells contain the sizes of (Majority, Minority) for each treatment. For
each communication regime and voting cost, each session combined two size treat-
ments and had 20 rounds total, with two independent electorates in each round.
Sessions with communication lasted about 1.5 hours, sessions without communica-
tion took a bit less than 1 hour.
4.2 Results
In this section we describe our main experimental results. To save space and for
expositional clarity, for many of our results we report additional supporting figures
and estimation details (e.g., standard errors and p-values) in 4.A.7
Table 4.3 presents for each treatment the summary averages of turnout rates in each
party and total turnout rate. With our 2×2×3 design, the total number of elections
in each of the 12 treatments was 40. To account for possible correlation across rounds
and across 10-person groups (as group composition changed every round), we treated
each group over 10 rounds as a panel, and computed panel-corrected standard errors
7In addition to the turnout-related results reported in this section, we also looked at the effects
on welfare, which in this model highlights the tradeoff between the probability the majority group
wins, the voting cost, and the expected total turnout. Reducing the voting cost or the relative
minority size increases total welfare in all treatments. For large minority, communication increases
welfare under low voting cost, but decreases it under high voting cost. Detailed results are available
from the authors upon request.
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with a correction for first order autocorrelation within each panel.8
Table 4.3: Mean Turnout Rates by Treatment
No Communication
N nA nB c TˆA TˆB Tˆ
40 6 4 .1 .600 (.030) .574 (.040) .587 (.032)
– – – .3 .403 (.020) .371 (.018) .390 (.014)
– 7 3 .1 .443 (.021) .377 (.044) .423 (.015)
– – – .3 .336 (.033) .349 (.059) .341 (.029)
Group Communication
N nA nB c TˆA TˆB Tˆ
40 6 4 .1 .875 (.023) .424 (.064) .696 (.032)
– – – .3 .483 (.055) .380 (.086) .442 (.046)
– 7 3 .1 .616 (.026) .448 (.100) .566 (.030)
– – – .3 .378 (.091) .251 (.042) .342 (.054)
Public Communication
N nA nB c TˆA TˆB Tˆ
40 6 4 .1 .541 (.037) .361 (.081) .471 (.043)
– – – .3 .639 (.053) .392 (.056) .541 (.042)
– 7 3 .1 .387 (.048) .221 (.038) .337 (.034)
– – – .3 .532 (.035) .342 (.054) .473 (.036)
Notes: N is the number of group decision observations.
Panel-corrected AR(1)-corrected standard errors are in
parentheses.
Table 4.3 reveals a number of differences across treatments, which we discuss and test
below.9 A quick comparison with the theoretic predictions for max-turnout equilibria
in Table 4.1 shows that Nash equilibrium is not consistent with the behavior observed
in our experiment: average total turnouts rates in the data are much higher (with
one exception) than in the maximal turnout Nash equilibria predictions of Table
4.1, already in the No Communication treatment, and even more so in the Group
Communication treatment. Similarly to the stylized facts from real world elections
8We also ran the standard two-sample t-test for mean comparisons across treatments, which
assumes independent observations in each sample, and found very similar results. The findings we
report are thus more conservative.
9In addition to turnout rates, we summarized several important electoral characteristics: mean
frequencies of ties, pivotal events and the frequency of upsets in Table 4.16 in 4.A.
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and many past experimental findings, voters in the lab tend to over-vote compared
to the Nash prediction. In contrast, a casual inspection of the turnout rates suggest
that the data might be consistent with correlated and subcorrelated equilibrium
predictions, although to establish this more rigorously requires a deeper analysis
that we present below. Total turnout rates in Table 4.3 are somewhat lower than
max-turnout correlated and subcorrelated equilibrium predictions in Table 4.1, but
seem to satisfy the constraint of the turnout upper bound, and thus it might be
possible to associate correlated and subcorrelated equilibria with expected turnout
that would match the data. In order to check this, we develop and apply a formal
direct test for consistency with correlated and subcorrelated equilibrium in Section
4.2.5.2.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. In Sections 4.2.1-4.2.3, we
statistically test the treatment effects of changes in communication protocol, voting
cost, and relative party sizes. These behavioral effects are tested for using group-
level decisions and do not rely on specific assumptions about equilibrium behavior.
In Section 4.2.4 we look at the distribution of votes at the party and electorate levels.
In Section 4.2.5 we look at the individual level data and check whether these patterns
are consistent with equilibrium behavior.
4.2.1 Effects of communication
We start our analysis by looking at the main effect of interest: how communication
affects turnout.
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Result 1. Group communication increases total turnout (with significant increase
under the low voting cost). Public communication increases turnout under the high
cost, but decreases turnout under the low cost.
Support for Result 1. To test for the effect of communication on total (and party)
turnout, we compared the mean turnout rates under two different communication
modes while keeping party sizes and voting cost fixed.10
Table 4.4: Effects of Communication on Turnout
Group Communication v. No Communication
nA nB c ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
6 4 0.1 0.276∗∗∗ −0.151∗∗ 0.109∗∗
– – 0.3 0.080 0.010 0.052
7 3 0.1 0.173∗∗∗ 0.071 0.143∗∗∗
– – 0.3 0.042 −0.099 0.001
Public Communication v. No Communication
nA nB c ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
6 4 0.1 −0.058 −0.214∗∗ −0.117∗∗
– – 0.3 0.236∗∗∗ 0.021 0.151∗∗∗
7 3 0.1 −0.055 −0.155∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗
– – 0.3 0.200∗∗∗ −0.008 0.131∗∗∗
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1
From Table 4.4, we see that GC increases total turnout, compared to NC for each size
treatment and the low cost. The difference under the high cost is also positive, but
not significant. By contrast, PC works in the opposite way: for each size treatment,
PC increases total turnout, compared to NC, under the high cost, but decreases it
under the low cost. 
Result 2. Communication affects parties differently: under the low cost, communi-
cation decreases minority party turnout (except Group communication and small mi-
nority). Under the high cost, Public communication increases majority party turnout,
10We report two-sided p-values in Table 4.17 in 4.A.
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while Group communication shows no effect.
Support for Result 2. Looking at the turnout rate by parties in Table 4.4, we
see that group communication increases majority turnout for each size treatment
and the low cost, compared with no communication. As for public communication,
PC increases majority party turnout for each majority size and the high cost, but
decreases majority turnout under the low cost (the decrease is not significant though).
Comparing GC and PC, we find a pattern similar to the one we observed for total
turnout: for each size treatment, PC increases majority turnout, compared to GC,
under the high cost, but decreases it under the low cost.
The effect of communication on minority turnout is less pronounced. GC decreases
minority turnout, compared to NC for the large minority and the low cost (p = 0.05),
and for the small minority and the high cost (not significantly). PC decreases mi-
nority turnout compared to NC for each size treatment and the low cost; this finding
is in line with our results for total turnout. Finally, PC and GC are not significantly
different with respect to minority turnout for each size and cost treatments, except
for partition (7, 3) and the low cost, where PC decreases minority turnout compared
to GC. 
Next, we look at the effects of communication on several electoral characteristics:
probability of ties, pivotal events, and upsets.
Result 3. Communication uniformly decreases probabilities of ties and upsets11,
with significant effects under GC, low cost, and large minority. Communication also
11With one exception under GC, high cost, and large minority.
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decreases the probabilities of pivotal events, with significant effects under PC and
high cost, and under GC, low cost, and large minority.
Support for Result 3. We report the corresponding results in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Effects of Communication on Electoral Characteristics
Group Communication v. No Communication
nA nB c ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
6 4 0.1 −0.256∗∗ −0.250∗∗ −0.240∗
– – 0.3 −0.056 −0.028 0.057
7 3 0.1 −0.060 −0.053 −0.044
– – 0.3 −0.075 −0.036 −0.063
Public Communication v. No Communication
nA nB c ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
6 4 0.1 −0.104 0.003 −0.122
– – 0.3 −0.122 −0.400∗∗∗ −0.030
7 3 0.1 −0.050 0.075 −0.031
– – 0.3 −0.112 −0.300∗∗∗ −0.113∗
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ <
0.1
From Table 4.5 we find that group communication uniformly decreases probabilities
of ties and pivotal events. The effect is significant for the low cost and partition
(6, 4). Public communication also decreases the probabilities of ties, although the
difference is not significant. The decrease in the probability of pivotal events is
large and significant under the high voting cost. GC marginally decreases the upset
probability, compared to NC, under the low cost and partition (6, 4). PC does the
same under the high cost and partition (7, 3). 
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4.2.2 Effects of changing the voting cost
Result 4. Increasing the voting cost reduces the total turnout for each size and com-
munication treatment, except public communication. Under public communication,
increasing the cost increases the total turnout. These changes mostly occur via the
effect on the majority party turnout. Increasing the cost increases the probability of
pivotal events under group communication and no communication, and decreases it
under public communication.
Support for Result 4. We first look at the effect of increasing the voting cost
on turnout and welfare (Table 4.6), and then report the effects on the electoral
characteristics (Table 4.7).
Table 4.6: Effects of Cost on Turnout
High Cost v. Low Cost
nA nB Communication mode ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
6 4 NC −0.196∗∗∗ −0.204∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗
– – GC −0.392∗∗∗ −0.043 −0.254∗∗∗
– – PC 0.098 0.031 0.070
7 3 NC −0.107∗∗∗ −0.027 −0.081∗∗
– – GC −0.238∗∗ −0.197∗ −0.225∗∗∗
– – PC 0.145∗∗ 0.120∗ 0.136∗∗∗
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
From Table 4.6, we see that reducing the voting cost increases total turnout for
each size and communication treatment except public communication. Under PC,
counter-intuitively, reducing voting cost decreases total turnout. Breaking down
the total turnout by parties, we see that these changes mostly occur via the effect
on the majority party turnout, although for the large majority and communication
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treatments, the change in the voting cost also affects (marginally significantly) the
minority party turnout.
Table 4.7 presents the corresponding effects of the cost change on the electoral char-
acteristics we considered before: the probability of ties, pivotal events, and upsets.
Table 4.7: Effects of Cost on Electoral Characteristics
High Cost v. Low Cost
nA nB Comm. mode ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
6 4 NC −0.067 0.127 −0.055
– – GC 0.133 0.349∗∗∗ 0.242
– – PC −0.084 −0.276∗∗∗ 0.037
7 3 NC 0.126 0.200∗∗ 0.108
– – GC 0.134∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.088
– – PC 0.082 −0.174∗∗ 0.025
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
From Table 4.7 we see that reducing the voting cost does not significantly affect
the probability of ties. Reducing the cost decreases the probability of pivotal events
under group communication and no communication, and increases it under public
communication. The probability of upsets is uniformly increasing in the cost (except
no communication and large minority), but the changes are not significant. 
4.2.3 Effects of changing the relative party sizes
We now turn to the effects of changing the party sizes while keeping the electorate
size fixed. The competition effect hypothesis (Levine and Palfrey, 2007) predicts
that turnout in each party is decreasing in nA − nB. Thus increasing the minority
party size from 3 to 4 should increase turnout in each party.
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Result 5. Increasing the minority party at the expense of the majority party increases
the total turnout rate, significantly under the low cost. We observe the competition
effect under the low cost and no communication, and partial competition effect (for
majority party only) in the remaining treatments.
Support for Result 5. The effects on turnout are reported in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Effects of Changing the Relative Party Size on Turnout
Minority Size 4 v. Minority Size 3
c Comm. mode ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
0.1 NC 0.156∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗
– GC 0.259∗∗∗ −0.024 0.130∗∗∗
– PC 0.154∗∗ 0.140 0.134∗∗
0.3 NC 0.067∗ 0.021 0.049
– GC 0.105 0.130 0.100
– PC 0.106∗ 0.050 0.068
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
From Table 4.8, we note that increasing the minority party at the expense of the
majority party increases the total turnout rate, significantly so under the low cost.
We observe the competition effect under the low cost and no communication, but not
in the remaining treatments, primarily because the expected turnout in the minority
party is not significantly different across party sizes. There are significant differences
for the majority party, so we observe a partial competition effect.
Going from the small minority to the large minority does not significantly change
the probability of ties, pivotal events, and upsets, as we show in Table 4.22 in 4.A.

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4.2.4 Vote distributions
We now give a closer look at the distribution of votes for each party under different
treatments. First, we plot the respective histograms, separated by the communi-
cation treatments in Figures 4.2 – 4.3 in 4.A. These figures illustrate the effects
described in Sections 4.2.1-4.2.3.
Second, we look at the high turnout profiles, like those with nA and nA− 1 votes for
the majority party (or nB and nB−1 votes for the minority party). A high expected
turnout implies an increased probability of the high turnout profiles, and we can
check how it is affected by communication.
Result 6. Communication increases the likelihood of high-turnout profiles in both
majority and minority.
Support for Result 6. The vote distributions by profile are reported in Tables 4.26
– 4.27 in 4.A. First, we look at the majority party. We find that for partition (6, 4)
and no communication, the majority group profiles with high turnout (i.e., 5 and 6
votes) are played 27.5% of the time under the low cost and 5% of the time under
the high cost. With group communication, the corresponding profiles are played a
staggering 87.5% of the time under the low cost and 23% of the time under the high
cost. With public communication, these profiles are played 20% of the time under
the low cost and 35% of the time under the high cost.
For partition (7, 3) and no communication, the majority group profiles with high
turnout (i.e., 6 and 7 votes) are never played under the low cost and are played just
2.5% of the time under the high cost. With group communication, the corresponding
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profiles are played 15% of the time under the low cost and 10% of the time under
the high cost. With public communication, these profiles are played 5% of the time
under the low cost and 22.5% of the time under the high cost.
Thus, communication increases the likelihood of high-turnout profiles in the majority.
Second, we look at the minority party. For partition (6, 4) and no communication,
the minority group profile with high turnout (i.e., 4 votes) is played 7.5% of the time
under the low cost and is never played under the high cost. With group communi-
cation, the corresponding profile is played 37.5% of the time under the low cost and
17.5% of the time under the high cost. With public communication, this profile is
played 2.5% of the time under the low cost and 17.5% of the time under the high
cost.
For partition (7, 3) and no communication, the minority group profile with high
turnout (i.e., 3 votes) is played 5% of the time under either cost treatment. With
group communication, the corresponding profile is played 37.5% of the time under
the low cost and 7.5% of the time under the high cost. With public communication,
this profile is played 2.5% of the time under the low cost and 12.5% of the time under
the high cost.
Thus communication increases the likelihood of high-turnout profiles in the minority
group as well. 
We also looked at the dynamics of party turnout with rounds of the game (see
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 in 4.A). There are a few dominance relations for the majority
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party turnout, but the pattern is less clear for the minority party, consistently with
our results in Table 4.4.
4.2.5 Individual level data
Turning to the individual level data, we first classify subjects by their observed
frequency to turn out conditional on their party.
Result 7. Most subjects are responsive to their party type. There is more homo-
geneous behavior in treatments with communication than without communication.
Contrary to the Underdog effect, subjects assigned to the majority party are, on av-
erage, more likely to turn out than subjects assigned to the minority party.
Support for Result 7. Figure 4.6 in Appendix 4.A depicts individual turnout
frequencies for each party. Since in Part 2 of each session, in each round subjects
from the former majority party were assigned to the minority party with probability
1/2, some subjects were changing parties during the respective 10 rounds. Thus if
party assignment does not influence their voting behavior, there will be coinciding
droplines in a figure. We see that out of the 40 subjects who participated in each
treatment, only few subjects were irresponsive to their party type. We also see more
homogeneous behavior in treatments with communication than in the NC treatment.
Finally, we see that subjects assigned to the majority party are, on average, more
likely to turn out than subjects assigned to the minority party. This is contrary to
the Underdog effect, which predicts a larger turnout rate in the minority party. 
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4.2.5.1 Correlation in voting decisions
In this section, we investigate whether adding communication results in a “higher”
correlation in voters’ choices, and whether the data are consistent with correlated
and subcorrelated equilibrium.
Assumptions and Hypotheses
For the analysis of correlation, we need frequency estimates of the all-electorate
voting profiles from the data. The number of all possible profiles in a 10-person
electorate is 210, making it impossible to estimate frequencies with our data; hence
we make the following assumption to reduce the number of joint profiles. We combine
together all profiles that have the same number of votes from each party and only
differ by the identity of those voting and abstaining, and assume that such profiles
are equally likely. For example, we assume that the following profiles have equal
probability: a profile with all of the minority voting and with voters 1, 2, and 3 of
the majority voting, and a profile with all of the minority voting and with voters 4, 5,
and 6 of the majority voting. To state this assumption formally, let µ(zi, a, b) denote
the probability of any joint profile where player i plays strategy zi, and, among the
other n− 1 players, a players turn out in group NA and b players turn out in group
NB (where “groups” correspond to majority and minority party, respectively, in the
context of our experiment).
Assumption 1. (Group-symmetric distributions). For all treatments, we only con-
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sider distributions over joint voting profiles which satisfy the following restrictions:
∀i ∈ NA,∀a ∈ {1, . . . , nA − 1}, ∀b ∈ {0, . . . , nB} : µ(0i, a, b) = µ(1i, a− 1, b)
∀k ∈ NB,∀b ∈ {1, . . . , nB − 1},∀a ∈ {0, . . . , nA} : µ(0k, a, b) = µ(1k, a, b− 1)
Using Assumption 1, we now have a total of (nA+1)(nB+1) different profiles, i.e. 32
and 35 profiles in (7, 3) and (6, 4) treatments, respectively, which can be estimated
from the data. Furthermore, this assumption is also plausible to hold in our data,
since player ids within each party are randomly re-assigned every round. We can
now simply write µa,b for the probability of a joint profile with a votes from party
NA and b votes from party NB. We cannot verify Assumption 1 with our current
data, so for the remainder of our analysis, we just assume that it holds throughout.
Given a group-symmetric distribution, we can hypothesize various additional in-
cremental restrictions on its structure. We begin by formulating a group indepen-
dence hypothesis, which says that admissible group-symmetric distributions over
all-electorate voting profiles can be decomposed as a product of two independent
distributions over party voting profiles.
Hypothesis 1. (Group Independence). Distributions over joint voting profiles sat-
isfy Assumption 1 and the following restriction:
∀a ∈ {0, . . . , nA}, ∀b ∈ {0, . . . , nB} : µa,b = γ(a)δ(b),
where γ ∈ ∆({0, . . . , nA}) and δ ∈ ∆({0, . . . , nB}) are probability distributions over
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group profiles.
The decomposition in Hypothesis 1 is necessary for the subcorrelated equilibrium,
formally defined below. This is a relatively weak restriction. For instance, any Nash
equilibrium would require a distribution over joint profiles to be decomposable as a
product of n independent individual voting probabilities.
Hypothesis 1 can be strengthened at the individual level by requiring symmetry and
independence, which is necessary for a quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Hypothesis 2. (Symmetric Independent Voting). Distributions over joint voting
profiles satisfy Hypothesis 1, and each voter votes independently with the same prob-
ability conditional on her party.
Notice that Hypothesis 2 simultaneously requires independence and equal voting
probabilities, so in principle it can be rejected due to a violation of either property.
But since Assumption 1 combined with Hypothesis 1 holding implies the symmetry of
all players in a party, we can focus on testing for independence only. Thus if we find
that Hypothesis 2 holds in the No Communication treatment, but can be rejected
in some communication treatment, this is evidence for communication introducing
correlation.
If Hypothesis 2 holds, strategies can be described by two probabilities, pA and pB,
for voters in the majority and minority parties, respectively. Furthermore, the prob-
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ability of a majority group profile with a votes is written as
γ(a) =
(
nA
a
)
paA(1− pA)nA−a, (4.1)
and probability of a minority group profile with b votes is written as
δ(b) =
(
nB
b
)
pbB(1− pB)nB−b. (4.2)
The probability of a joint profile (a, b) with a+ b votes is simply µa,b = γ(a)δ(b).
Hypothesis 2 can be strengthened even more by requiring that subjects actually play
a quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Hypothesis 3. (Quasi-symmetric Nash). Distributions over joint voting profiles
satisfy Hypothesis 2 with probabilities p∗A and p
∗
B determined in a quasi-symmetric
Nash equilibrium.
The equilibrium conditions on p∗A and p
∗
B are given in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983,
pp.27-28). We focus on testing Hypothesis 3 for the max-turnout quasi-symmetric
Nash equilibrium because the summary estimates in Table 4.3 indicate very high
total turnout rates that cannot be generated by other Nash equilibria with lower
turnout.
The technical details of the tests used for testing Hypotheses 1-3 are in 4.A.1. The
main idea is to compare the estimated probabilities of the joint profiles µˆa,b for
each pair of vote counts (a, b) with the induced probabilities µ˜a,b under the null of
the respective Hypothesis. We compare the two distributions by means of a two-
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sample Epps-Singleton test, which is a powerful non-parametric alternative to the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney tests suited for comparing discrete distri-
butions, to see if the two are significantly different.
Result 8. Without communication, we can view voters’ turnout decisions as inde-
pendent. Introducing communication results in correlated turnout decisions (except
with public communication under the low voting cost). In communication treatments,
there is essentially no support for Nash equilibrium play.
Support for Result 8. First, we check Hypothesis 1. From Table 4.23 in 4.A.1, we
see that Hypothesis 1 appears to hold in all treatments.
Next, we test Hypothesis 2. Table 4.9 shows that Hypothesis 2 is not rejected at
0.05 level in all no communication treatments by both Epps-Singleton and likelihood
ratio tests. The likelihood ratio test rejects Hypothesis 2 for all communication
treatments (except public communication under low cost). Epps-Singleton also re-
jects Hypothesis 2 under group communication and high cost, but does not reject
it in the remaining communication treatments. Since the results of Epps-Singleton
do not take into account the variance in the estimation of pˆA and pˆB, we are more
confident in the likelihood ratio test results in this case.
Thus subjects’ turnout decisions under communication are correlated. This fact by
itself does not imply that the subjects’ play is inconsistent with Nash equilibrium,
so we test Hypothesis 3 separately. Table 4.10 confirms our results above. We reject
the max-turnout quasi-symmetric Nash equilibrium in all treatments except NC and
low cost, and one GC treatment with low cost and large minority. 
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Table 4.9: Test for Symmetric Independent Voting: Estimated vs. Induced Distri-
butions
Communication nA nB c ES test LR test
W2 p-val LR χ
2
0.05
NC 6 4 0.1 1.173 .883 35.780 46.194 (32)
– – – 0.3 0.962 .916 35.631 –
GC – – 0.1 7.368 .118 137.566∗ –
– – – 0.3 15.997∗∗ .003 86.962∗ –
PC – – 0.1 8.501 .075 45.554 –
– – – 0.3 6.922 .140 85.660∗ –
NC 7 3 0.1 4.636 .327 16.694 42.557 (29)
– – – 0.3 3.979 .409 30.330 –
GC – – 0.1 1.335 .855 86.237∗ –
– – – 0.3 9.488∗ .049 51.049∗ –
PC – – 0.1 2.153 .708 21.453 –
– – – 0.3 5.784 .216 51.053∗ –
Notes: W2 is two-sample Epps-Singleton test statistic for discrete data, com-
puted using a modified version of external Stata routine escftest. LR is the
likelihood ratio, corresponding χ20.05 critical value has (nA+1)(nB+1)−1−2
degrees of freedom (either 32 or 29). Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.001,
∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05.
Table 4.10: Test for Max-Turnout Quasi-Symmetric Nash
Communication nA nB c ES test
W2 p-val
NC 6 4 0.1 2.752 .600
– – – 0.3 48.595∗∗∗ .000
GC – – 0.1 54.621∗∗∗ .000
– – – 0.3 50.604∗∗∗ .000
PC – – 0.1 10.563∗ .032
– – – 0.3 179.778∗∗∗ .000
NC 7 3 0.1 7.830 .098
– – – 0.3 26.193∗∗∗ .000
GC – – 0.1 7.230 .124
– – – 0.3 26.705∗∗∗ .000
PC – – 0.1 19.393∗∗∗ .001
– – – 0.3 110.710∗∗∗ .000
Notes: W2 is two-sample Epps-Singleton test
statistic for discrete data, computed using a modi-
fied version of external Stata routine escftest. Sig-
nificance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05.
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4.2.5.2 Consistency with Correlated and Subcorrelated Equilibrium
Given the frequencies of all joint profiles, we can now check if the realized vote
distribution forms a correlated equilibrium. Since we cannot reject Hypothesis 1 in
our data, we can also test for a subcorrelated equilibrium. This kind of estimation
becomes feasible under the following assumption.
Assumption 2. (Fixed distribution) The realized voting outcomes are drawn every
round from the same joint probability distribution (not necessarily an equilibrium
one).
Assumption 2 would be violated if, for example, outcomes from the first 5 rounds
and from the last 5 rounds had come from two different distributions.
A correlated equilibrium (CE) in our game is a probability distribution over joint
voting profiles where at every profile each player’s choice is a best response under
the posterior distribution conditional on that choice. Thus, unlike Nash, there are
two best response conditions for each player: conditional on deciding to vote, and
conditional on deciding to abstain. In the turnout game, CE is defined by the
following 2n inequalities (in addition to the standard probability constraints) for
each i ∈ N :
c ≥ 1
2
Pr(i is pivotal | i abstains) (4.3)
c ≤ 1
2
Pr(i is pivotal | i votes) (4.4)
173
Under the group-symmetric distributions, defined in Assumption 1, ? shows that
conditions (4.3)-(4.4) can be written as system of four inequalities, two for players
in NA, and two for players in NB, with respect to (nA + 1)(nB + 1) variables of the
form
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b.
Let φ = [φ0A, φ
1
A, φ
0
B, φ
1
B] be a 4 × 1 vector of the left hand sides of the incentive
compatibility constraints (4.3)-(4.4). We show in 4.A.2 that one can write φ = Jµ,
where J ∈ R4×(nA+1)(nB+1) is a constant Jacobian matrix, and µ ∈ ∆({0, . . . , nA +
1}× {0, . . . , nB + 1}) is a group-symmetric probability distribution over joint voting
profiles. Then µ is a group-symmetric correlated equilibrium if and only if φ ≤
0. Clearly, when µ is estimated from the data, there might be some violations in
individual components of φ, so we define ν ≡ −φ = −Jµ, and test H0 : ν0 ≥
0 vs .ν0 6≥ 0 using a test from Wolak (1989). See 4.A.2 for details.
Result 9. Estimated joint vote distributions are largely consistent with correlated
equilibrium under the low cost, but not under the high cost. Inconsistency in the
latter case is due to an insufficiently high frequency of being pivotal conditional on
deciding to vote, which can be related to over-voting in the majority party and under-
voting in the minority party relative to the equilibrium level.
Support for Result 9. Table 4.11 presents the results of our test for constraint
violations for all our treatments. We report the estimated profile frequencies and the
estimates of φ in corresponding Tables 4.24-4.25 in 4.A.
The results from Table 4.11 should be taken with caution, because they are based
on a small number of observations. Based on these data, however, we find that
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Table 4.11: Test for Consistency with Correlated Equilibrium
Communication nA nB c IU stat
NC 6 4 0.1 9.682∗∗
– – – 0.3 24.747∗∗∗
GC – – 0.1 2.760
– – – 0.3 9.548∗∗
PC – – 0.1 5.213
– – – 0.3 64.553∗∗∗
NC 7 3 0.1 0.065
– – – 0.3 11.031∗∗
GC – – 0.1 0.195
– – – 0.3 16.564∗∗∗
PC – – 0.1 5.861
– – – 0.3 58.619∗∗∗
IU stat is the test statistic defined in (4.10). Sig-
nificance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
under the low cost, for all cases except one (no communication, low cost, and large
minority) we cannot reject the the null of aggregate voting behavior being consistent
with a correlated equilibrium. By contrast, under the high voting cost we soundly
reject the correlated equilibrium hypothesis.12
The estimates of φ in Tables 4.24-4.25 in 4.A also show that inconsistencies under
the high voting cost are due to violations of the incentive compatibility constraints
(4.4), which restrict the pivotal probability conditional on deciding to vote. Thus,
this probability in the data is not high enough under the high voting cost. The
remaining constraints (4.3) are satisfied. 
Our findings so far suggest that the group communication case is somewhat special
in that voting probabilities appear correlated within groups, but not across groups.
This pattern would be consistent with the presence of a subcorrelated equilibrium in
12Strictly speaking, this is a joint hypothesis of a correlated equilibrium and Assumptions 1–2.
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our data. In this case, the moment inequality test procedure needs to be adjusted.13
A subcorrelated equilibrium (SCE) in our game is a correlated equilibrium for which
in addition to constraints (4.3)-(4.4), Hypothesis 1 holds. Thus, in a subcorrelated
equilibrium votes can be correlated within, but not across, the two parties. In order
to check for consistency of our data with a Subcorrelated equilibrium, we computed
an analog of Table 4.11 under Hypothesis 1. That is, instead of computing the joint
distribution directly, we estimated γˆ and δˆ from the data, and then computed an
induced probability distribution µ˜a,b as γˆ(a)δˆ(b) for each joint profile (a, b).
Result 10. Assuming group independence (which is not rejected in the data), joint
vote distributions are consistent with subcorrelated equilibrium under the low cost and
group communication, but not under the high cost or other communication treatments
(except one no communication case).
Support for Result 10. Table 4.12 presents the results of our test for subcorrelated
equilibrium. The estimated group frequencies and estimates of φ are in Tables 4.26
– 4.27 in 4.A.
From Table 4.12 we see that test results for subcorrelated equilibrium are broadly
in line with results for correlated equilibrium: under the high voting cost we reject
the null of consistency with subcorrelated equilibrium in all cases; but under the low
voting cost we now also reject it under public communication. Thus, subcorrelated
equilibrium, by imposing additional restrictions on the distribution over joint profiles,
allows one to distinguish between group and public communication.
13See 4.A.2 for details.
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Table 4.12: Test for Consistency with Subcorrelated Equilibrium
Communication nA nB c IU stat
NC 6 4 0.1 11.656∗∗
– – – 0.3 21.234∗∗∗
GC – – 0.1 3.432
– – – 0.3 73.085∗∗∗
PC – – 0.1 6.791∗
– – – 0.3 68.663∗∗∗
NC 7 3 0.1 1.268
– – – 0.3 21.406∗∗∗
GC – – 0.1 0.662
– – – 0.3 31.523∗∗∗
PC – – 0.1 8.802∗∗
– – – 0.3 64.155∗∗∗
IU stat is defined in (4.10). Significance codes:
∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
Importantly, we see again (using estimates of φ in Tables 4.26 – 4.27) that the
inconsistencies under the high voting cost are due to violations of the incentive
compatibility constraints (4.4) for those players from both parties who turn out.
This pattern is consistent with over-voting in the majority party and under-voting
in the minority party, and is also evidenced from the anti-Underdog effect in our
data. 
4.2.5.3 Analysis of Chat Data in Communication Treatments
In this section we take a deeper look at the actual communication between subjects.
We recorded the messages subjects exchanged during each communication stage and
employed an independent research assistant to classify and code the messages ac-
cording to 10 general categories, listed in Table 4.13.
We begin our analysis by looking at the frequency distributions across communication
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Table 4.13: Message Categories
Code Description Message examples
0 Disagreement “no!”, “unfair :(”, “lol, no point”
1 Irrelevant “hello”, “lol”, “omg”
2 Agreement to a proposed strategy “ok”, “cool”, “yes”, “alright”, “sure”
3 General discussion about rules of the game “if we all chose x we can win at the end”,
“if we are of type A should it always work to
pick x if we all agree on it?”
4 Informative statement about history “only one A chose Y last time”
5 Question to others: what are you going to
do?
“do we want to play it safe or try the x gam-
ble again?”, “do we all want to try for x?”
6 Strategy suggestion about others/own deci-
sion/group decision
“choose x”, “let’s all pick x”, “if you’re 1-4
you pick x”
7 Own plan: will choose X “I’ll do X”, “im gonna go x”
8 Own plan: will choose Y “I’ll do Y”
9 Ambiguous/contradictory “gonna choose x or y.. I am not sure”
treatments. We observe a large fraction of meaningless messages in each treatment
(code 1). There are consistently more irrelevant messages under public communica-
tion than under group communication. Other popular categories of messages include
discussion about the rules of the game (code 3) and strategy suggestions (code 6).
There is a small fraction of messages informative about history of play (code 4),
messages expressing agreement (code 2), and a smaller fraction of messages related
to questions to others and own plans (codes 5, 7, and 8, respectively). The remaining
categories – disagreement and ambiguous messages – comprise on average less than
1.6% of total messages.
With this general distribution in mind, Table 4.14 lists the frequencies of messages by
category pooled across all rounds. For clarity of presentation, we excluded the very
large shares of irrelevant messages and messages discussing rules of the game (codes
1 and 3), as well as ambiguous messages (code 9), which are almost non-present in
178
the data.14 We refer to remaining messages as relevant messages.
Table 4.14: Message Frequencies by Treatment
nA nB Cost Comm. N Message Category
mode Strategy Negotiation History Query
(Strat.) (Vote) (Abst.) (Disagr.) (Agr.)
6 4 0.1 GC 834 41.73 15.23 4.32 2.52 19.06 10.55 6.59
– – – PC 654 64.68 1.53 4.89 1.68 7.80 13.91 5.50
– – 0.3 GC 651 40.71 3.53 9.22 6.30 20.89 13.21 6.14
– – – PC 944 67.06 5.51 2.65 1.17 9.11 11.97 2.54
7 3 0.1 GC 698 35.96 11.03 5.44 1.72 18.34 22.64 4.87
– – – PC 620 56.94 1.13 4.35 2.10 5.48 23.87 6.13
– – 0.3 GC 655 44.58 11.60 8.70 3.66 10.69 15.57 5.19
– – – PC 536 46.64 8.40 4.29 3.17 11.19 19.59 6.72
Notes. Table cells contain for each message code percentages of N , the total number
of relevant messages (i.e., excluding codes 1,3, and 9) in a given treatment.
We also break down message frequencies by round in Tables 4.28 – 4.29 in 4.A. Those
tables show that the patterns in Table 4.14 are not a by-product of pooling across
rounds.15
As the voting cost increases, we see a decrease in the total number of messages as
well as relevant messages for all cases except one (PC and large minority). There is
an increase in the share of strategy suggestions (except PC and small minority, and
GC and large minority). The share of informative history messages decreases under
public communication, and under group communication and small minority.
Comparing across communication treatments for a fixed voting cost, we see that
public communication treatments have more strategy suggestions.16 It is also inter-
14These types of messages do not affect turnout rates, as we check below. For entire frequency
distributions, see Tables 4.28 – 4.29 in 4.A.3.
15It is worth noting that we observe a somewhat increasing fraction of irrelevant messages over
rounds.
16There is also a notable increase in the proportion of irrelevant messages compared to group
communication and less discussion about the rules.
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esting to note that group communication treatments have a larger share of agreement
messages than public communication ones (with one exception).
To assess how messages in different categories affect total turnout, we estimated a
simple linear relationship, regressing for each treatment the total number of messages
per electorate in each code category on total turnout rate in that electorate. The
estimates are reported in Table 4.15 (with standard errors and p-values reported in
Table 4.30 in 4.A.) We also estimated an ordered probit model and found very similar
results.17
Table 4.15: Effects of the Number of Relevant Messages in Each Category on Total
Turnout Rate
nA nB Cost Comm. Message Category
mode (Disagr.) (Agr.) (Hist.) (Q?) (Strat.) (Vote) (Abst.)
6 4 0.1 GC −0.044∗ 0.002 0.000 0.053∗∗∗ 0.014∗ 0.014 0.004
– – – PC 0.061 0.055∗∗ −0.024 0.014 −0.003 0.037 −0.064∗∗∗
– – 0.3 GC −0.007 0.038∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.018 0.026∗∗∗ 0.063∗ −0.011
– – – PC 0.038 0.046∗∗∗ 0.012 −0.010 −0.001 0.046∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
7 3 0.1 GC 0.025 0.003 0.010∗ 0.009 0.001 0.034∗∗ −0.023
– – – PC 0.021 0.008 −0.001 0.046 −0.005∗ −0.028 −0.040
– – 0.3 GC −0.061 0.047∗ 0.004 −0.024 0.004 0.037∗∗∗ −0.004
– – – PC −0.019∗ 0.021 0.005 0.028∗ −0.004 0.044∗∗ −0.073∗∗
Notes. Table cells contain for each message code OLS estimates of the effects of the total
number of messages per electorate in that category on total turnout rate in a given treatment.
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05.
Table 4.15 reveals several common patterns among group and public communication
treatments. Disagreement messages have no effect (except (GC, large minority, low
cost) and (PC, small minority, high cost), where the effect is negative). Agreement
17We report effects of irrelevant category messages (codes 1,3 and 9) in Table 4.30. We show there
that including two most common message categories (irrelevant and discussion of rules) has no effect
on turnout (except few cases). Including ambiguous messages (code 9) results in an implausibly
large significant positive effect under PC and small minority, but given their small share in the total
messages, this is likely a data artifact.
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messages significantly increase turnout in half of the treatments, and increase turnout
insignificantly in the remaining treatments. Strategy suggestions increase turnout
under group communication and large minority, but decrease turnout under public
communication, small minority, and low cost. In the remaining treatments the effect
is positive for group communication, negative for public communication, but not
significant. History-related messages show no effect (except low cost, GC, and small
minority). Questions to others have a positive effect in two cases: under low cost, GC,
and large minority, and under high cost, PC, and small minority. Direct statements
about one’s own plan are largely consistent with turnout outcomes: messages about
voting mostly have a positive effect, while messages about abstention have a negative
effect.
Given our analysis in the previous section, it seems plausible that inconsistency with
correlated equilibrium under the high voting cost might be related to the violation
of Assumption 2: the distribution over voting profiles might be noticeably changing
over time (e.g., due to faster learning under the high cost). There is an increase in
the share of strategy suggestions, with more suggestions creating more room for mis-
coordination, which is detrimental at a high cost. As a result, expected distribution
over voting profiles shifts towards “safer”, non-pivotal voting outcomes, violating
incentive compatibility constraints for those turning out to vote in either party.
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4.3 Concluding Remarks
This is the first study to investigate effects of unrestricted and party-restricted un-
mediated cheap talk communication on turnout in the laboratory. We studied how
changes in communication structure, voting cost, and the relative party sizes affect
turnout, welfare, and electoral characteristics.
There are a number of central findings. First, with communication, we find essentially
no support for the standard Nash equilibrium turnout predictions.
Second, the results point to a strong interaction between the form of communica-
tion and the voting cost in terms of how these two factors influence overall turnout
in elections. In particular, with a low voting cost, party communication increases
turnout, while public communication decreases turnout. In contrast, with a high
voting cost, public communication increases turnout.
A third finding is that these factors impact differentially the turnout rates of majority
party versus minority party voters. We find that when the voting cost is high, the
majority party voters turn out at relatively higher rates, while the minority party
voters turn out at relatively lower rates.
Fourth, we develop and apply a test for the effect of communication on correlation
and find that communication results in correlated decisions. Overall, as a result of
this correlation, the effects of communication are large, and comparable in magnitude
to the effects of changing the main exogenous parameters of the model that have
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traditionally been viewed as key driving variables that influence turnout, i.e., voting
cost and the competitiveness of the election.
These findings underscore the importance of developing rigorous theoretical models
to explicitly take communication possibilities into account. Correlated and subcorre-
lated equilibrium provide the desirable framework by allowing players to coordinate
under unrestricted and group-restricted communication protocols. Testing for these
equilibria in our data is the first attempt at eliciting the general principles of co-
ordination in competing groups under communication. The partial success of this
framework suggests on the one hand that further study, perhaps with more compli-
cated experiments with larger groups and more variation, is warranted. On the other
hand, the data do not fully support the original hypothesis that turnout might ap-
proach the maximum theoretical bound implied by correlated equilibrium, so there is
clearly room for further theoretical development in the modeling of communication
in these games.
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4.A Appendix: Additional Estimation Details
The figures and tables in this appendix present additional estimation details for
results in Section 4.2.
Figure 4.1: User Interface (No Communication Treatment)
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Table 4.16: Mean Frequencies by Treatment
No Communication
N nA nB c Tie Pivotal Upset
40 6 4 0.1 0.272 (.044) 0.477 (.086) 0.259 (.049)
– – – 0.3 0.205 (.068) 0.603 (.052) 0.204 (.058)
– 7 3 0.1 0.111 (.182) 0.300 (.085) 0.116 (.084)
– – – 0.3 0.237 (.086) 0.500 (.035) 0.223 (.046)
Group Communication
N nA nB c Tie Pivotal Upset
40 6 4 0.1 0.016 (.095) 0.227 (.069) 0.019 (.122)
– – – 0.3 0.149 (.062) 0.575 (.065) 0.261 (.084)
– 7 3 0.1 0.043 (.065) 0.247 (.056) 0.072 (.058)
– – – 0.3 0.177 (.045) 0.464 (.036) 0.161 (.062)
Public Communication
N nA nB c Tie Pivotal Upset
40 6 4 0.1 0.167 (.116) 0.479 (.082) 0.137 (.070)
– – – 0.3 0.083 (.066) 0.204 (.053) 0.174 (.064)
– 7 3 0.1 0.043 (.065) 0.375 (.070) 0.085 (.082)
– – – 0.3 0.125 (.104) 0.201 (.051) 0.110 (.042)
Notes: N is the number of group decision observations.
Panel-corrected AR(1)-corrected standard errors are in
parentheses
Table 4.17: Effects of Communication on Turnout
Group Communication v. No Communication
N nA nB c ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
40 6 4 0.1 0.276∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.151∗ (0.050) 0.109∗ (0.018)
– – – 0.3 0.080 (0.182) 0.010 (0.911) 0.052 (0.285)
– 7 3 0.1 0.173∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.071 (0.519) 0.143∗∗∗ (0.000)
– – – 0.3 0.042 (0.666) −0.099 (0.180) 0.001 (0.993)
Public Communication v. No Communication
N nA nB c ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
40 6 4 0.1 −0.058 (0.225) −0.214∗ (0.022) −0.117∗ (0.032)
– – – 0.3 0.236∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.021 (0.720) 0.151∗∗∗ (0.001)
– 7 3 0.1 −0.055 (0.294) −0.155∗∗ (0.009) −0.086∗ (0.023)
– – – 0.3 0.200∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.008 (0.924) 0.131∗∗ (0.006)
Public Communication v. Group Communication
N nA nB c ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
40 6 4 0.1 −0.334∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.063 (0.546) −0.225∗∗∗ (0.000)
– – – 0.3 0.156∗ (0.045) 0.011 (0.913) 0.099 (0.114)
– 7 3 0.1 −0.228∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.226∗ (0.039) −0.229∗∗∗ (0.000)
– – – 0.3 0.155 (0.117) 0.091 (0.186) 0.131∗ (0.048)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance
codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
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Table 4.18: Effects of Communication on Electoral Characteristics
Group Communication v. No Communication
N nA nB c ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
40 6 4 0.1 −0.256∗∗ (0.018) −0.250∗ (0.027) −0.240 (0.073)
– – – 0.3 −0.056 (0.542) −0.028 (0.737) 0.057 (0.581)
– 7 3 0.1 −0.068 (0.727) −0.053 (0.607) −0.044 (0.671)
– – – 0.3 −0.060 (0.539) −0.057 (0.581) −0.063 (0.419)
Public Communication v. No Communication
N nA nB c ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
40 6 4 0.1 −0.104 (0.405) 0.003 (0.982) −0.122 (0.158)
– – – 0.3 −0.122 (0.200) −0.400∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.030 (0.728)
– 7 3 0.1 −0.068 (0.727) 0.075 (0.496) −0.031 (0.796)
– – – 0.3 −0.112 (0.412) −0.300∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.113 (0.071)
Public Communication v. Group Communication
N nA nB c ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
40 6 4 0.1 0.151 (0.317) 0.253∗ (0.022) 0.118 (0.404)
– – – 0.3 −0.066 (0.469) −0.372∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.087 (0.415)
– 7 3 0.1 0.000 (1.000) 0.128 (0.158) 0.013 (0.898)
– – – 0.3 −0.052 (0.652) −0.263∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.051 (0.503)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.001,
∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05
Table 4.19: Effects of Cost on Turnout
High Cost v. Low Cost
N nA nB Comm. mode ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
40 6 4 NC −0.196∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.204∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.197∗∗∗ (0.000)
– – – GC −0.392∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.043 (0.689) −0.254∗∗∗ (0.000)
– – – PC 0.098 (0.136) 0.031 (0.756) 0.070 (0.246)
– 7 3 NC −0.107∗∗ (0.008) −0.027 (0.712) −0.081∗ (0.017)
– – – GC −0.238∗∗ (0.015) −0.197 (0.075) −0.224∗∗∗ (0.001)
– – – PC 0.145∗∗ (0.017) 0.120 (0.070) 0.136∗∗ (0.007)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01,
∗ < 0.05.
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Table 4.20: Effects of Cost on Electoral Characteristics
High Cost v. Low Cost
Ncl nA nB Comm. mode ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
40 6 4 NC −0.067 (0.411) 0.127 (0.211) −0.055 (0.469)
– – – GC 0.133 (0.246) 0.349∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.242 (0.107)
– – – PC −0.084 (0.530) −0.276∗∗ (0.006) 0.037 (0.697)
– 7 3 NC 0.126 (0.535) 0.200∗ (0.034) 0.108 (0.266)
– – – GC 0.134 (0.095) 0.217∗∗ (0.002) 0.088 (0.303)
– – – PC 0.082 (0.506) −0.174∗ (0.048) 0.025 (0.790)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01,
∗ < 0.05.
Table 4.21: Effects of Changing the Relative Party Size on Turnout
Majority Size 6 v. Majority Size 7
Ncl c Comm. mode ∆TˆA ∆TˆB ∆Tˆ
40 0.1 NC 0.156∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.198∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.165∗∗∗ (0.000)
– – GC 0.259∗∗∗ (0.000) −0.024 (0.840) 0.130∗∗ (0.004)
– – PC 0.154∗ (0.013) 0.140 (0.125) 0.134∗ (0.016)
– 0.3 NC 0.067 (0.084) 0.021 (0.625) 0.049 (0.139)
– – GC 0.105 (0.326) 0.130 (0.181) 0.100 (0.162)
– – PC 0.106 (0.099) 0.050 (0.519) 0.068 (0.227)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01,
∗ < 0.05.
Table 4.22: Effects of Changing the Relative Party Size on Electoral Characteristics
Majority Size 6 v. Majority Size 7
Ncl c Comm. mode ∆Tie ∆Pivotal ∆Upset
40 0.1 NC 0.161 (0.396) 0.177 (0.147) 0.143 (0.147)
– – GC −0.027 (0.816) −0.021 (0.819) −0.054 (0.692)
– – PC 0.124 (0.354) 0.104 (0.336) 0.052 (0.636)
– 0.3 NC −0.032 (0.773) 0.104 (0.104) −0.020 (0.791)
– – GC −0.028 (0.716) 0.111 (0.139) 0.100 (0.344)
– – PC −0.042 (0.734) 0.003 (0.970) 0.064 (0.406)
Notes: Two-sided p-values in parentheses. Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.001,
∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05.
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Figure 4.2: Voting patterns for majority party
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Figure 4.3: Voting patterns for minority party
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Figure 4.4: Turnout dynamics for majority party
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Figure 4.5: Turnout dynamics for minority party
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Figure 4.6: Individual turnout frequencies
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4.A.1 Tests for the presence of correlation
To test Hypothesis 1, we first estimate from the data the probabilities of the joint
profiles µa,b for each pair of vote counts (a, b), obtaining the estimated distribution µˆ.
Next, we estimate probability distributions over group profiles, γˆ and δˆ, separately
for each party, and compute the induced probability distribution µ˜ as a product of
γˆ and δˆ, thereby satisfying Hypothesis 1. Finally, we compare µ˜ with µˆ by means
of a two-sample Epps-Singleton test, which is a powerful non-parametric alternative
to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney tests suited for comparing discrete
distributions, to see if the two distributions are significantly different.
We can test Hypothesis 2 as follows. First, estimate the probabilities of the joint
profiles µa,b from the data for each pair of vote counts (a, b), obtaining the estimated
distribution µˆ. Next, estimate pA and pB from the data as averages over individual
subjects’ voting probabilities in each group (depicted in Figure 4.6 for all subjects in
all treatments), obtaining pˆA and pˆB. Given these estimates, we compute the induced
group probabilities γ˜ and δ˜ by plugging pˆA and pˆB into (4.1) and (4.2), and compute
the induced joint distribution under the null as µ˜a,b = γ˜(a)δ˜(b). Finally, we compare
the resulting distribution with the actual distribution (i.e., µ˜ with µˆ) by means of
a two-sample Epps-Singleton test, obtaining the W2 test statistic. The caveat of
this approach is that one needs to account for variance in the estimates pˆA and pˆB
when generating the induced distribution. Therefore we supplement the results of
Epps-Singleton test with a maximum likelihood ratio test (cf. Moreno and Wooders
(1998, pp.57-58)). Let na,b be the number of times vote count (a, b) was observed,
and N =
∑nA
a=0
∑nB
b=0 na,b be the total number of observations in a given treatment.
The loglikelihood that a sample was generated by a multinomial distribution µ can
be written as
`(µ) = C +
nA∑
a=0
nB∑
b=0
na,b lnµa,b (4.5)
where C is a normalization constant. Under the null of Hypothesis 2, the loglikeli-
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hood is maximized at
µˆ0a,b =
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)(∑
a,b
a
nA
na,b
N
)a(
1−
∑
a,b
a
nA
na,b
N
)nA−a(∑
a,b
b
nB
na,b
N
)b(
1−
∑
a,b
b
nB
na,b
N
)nB−b
Under the alternative hypothesis of µ being an arbitrary multinomial distribution,
the loglikelihood is maximized at µˆ1a,b =
na,b
N
. The null and the alternative have 2
and (nA + 1)(nB + 1) − 1 degrees of freedom, respectively. The likelihood ratio,
−2 (`(µˆ0)− `(µˆ1)), is then asymptotically distributed as χ2 with (nA + 1)(nB + 1)−
1 − 2 degrees of freedom, so we can compare the LR statistic with the χ2 critical
value at 0.05 level. These tests are also reported below.
To test Hypothesis 3, we plug the Nash equilibrium probabilities in (4.1) and (4.2)
(e.g., we set pA and pB equal to TA and TB from Table 4.1, respectively) and again
compare the predicted distribution with the actual one using Epps-Singleton test.
Test results
Table 4.23: Test for Group Independence
Communication nA nB c ES test
W2 p-val
NC 6 4 0.1 4.552 .336
– – – 0.3 0.446 .978
GC – – 0.1 1.840 .765
– – – 0.3 0.443 .979
PC – – 0.1 0.413 .981
– – – 0.3 4.052 .399
NC 7 3 0.1 1.965 .742
– – – 0.3 1.666 .797
GC – – 0.1 1.302 .861
– – – 0.3 1.416 .842
PC – – 0.1 4.619 .329
– – – 0.3 3.060 .548
Notes: W2 is two-sample Epps-Singleton test
statistic for discrete data, computed using a mod-
ified version of external Stata routine escftest.
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4.A.2 Tests for consistency with correlated and subcorre-
lated equilibrium
Correlated Equilibrium Under the group-symmetric distributions, defined in As-
sumption 1, we can rewrite conditions (4.3)-(4.4) as the following system of four
inequalities, two for players in NA, and two for players in NB, with respect to
(nA + 1)(nB + 1) variables of the form
(
nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b:
φ0A ≡
1
2
− c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1
)
−nA−1∑
a=1
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−2∑
a=0
nB∑
b=a+2
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b
 ≤ 0 (4.6)
φ1A ≡
nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB}∑
b=0
(
nA−1
a−1
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
nB−1∑
a=1
nB∑
b=a+1
(
nA−1
a−1
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b −
1
2
− c
c
(
nB∑
a=0
(
nA−1
a
)(
nA
a+1
) ( nA
a+ 1
)(
nB
a
)
µa+1,a +
nB∑
a=1
(
nA−1
a−1
)(
nA
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
≤ 0 (4.7)
and
φ0B ≡
1
2
− c
c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nB−1
a
)(
nB
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a +
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nB−1
a
)(
nB
a
) ( nA
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)(
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a
)
µa+1,a
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− nA∑
a=2
min{a−2,nB−1}∑
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a
)(
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nB−1∑
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(
nB−1
b
)(
nB
b
) (nA
a
)(
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b
)
µa,b
 ≤ 0 (4.8)
φ1B ≡
nA∑
a=2
min{a−1,nB}∑
b=1
(
nB−1
b−1
)(
nB
b
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b +
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nB∑
b=a+2
(
nB−1
b−1
)(
nB
b
) (nA
a
)(
nB
b
)
µa,b −
1
2
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c
(
nB−1∑
a=0
(
nB−1
a
)(
nB
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) (nA
a
)(
nB
a+ 1
)
µa,a+1 +
nB∑
a=1
(
nB−1
a−1
)(
nB
a
) (nA
a
)(
nB
a
)
µa,a
)
≤ 0 (4.9)
Let φ = [φ0A, φ
1
A, φ
0
B, φ
1
B] be a 4 × 1 vector of the left hand sides of the incentive
compatibility constraints (4.6)-(4.9). Notice that we can write φ = Jµ, where
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J ∈ R4×(nA+1)(nB+1) is a constant Jacobian matrix, and µ ∈ ∆({0, . . . , nA + 1} ×
{0, . . . , nB + 1}) is a group-symmetric probability distribution over joint voting pro-
files. Then µ is a group-symmetric CE if and only if φ ≤ 0.
We now apply the inequality-based testing procedure described in Wolak (1989). De-
fine ν ≡ −φ = −Jµ, and let νˆ be its estimate from the experimental data, obtained
from K independent trials. Given µ, interpreted as a multinomial distribution with
K trials and (nA + 1)(nB + 1) outcomes, and a (nA + 1)(nB + 1)× (nA + 1)(nB + 1)
variance-covariance matrix Σ, we can derive by the Delta method that νˆ
a∼ N(ν0,Ω)
and Ω = JΣJ ′.
We want to test H0 : ν0 ≥ 0 vs .ν0 6≥ 0. Following Wolak (1989), we define the test
statistic as
IU ≡ (νˆ − ν˜)′Ω−1(νˆ − ν˜), (4.10)
where
ν˜ ≡ arg min
ν≥0
(νˆ − ν)′Ω−1(νˆ − ν).
In our computations, we estimate νˆ = −Jµˆ, where µˆ is a vector of estimated joint
frequencies from K experimental trials, and replace Ω with its consistent estimate
Ωˆ = JΣˆJ ′. Suppose the IU test statistic computed from the data equals s, then
Wolak (1989, Corollary 1) allows us to compute the p-value under the null hypothesis
ν0 ≥ 0 as follows.
sup
ν0≥0
Prν,Ω[IU ≥ s] =
4∑
k=0
Pr(χ2k ≥ s)w(4, 4− k,Ω),
where Pr(χ2k ≥ s) denotes the probability that a χ2k random variable exceeds s, and
w(4, 4− k,Ω) is the probability that exactly 4− k out of 4 elements in ν˜ are strictly
positive. These weights can be computed by Monte Carlo simulations.18
18For the case with up to 4 restrictions analytical expressions for the weights are available in
Kudo (1963) and Shapiro (1985).
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Subcorrelated Equilibrium In order to test the subcorrelated equilibrium hy-
pothesis, we slightly modify the moment inequality procedure using the fact that
now νˆ = −J [δˆ ⊗ γˆ], where δˆ ∈ ∆({0, . . . , nB + 1}), γˆ ∈ ∆({0, . . . , nA + 1}) have
sample covariance matrices Σˆ1 and Σˆ2, respectively (each estimated as a covariance
matrix of a corresponding multinomial distribution over group profiles), and⊗ stands
for Kronecker product. Using the Delta method, we obtain that νˆ
a∼ N(ν0,Ω) and
Ω = H
[
Σˆ1 0
0 Σˆ2
]
H ′,
where
H4×(nB+1+nA+1) =
[
J [I[nB+1] ⊗ γˆ] J [δˆ ⊗ I[nA+1]]
]
,
and I[x] is an identity matrix of size x× x. The rest of the testing procedure is the
same: we compute the IU test statistic and test the null of H0 : ν0 ≥ 0 vs .ν0 6≥ 0.
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Table 4.24: Profile Frequencies and Test for Correlated Equilibrium, Partition (6, 4)
No communication
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 4 a\b 0 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0.025 0 0 0.025 0 0.050 0.025 0
1 0 0.025 0 0 0 1 0 0.050 0.025 0 0
2 0 0 0.075 0.050 0.025 2 0.025 0.225 0.125 0 0
3 0.025 0 0.050 0.175 0.025 3 0 0.100 0.150 0 0
4 0.050 0.050 0.100 0.050 0 4 0 0.075 0.075 0 0
5 0.025 0 0.025 0.125 0.025 5 0 0.025 0 0.025 0
6 0 0.025 0.025 0.025 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
φ0A 0.621 −0.311
φ1A −0.379 0.071
φ0B 0.263 −0.017
φ1B −0.613 0.223
IU stat 9.682∗∗, p = .032 24.747∗∗∗, p = .000
Group communication
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 4 a\b 0 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.050 0.075 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.050 0.025 0.025 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0.025 0.150 0 0.025 0.025
3 0 0 0 0 0.025 3 0.050 0.050 0.050 0 0.025
4 0.050 0 0.025 0 0.025 4 0 0 0.025 0 0.075
5 0.225 0 0.075 0 0.175 5 0.075 0.075 0.050 0 0.025
6 0.250 0 0 0 0.150 6 0 0 0 0.025 0.025
φ0A −0.021 −0.149
φ1A 0.063 0.219
φ0B −0.575 −0.192
φ1B 0.175 0.121
IU stat 2.760, p = .457 9.548∗∗, p = .034
Public communication
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 4 a\b 0 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.050 0 0 0
1 0.075 0.050 0 0 0 1 0.025 0 0 0 0
2 0.100 0.075 0.050 0.050 0 2 0 0 0 0.025 0.050
3 0.025 0.050 0.025 0.050 0 3 0.100 0.100 0 0.050 0
4 0.050 0.025 0.075 0.075 0.025 4 0.100 0.050 0.075 0 0.025
5 0 0.050 0.050 0 0 5 0.050 0.025 0.025 0.050 0.025
6 0 0 0.100 0 0 6 0.075 0 0.025 0 0.075
φ0A 0.246 −0.192
φ1A −0.296 0.531
φ0B 0.556 −0.550
φ1B −0.319 0.231
IU stat 5.213, p = .198 64.553∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Notes: φij refers to incentive compatibility condition i for group Nj (see (4.6)-(4.9)).
IU stat is defined in (4.10). Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Table 4.25: Profile Frequencies and Test for Correlated Equilibrium, Partition (7, 3)
No communication
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 a\b 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.050 0.075 0.025 0
1 0 0 0.025 0 1 0.050 0.075 0 0
2 0.125 0.100 0.075 0.025 2 0.100 0.075 0.125 0
3 0.075 0.150 0.050 0.025 3 0.025 0.125 0.025 0
4 0.025 0.125 0.075 0 4 0.050 0.025 0.075 0.025
5 0.025 0.050 0.050 0 5 0.025 0 0 0.025
6 0 0 0 0 6 0 0.025 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
φ0A −0.021 −0.200
φ1A 0.032 0.169
φ0B −0.083 −0.233
φ1B −0.208 0.128
IU stat 0.065, p = .992 11.031∗∗, p = .018
Group communication
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 a\b 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.025 0.025 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0.150 0.150 0.025 0
2 0.025 0 0 0.050 2 0.050 0.050 0.025 0
3 0.050 0 0 0.050 3 0.150 0.025 0.025 0
4 0.175 0.025 0.075 0.150 4 0.075 0.025 0 0.025
5 0.150 0 0.025 0.075 5 0.050 0 0 0.025
6 0.100 0 0 0.050 6 0.050 0 0.025 0.025
7 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
φ0A −0.064 −0.300
φ1A 0.079 0.230
φ0B −0.550 −0.250
φ1B −0.050 0.097
IU stat 0.195, p = .966 16.564∗∗∗, p = .002
Public communication
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a\b 0 1 2 3 a\b 0 1 2 3
0 0 0.025 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0.125 0.050 0.025 0.025 1 0 0.025 0 0.025
2 0.125 0.100 0 0 2 0.125 0.025 0.075 0.025
3 0.125 0.100 0.050 0 3 0.075 0.050 0 0.025
4 0.075 0.075 0.025 0 4 0 0.125 0.075 0.025
5 0 0.025 0 0 5 0.050 0.025 0 0.025
6 0.025 0 0 0 6 0.150 0.050 0.025 0
7 0.025 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
φ0A −0.175 −0.286
φ1A 0.004 0.440
φ0B 0.425 −0.561
φ1B 0.008 0.161
IU stat 5.861, p = .195 58.619∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Notes: φij refers to incentive compatibility condition i for group Nj (see (4.6)-(4.9)).
IU stat is defined in (4.10). Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Table 4.26: Group Profile Frequencies and Test for Subcorrelated Equilibrium, Par-
tition (6, 4)
No communication
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0.025 0 0.100 0 0.100 0 0.050
1 0.025 1 0.100 1 0.075 1 0.475
2 0.150 2 0.275 2 0.375 2 0.425
3 0.275 3 0.450 3 0.250 3 0.050
4 0.250 4 0.075 4 0.150 4 0
5 0.200 5 0.050
6 0.075 6 0
φ0A 0.419 −0.206
φ1A −0.496 0.098
φ0B 0.253 −0.120
φ1B −0.466 0.136
IU stat 11.656∗∗, p = .013 21.234∗∗∗, p = .000
Group communication
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0 0 0.525 0 0.125 0 0.250
1 0 1 0 1 0.100 1 0.375
2 0 2 0.100 2 0.225 2 0.150
3 0.025 3 0 3 0.175 3 0.050
4 0.100 4 0.375 4 0.100 4 0.175
5 0.475 5 0.225
6 0.400 6 0.050
φ0A −0.039 −0.221
φ1A 0.002 0.291
φ0B −0.569 −0.317
φ1B 0.191 0.200
IU stat 3.432, p = .336 73.085∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Public communication
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0 0 0.250 0 0.050 0 0.350
1 0.125 1 0.250 1 0.025 1 0.225
2 0.275 2 0.300 2 0.075 2 0.125
3 0.150 3 0.175 3 0.250 3 0.125
4 0.250 4 0.025 4 0.250 4 0.175
5 0.100 5 0.175
6 0.100 6 0.175
φ0A 0.345 −0.191
φ1A −0.122 0.445
φ0B 0.306 −0.481
φ1B −0.299 0.173
IU stat 6.791∗, p = .088 68.663∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Notes: φij refers to incentive compatibility condition i for group
Nj (see (4.6)-(4.9)). IU stat is defined in (4.10). Significance
codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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Table 4.27: Group Profile Frequencies and Test for Subcorrelated Equilibrium, Par-
tition (7, 3)
No communication
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0 0 0.250 0 0.150 0 0.300
1 0.025 1 0.425 1 0.125 1 0.400
2 0.325 2 0.275 2 0.300 2 0.250
3 0.300 3 0.050 3 0.175 3 0.050
4 0.225 4 0.175
5 0.125 5 0.050
6 0 6 0.025
7 0 7 0
φ0A −0.062 −0.258
φ1A −0.135 0.176
φ0B 0.189 −0.258
φ1B −0.120 0.131
IU stat 1.268, p = .756 21.406∗∗∗, p = .000
Group communication
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0 0 0.500 0 0.050 0 0.525
1 0 1 0.025 1 0.325 1 0.275
2 0.075 2 0.100 2 0.125 2 0.125
3 0.100 3 0.375 3 0.200 3 0.075
4 0.425 4 0.125
5 0.250 5 0.075
6 0.150 6 0.100
7 0 7 0
φ0A −0.151 −0.325
φ1A 0.044 0.255
φ0B −0.515 −0.262
φ1B 0.097 0.090
IU stat 0.662, p = .858 31.523∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Public communication
c = 0.1 c = 0.3
a γ(a) b δ(b) a γ(a) b δ(b)
0 0.025 0 0.500 0 0 0 0.400
1 0.225 1 0.375 1 0.050 1 0.300
2 0.225 2 0.100 2 0.250 2 0.175
3 0.275 3 0.025 3 0.150 3 0.125
4 0.175 4 0.225
5 0.025 5 0.100
6 0.025 6 0.225
7 0.025 7 0
φ0A 0.066 −0.323
φ1A −0.001 0.412
φ0B 0.488 −0.486
φ1B −0.152 0.192
IU stat 8.802∗∗, p = .040 64.155∗∗∗, p = 0.000
Notes: φij refers to incentive compatibility condition i for group
Nj (see (4.6)-(4.9)). IU stat is defined in (4.10). Significance
codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.01, ∗∗ < 0.05, ∗ < 0.1.
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4.A.3 Analysis of chat data
Table 4.28: Message Frequencies by Round under Group Communication
nA nB Cost Round N Message Code
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
6 4 0.1 1 191 3.14 21.99 13.09 25.13 0.00 4.19 25.13 6.28 0.52 0.52
– – – 2 188 1.60 18.62 11.70 27.66 5.85 5.32 25.00 3.19 1.06 0.00
– – – 3 199 2.51 28.64 8.54 20.60 5.03 2.01 26.13 3.52 3.02 0.00
– – – 4 159 0.00 21.38 8.18 38.36 2.52 3.14 23.27 1.26 1.89 0.00
– – – 5 176 1.14 18.75 7.39 34.66 10.23 2.27 12.50 11.36 1.70 0.00
– – – 6 165 1.21 35.15 8.48 20.61 4.24 3.64 16.36 9.70 0.00 0.61
– – – 7 161 0.00 24.84 9.94 27.33 0.62 4.35 13.04 11.80 8.07 0.00
– – – 8 166 0.00 28.92 10.84 27.11 3.61 3.01 14.46 9.04 3.01 0.00
– – – 9 204 0.98 22.55 3.92 39.71 6.37 1.96 15.69 7.84 0.49 0.49
– – – 10 206 0.49 29.61 6.31 27.18 8.74 0.97 18.45 6.80 0.97 0.49
– – 0.3 1 133 3.76 23.31 19.55 22.56 0.75 6.02 21.05 1.50 0.75 0.75
– – – 2 132 3.03 14.39 12.88 21.21 6.06 9.09 22.73 0.76 9.09 0.76
– – – 3 126 2.38 14.29 8.73 30.95 6.35 4.76 23.81 1.59 7.14 0.00
– – – 4 107 4.67 18.69 14.95 25.23 1.87 1.87 23.36 0.93 7.48 0.93
– – – 5 119 8.40 10.92 5.04 35.29 6.72 2.52 20.17 5.04 5.04 0.84
– – – 6 122 2.46 20.49 19.67 23.77 12.30 0.82 18.03 0.00 2.46 0.00
– – – 7 124 1.61 29.84 3.23 18.55 8.06 1.61 29.84 4.03 3.23 0.00
– – – 8 116 3.45 33.62 8.62 18.10 2.59 0.86 25.00 2.59 5.17 0.00
– – – 9 133 2.26 33.08 6.77 26.32 5.26 3.01 13.53 2.26 7.52 0.00
– – – 10 121 1.65 33.06 10.74 14.88 19.83 0.83 18.18 0.00 0.83 0.00
7 3 0.1 1 185 0.00 33.51 15.68 25.95 0.00 1.62 12.43 5.95 4.86 0.00
– – – 2 217 1.38 21.66 5.07 24.88 1.84 1.84 29.95 5.99 5.07 2.30
– – – 3 162 0.00 30.86 17.28 20.37 11.11 3.09 10.49 3.09 3.09 0.62
– – – 4 148 0.00 45.27 8.11 27.03 5.41 0.68 9.46 2.70 1.35 0.00
– – – 5 163 0.00 39.26 6.13 28.22 4.91 0.61 16.56 3.07 1.23 0.00
– – – 6 169 0.00 28.40 4.73 42.60 8.88 1.18 7.69 5.33 1.18 0.00
– – – 7 198 0.00 35.86 3.54 25.25 19.70 0.00 10.61 5.05 0.00 0.00
– – – 8 186 1.08 26.88 6.45 32.26 11.29 3.76 10.75 3.76 2.69 1.08
– – – 9 175 1.71 43.43 2.86 11.43 17.14 1.14 18.86 2.29 1.14 0.00
– – – 10 176 2.27 38.07 3.41 27.27 8.52 5.11 10.23 5.11 0.00 0.00
– – 0.3 1 149 3.36 16.11 10.74 36.91 0.00 6.71 20.81 2.01 3.36 0.00
– – – 2 124 1.61 13.71 8.06 28.23 3.23 4.03 26.61 3.23 10.48 0.81
– – – 3 127 1.57 18.90 3.94 32.28 2.36 3.94 23.62 12.60 0.79 0.00
– – – 4 126 0.79 13.49 7.94 26.19 3.97 4.76 26.19 11.90 4.76 0.00
– – – 5 177 5.08 22.60 2.82 23.16 7.34 1.13 23.16 10.17 4.52 0.00
– – – 6 124 0.81 24.19 2.42 30.65 19.35 1.61 17.74 0.00 3.23 0.00
– – – 7 106 0.00 20.75 2.83 31.13 10.38 0.94 18.87 6.60 8.49 0.00
– – – 8 118 0.85 22.88 4.24 31.36 6.78 1.69 26.27 1.69 4.24 0.00
– – – 9 128 0.78 23.44 4.69 23.44 17.19 0.00 22.66 4.69 3.13 0.00
– – – 10 161 1.24 29.81 4.35 37.89 7.45 0.62 13.66 3.11 1.24 0.62
Notes. Table cells contain for each message code percentages of the total number of messages in a
given round. For code category description see Table 4.13.
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Table 4.29: Message Frequencies by Round under Public Communication
nA nB Cost Round N Message Code
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
6 4 0.1 1 144 0.69 31.25 2.78 11.11 2.78 7.64 37.50 1.39 4.86 0.00
– – – 2 150 4.00 33.33 4.67 18.67 7.33 2.00 26.00 0.67 3.33 0.00
– – – 3 143 0.70 35.66 4.90 17.48 6.29 2.80 25.87 1.40 4.90 0.00
– – – 4 170 0.00 47.65 5.88 9.41 5.88 2.35 26.47 1.76 0.59 0.00
– – – 5 133 0.00 47.37 5.26 15.04 8.27 0.00 21.05 0.75 2.26 0.00
– – – 6 145 0.00 49.66 2.07 11.03 8.28 4.14 23.45 0.00 1.38 0.00
– – – 7 164 0.61 54.88 1.83 14.63 5.49 0.00 20.73 0.00 1.83 0.00
– – – 8 164 0.00 50.61 1.83 15.24 3.66 3.05 23.17 0.00 0.61 1.83
– – – 9 162 0.00 40.12 2.47 27.16 3.09 0.62 25.31 0.00 1.23 0.00
– – – 10 190 1.05 39.47 1.58 10.00 7.37 1.05 38.42 0.53 0.53 0.00
– – 0.3 1 128 0.78 28.91 6.25 32.81 1.56 2.34 25.00 1.56 0.78 0.00
– – – 2 136 0.74 22.06 9.56 22.06 12.50 0.74 27.21 4.41 0.74 0.00
– – – 3 152 0.66 21.71 5.92 36.18 6.58 3.29 21.71 3.29 0.66 0.00
– – – 4 156 0.00 26.92 3.85 34.62 7.69 1.28 21.15 1.92 2.56 0.00
– – – 5 432 1.39 11.81 0.46 17.13 2.78 0.23 64.12 1.62 0.46 0.00
– – – 6 233 0.43 17.17 4.29 30.47 7.73 1.29 35.62 3.00 0.00 0.00
– – – 7 157 0.00 31.85 7.01 24.84 5.73 1.91 22.93 3.18 2.55 0.00
– – – 8 184 0.00 46.20 7.07 15.76 5.43 2.17 19.02 2.17 2.17 0.00
– – – 9 167 0.60 55.09 2.99 11.98 7.78 0.00 16.77 2.99 1.80 0.00
– – – 10 188 0.00 45.21 4.79 15.96 5.32 1.06 20.74 4.26 2.66 0.00
7 3 0.1 1 116 3.45 34.48 6.90 22.41 1.72 4.31 23.28 0.86 1.72 0.86
– – – 2 128 3.91 31.25 3.13 21.88 6.25 1.56 31.25 0.78 0.00 0.00
– – – 3 134 0.00 25.37 2.24 27.61 8.96 3.73 29.85 0.00 2.24 0.00
– – – 4 167 0.60 53.89 0.60 11.38 11.98 3.59 14.37 0.00 3.59 0.00
– – – 5 168 0.00 44.64 2.98 19.05 7.14 2.38 23.21 0.00 0.60 0.00
– – – 6 170 0.59 34.12 1.76 21.76 19.41 2.35 17.06 0.00 2.94 0.00
– – – 7 168 0.00 37.50 1.79 20.24 13.10 2.98 20.83 1.19 1.79 0.60
– – – 8 212 0.47 41.98 1.89 13.21 5.66 0.94 33.49 1.42 0.94 0.00
– – – 9 172 0.00 58.72 0.58 15.12 6.98 1.16 14.53 0.00 2.91 0.00
– – – 10 179 0.56 63.13 1.12 12.29 8.38 1.68 12.85 0.00 0.00 0.00
– – 0.3 1 161 0.00 36.65 8.07 24.22 0.00 5.59 18.01 3.73 1.86 1.86
– – – 2 150 0.67 42.00 6.00 25.33 2.00 2.00 17.33 3.33 0.67 0.67
– – – 3 145 1.38 42.76 4.14 23.45 5.52 2.07 17.93 1.38 1.38 0.00
– – – 4 126 0.00 38.10 4.76 25.40 8.73 0.79 22.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
– – – 5 167 0.60 35.93 2.99 27.54 10.78 0.00 19.16 2.40 0.60 0.00
– – – 6 141 5.67 46.81 2.84 19.15 6.38 0.71 17.02 0.71 0.71 0.00
– – – 7 155 1.29 30.32 5.81 25.16 9.68 3.87 13.55 7.10 1.94 1.29
– – – 8 170 1.76 45.29 1.18 14.12 10.00 4.71 12.94 5.88 1.76 2.35
– – – 9 164 0.00 46.95 2.44 14.02 10.98 1.83 16.46 3.66 3.05 0.61
– – – 10 147 0.00 59.18 1.36 21.09 4.08 1.36 10.20 0.00 2.72 0.00
Notes. Table cells contain for each message code percentages of the total number of messages in a
given round. For code category description see Table 4.13.
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Table 4.30: Effects of the Number of Messages in Each Category on Total Turnout
Rate
nA nB Cost Chat N Message Code
mode 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(Disagr.) (Junk) (Agr.) (Rules) (Hist.) (Q?) (Strat.) (Vote) (Abst.) (Amb.)
6 4 0.1 GC 40 −0.047∗ 0.004 0.006 0.003 −0.001 0.055∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.012 0.003 0.067
(.018) (.004) (.011) (.003) (.011) (.013) (.006) (.010) (.008) (.069)
[.013] [.305] [.581] [.375] [.947] [.000] [.046] [.207] [.752] [.335]
– – – PC – 0.079 0.001 0.059∗∗ −0.014 −0.033∗ 0.002 −0.005 0.014 −0.067∗∗∗ 0.021
(.053) (.002) (.020) (.009) (.014) (.024) (.004) (.033) (.017) (.028)
[.143] [.596] [.005] [.130] [.023] [.936] [.260] [.674] [.000] [.455]
– – 0.3 GC – 0.008 −0.006 0.036∗∗∗ −0.001 0.010 −0.005 0.025∗∗∗ 0.062∗ −0.017 −0.165
(.025) (.007) (.007) (.009) (.012) (.025) (.007) (.027) (.021) (.109)
[.744] [.366] [.000] [.951] [.431] [.838] [.001] [.026] [.401] [.137]
– – – PC – 0.038 0.005∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.001 0.012 −0.010 −0.001 0.046∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ 0.000
(.049) (.002) (.013) (.004) (.012) (.025) (.001) (.015) (.021) (–)a
[.440] [.025] [.001] [.797] [.312] [.701] [.471] [.005] [.000] [–]a
7 3 0.1 GC – 0.038 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.012∗ 0.014 −0.001 0.036∗∗ −0.019 0.011
(.033) (.003) (.008) (.003) (.005) (.013) (.003) (.011) (.017) (.037)
[.257] [.415] [.401] [.102] [.026] [.270] [.844] [.002] [.263] [.769]
– – – PC – 0.033 0.003 0.017 0.006 0.000 0.044∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.051∗ -0.045 0.251∗∗∗
(.036) (.002) (.027) (.004) (.005) (.019) (.002) (.022) (.023) (.042)
[.374] [.195] [.521] [.198] [.959] [.023] [.004] [.026] [.063] [.000]
– – 0.3 GC – −0.037 0.017∗∗ 0.058∗∗ −0.004 0.007 −0.012 −0.000 0.034∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.085
(.029) (.005) (.017) (.004) (.007) (.020) (.007) (.008) (.008) (.083)
[.218] [.002] [.002] [.350] [.287] [.540] [.992] [.000] [.233] [.313]
– – – PC – −0.017∗ 0.002 0.021 0.007∗ 0.010 0.004 −0.003 0.009 −0.059∗∗ 0.117∗∗
(.008) (.002) (.012) (.003) (.008) (.015) (.005) (.015) (.021) (.043)
[.041] [.370] [.096] [.044] [.242] [.808] [.613] [.546] [.007] [.009]
Notes. Table cells contain for each message code OLS estimates of the effects of the total number of messages per electorate in
that code category on total turnout rate in a given treatment. For detailed message code description see Table 4.13. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are computed using N electorate-round level observations. Corresponding p-values are in brackets.
Significance codes: ∗∗∗ < 0.001, ∗∗ < 0.01, ∗ < 0.05.
a for this treatment, there were no messages in the respective code category, so no variance can be estimated.
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4.B Appendix: Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research experiment on group decision
making. During the experiment we require your complete, undistracted attention. So
we ask that you follow instructions carefully. Please do not open other applications
on your computer, chat with other students, read books, or do homework. Also make
sure to turn off your cell phone.
For your participation, you will be paid in cash, at the end of the experiment. Differ-
ent participants may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your
decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on chance. So it is important
that you listen carefully and fully understand the instructions before we begin. There
will be a short comprehension quiz after the upcoming practice session, which you
all need to pass before we can begin the paid matches.
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction
among you will take place through the computers. It is important that you not talk
or in any way try to communicate with other participants during the experiments,
except according to the rules described in these instructions. We will start with a
brief instruction period. During the instruction period, you will be given a complete
description of the experiment and will be shown how to use the computers. If you
have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and your question
will be answered out loud so everyone can hear. If any difficulties arise after the
experiment has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist
you privately.
This experiment consists of two different parts. The instructions for part 2 will be
delivered after part 1 is completed. At the end of the experiment you will be paid
the sum of what you have earned in both parts, plus the show-up fee of $7. Everyone
will be paid in private, and you are under no obligation to tell others how much you
earned.
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[Turn on the projector and start the multistage server]
Here are the instructions for part 1. Part 1 consists of several matches. Your earnings
in part 1 will be determined as follows: the computer will randomly select two
matches from part 1, and you will be paid what you earned in those two matches.
All matches are equally likely to be chosen as the paid matches. Your earnings during
the experiment are denominated in points. Your US dollar earnings are determined
by multiplying your earnings from the paid matches in points by a conversion rate.
In this experiment, the conversion rate is 0.07, meaning that 100 points is worth $7.
Please click on the Client Multistage icon. This window will appear (SHOW SCREEN
2 [client information].) Enter your computer name (e.g., SSEL01) in the box that
appears and then click Submit. You will then see this screen. (SHOW SCREEN 3
[initializing].)
Please turn your attention to the screen at the front of the room. We will demonstrate
how the matches are played. Please do not begin unless we tell you to do so. Please
have your attention focused on the stage during this demonstration period.
Once everyone has logged in, you will be randomly assigned to one of two types:
type A or type B. You will see this screen (SHOW SCREEN 4 [user interface, either
with or without chat, depending on treatment].)
At the top of the screen is your player id number. This is your id within your type.
Once the first practice match starts, you will be randomly assigned a type label (A
or B) and an id within this type. You will have the same type label, but your player
id may change from match to match. Below the screen informs you which type you
are in and how many members there are of each type. As you can see, type A has 6
(reverseSequence: 7) members and type B has 4 (reverseSequence: 3) members.
[start here for COMMUNICATION treatments]
Next on the screen is a time counter showing how many seconds you are allowed to
chat with the other [(GC): players of your type /(PC): players] before making your
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choice. All matches will have two stages. At the first stage you can use the chat
feature to communicate with other [(GC): players of your type /(PC): players] about
the decision making problem. Each message you send or receive in this chat stage
is visible to all players of [(GC): your type, but not to players of the other type.
/(PC): both types]. At the second stage, everyone will be asked to independently
choose between two options, as will be described shortly. Messages sent by you are
displayed in red and have ‘[you]’ at the identifying string. Messages sent by other
players are displayed in black. All messages include the sender’s player id and type
label. During the communication stage we require you to be courteous and polite
to other participants, and also preserve the anonymity of interaction. That is, you
are not allowed to communicate any personal information that might identify you to
other participants. Once the time counter reaches zero, the communication stage is
over, and you will see this screen (SHOW SCREEN 5 [user interface when chat is
over, GC or PC].)
[start here for CONTROL CASE (NO COMMUNICATION); continue here for other
treatments]
Next on the screen is a table, describing how your earnings depend on your choice of
either X or Y and on which type has the most members choosing X. The display in
front of the room shows you what the screen looks like for a player of type A. You will
choose either X or Y by highlighting the corresponding row label and clicking with
your mouse. (SHOW SCREEN 5x and 5y and 6 [showing highlighting], use screens
with chat for communication treatments.) After you and the other participants have
all made your choices of X or Y in a match the screen will change to highlight the row
corresponding to your own choice, and the column of the type which had the greatest
number of players choosing X (SHOW screen for completed match). Your earnings
from each match are computed in the following way. It is very important that you
understand this, so please listen carefully. Suppose you choose X. If your type has
more players choosing X than the other type, then you will earn 105 points, if both
types have the same number of players choosing X, then you will earn 55 points, and
if the other type has more players choosing X than your type, then you will earn 5
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points. Alternatively, suppose you choose Y. If your type has more players choosing
X than the other type, then you will earn 115 (high-cost: 135) points, if both types
have the same number of players choosing X, then you will earn 65 (high-cost: 85)
points, and if the other type has more players choosing X than your type, then you
will earn 15 (high-cost: 35) points Here is an example: suppose that one player of
type A chose X and two players of type B chose X. Then the B type has more players
choosing X than the A type. Each player of type A who chose X earns 5 points; each
player of type A who chose Y earns ten (high-cost: thirty) additional points making
it 15 (high-cost: 35) points; the players of type B who chose X earn 105 points, and
each player of type B who chose Y earns ten (high-cost: thirty) additional points
making it 115 (high-cost: 135) points. The bottom of the screen contains a history
panel. During the experiment, this panel will be updated to reflect the history of
your past matches. For each match you can see the match number, your type in that
match, your choice, your earnings from that match if it is chosen to be a paid match
by the computer, and the number of each type choosing X. Your type will remain the
same for all matches. However, the actual membership in your type will be randomly
reshuffled after each match. Here is how the matching works (SHOW MATCHING
SLIDE). There are 20 people in this room. First, we randomly divide you into two
types, A and B. Next, we randomly pick 6 (reverseSequence: 7) people of type A,
4 (reverseSequence: 3) people of type B, randomly assign ids within each type and
put them together in one group. Then we pick 6 (reverseSequence: 7) remaining
people of type A, 4 (reverseSequence: 3) people of type B, randomly assign ids and
put them together in the second group. Next match, we repeat the same process
again. Thus, you will remain the same type, but your player id as well as the other
players of your type in your group will change from match to match. If you have any
questions at this time, please raise your hand and ask your question so that everyone
in the room may hear it.
PRACTICE [BRING UP PAYMENT SCREEN FOR PRACTICE SESSION]
We will now give you a chance to get used to the computers with a short practice
session. Please take your time, and do not press any keys or use your mouse until
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instructed to do so. You will NOT be paid for this session; it is just to allow you to
get familiar with the experiment and your computers. Please pull out your dividers.
[start practice]
[NO COMMUNICATION] Everyone please choose X. Once everyone has made their
selection, the results from this first practice match are displayed on your screen. The
outcome of the match is now highlighted. The number of players who chose X is
greater for type A, so the potential payoff from this match (if it is selected by the
computer) is 105 points for players of type A. For players of type B, the potential
payoff is 5 points, since for them it is the other type that has more players choosing
X. Remember, you are not paid for this practice match. We will now proceed to the
second practice match. Notice that you may have been assigned a new player id.
Now please everyone chose Y. Once everyone has made their selection, the results
from this second practice match are displayed on your screen. The number of players
who chose X is the same (zero) for both types, so the potential payoff from this match
(if it is selected by the computer) is 65 (high cost: 85) points for players of either
type. We have now completed the practice session, and the quiz popped up.
[COMMUNICATION] Notice that the 110-second communication stage has started.
To send a message [GC: to the other players of your type/ (PC): to other players],
click on the text field, type in your message and either press Enter or click ‘Send’.
[(GC): Remember, each message you send or receive in this chat is visible to all
players of your type, but not to the players of the other type. / (PC): Remem-
ber, each message you send or receive in this chat is visible to all players of both
types.] During the communication stage we require you to be courteous and polite
to other participants, and also preserve the anonymity of interaction. That is, you
are not allowed to communicate any personal information that might identify you
to other participants. After the communication stage is over, please wait for further
instructions, and don’t click anywhere.
[Wait for the subjects to chat]
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Now that the communication stage is over, please everyone choose X. Once everyone
has made their selection, the outcome of the match is highlighted. The number of
players who chose X is greater for type A, so the potential payoff from this match
(if selected by the computer) is 105 points for players of type A. For players of type
B, the potential payoff is 5 points, since for them it is the other type that has more
players choosing X. Remember, you are not paid for this practice match. We will
now proceed to the second practice match. Notice that you may have been assigned
a new player id. This time a 60-second communication stage has started, so that we
can move on to the paid matches quicker. After the communication stage is over,
please wait for further instructions.
[Wait for the subjects to chat]
Now please everyone chose Y. Once everyone has made their selection, the results
from this second practice match are displayed on your screen. The number of players
who chose X is the same (zero) for both types, so the potential payoff from this match
(if it is selected by the computer) is 65 (high cost: 85) points for players of either
type. We have now completed the practice session, and the quiz popped up.
[QUIZ] Please read each question carefully and check the correct answer. Once
everyone has answered the questions correctly, you may all go on to the second stage
of the quiz. After successfully completing the second round of questions, we will
commence with the first paid session. If you have questions during the quiz, please
raise your hand. [END QUIZ]
The next remaining matches in Part 1 will follow the same rules as the practice
session. Let me summarize those rules before we start. Please listen carefully. In each
match, 6 (reverseSequence: 7) players are assigned to type A, and 4 (reverseSequence:
3) players are assigned to type B. You may choose X or Y. As you can see on the
table of this screen, if you choose X, your payoff will be 105 points if your type has
more players choosing X than the other type, 5 points if your type has fewer players
choosing X, and 55 points if both types have the same number of members choosing
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X. If you choose Y, your match payoff will be 115 (high-cost: 135) points if your type
has more players choosing X than the other type, 15 (high-cost: 35) points if your
type has fewer players choosing X than the other type, and 65 (high-cost: 85) points,
if both types have the same number of players choosing X. Computer will randomly
select two matches from part 1, and in part 1 you will be paid what you earned in
those two matches. All matches are equally likely to be chosen as paid matches. Are
there any questions before we begin the paid matches? [Answer questions.]
[BRING UP PAYMENT SCREEN FOR part 1]
Please begin. (Play matches 1–10.) Part 1 is now over.
[SESSION 2] Here are the instructions for part 2 of the experiment.
[BRING UP PAYMENT SCREEN FOR SESSION 2]
The second part will be slightly different from the first part. Let me summarize
those rules before we start. Please listen carefully. There will be a series of matches
in this part. In each match, 7 (reverseSequence: 6) players will be assigned to type
A, and 3 (reverseSequence: 4) players will be assigned to type B. In the first match
your type label will be assigned as follows. [SHOW MATCHING SCREEN] If you
were of type B during part 1, you will now be assigned to type A for all matches.
If you were of type A during part 1, in each match there is an equal chance that
you either remain assigned to type A, or will be assigned to type B. So if you were
of type A during part 1, each match now you may have a different type label and
player id. If you were in type B during part 1, your type label will remain the same
for all matches in part 2. As before, the actual membership in your type will be
randomly reshuffled after each match, so the other members of your type will change
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from match to match, as well as your player id even if your keep the same type. In
any case, there is always information at the top of the screen telling you your player
id and which type you are. Your earnings in part 2 will be determined similarly as
before. The computer will randomly select two matches from part 2, and you will
be paid what you earned in those two matches. All matches are equally likely to be
chosen as paid matches. Your total earnings from the experiment will be the sum of
your earnings from both parts, plus the show-up fee. Are there any questions before
we begin the second paid session? Please begin. (Play matches 1–10.) Part 2 is now
over. The experiment is now completed. Thank you all very much for participating
in this experiment. Please record your total payoff in U. S. dollars at the experiment
record sheet. Please add your show-up fee of $7 and write down the total, rounded
up to the nearest dollar. After you are done with this, please remain seated. You
will be paid in the office at the back of the room one at a time. Please bring all
your things with you when you go to the back office. You can leave the experiment
through the back door of the office. Please refrain from discussing this experiment
while you are waiting to receive payment so that privacy regarding individual choices
and payoffs may be maintained.
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